ISWAP sends 100 fighters to Mali — the Sahel and Nigeria form a single jihadist theater in 2026

In Ménaka, in eastern Mali, the jihadist front is no longer measured solely by visible attacks on a map. According to information gathered by the Institute for Security Studies from defectors and still-active fighters, the Islamic State in West Africa, or ISWAP, has reportedly decided to send about 100 men to reinforce the Islamic State Province in the Sahel, the ISSP. Another fifty would have been directed towards Nasarawa State, in central Nigeria. This movement should be taken seriously, even if its numbers and timeline remain to be confirmed.

On the ground, this means that a fighter can leave the islands of Lake Chad, cross northwestern Nigeria, and reach the areas of Ménaka without encountering a regional architecture capable of tracking his movements. Borders exist for administrations. They exist much less for an organization that thinks in corridors, relays, and sanctuaries.

From Ménaka to Nasarawa a maneuver in two directions

ISSP primarily operates in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger area. Ménaka is an important pressure point, located several hundred kilometers from the Lake Chad bases but connected to them by smuggling networks, paths, and mobile communities. The group has reportedly suffered setbacks when Malian forces attempted to retake certain positions. The reinforcements announced by ISWAP therefore resemble less a classic conquest than a survival and projection operation.

The second axis, towards Nasarawa, is even more concerning for Abuja. This is not the traditional theater of Boko Haram and ISWAP, in Borno or around Lake Chad. It is an area of central Nigeria where a sleeper cell can take advantage of trade routes, forests, and the weak coordination between services. The Institute for Security Studies is already reporting movements of fighters linked to the ISSP towards Sokoto and Kebbi from southern Niger. Recent clashes around a forward base in Maiyama show that northwestern Nigeria is no longer a secure strategic depth.

Military pressure disperses fighters

It would be tempting to read this redeployment as evidence of a victorious ISWAP. That would be a mistake. The American and Nigerian strikes in May killed commander Bukar Mainok and, according to sources cited by the ISS, about 200 fighters. Under pressure, the organization is increasing taxes imposed on livestock and fishing, lowering the minimum recruitment age, and seeking specialized instructors. It has also reportedly relaxed movement restrictions to its island strongholds.

This logic is known on the ground. An organization that loses men does not necessarily disappear. It reduces its concentrations, sends small cores to new areas, and transforms mobility into a lifeline. For Nigerian forces, the problem is therefore not just to retake a base. It is to prevent a group driven from Lake Chad from reappearing in Kebbi, Sokoto, or Nasarawa with new informants and recovered weapons.

A war without operational borders

The signals coming from Mali and Burkina Faso go in the same direction. JNIM has claimed attacks against volunteer positions and a military headquarters in Diapaga, while available information indicates a gradual resumption of Malian operations around Kidal. These events do not prove an alliance between JNIM and the Islamic State. The two organizations remain competitors and sometimes fight each other. However, they show that national forces are forced to respond simultaneously to multiple threats, along axes they cannot monitor together.

The figures from ACLED cited by The Guardian illustrate the problem. Violence involving jihadist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger rose from 63 events in 2016 to 2,845 in 2025. More than 2,100 events had already been recorded in 2026 at the time of this analysis. Behind this progression lies a simple tactical reality: groups do not necessarily hold a border; they temporarily control roads, markets, wells, and human relays.

The failure of coordination becomes a multiplier

Lake Chad and the Sahel have different security structures. The Multinational Joint Task Force looks towards the lake basin, the Sahel States Alliance prioritizes its own mechanisms, and ECOWAS is trying to rebuild a counter-terrorism force. Between these frameworks, intelligence flows poorly. The ISS notes that there are few, if any, formal channels between the mechanisms of Lake Chad and those of the Sahel.

The decision to send fighters to Ménaka exploits exactly this seam. The juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey have their political reasons for reducing cooperation with neighbors and Western partners. But a column leaving Lake Chad does not ask for permission from the capitals. It takes advantage of the gap between administrative maps and the real geography of trafficking.

The crucial point is not whether ISWAP already has an army in Mali. It is whether states can detect the movement of a small group before it becomes a garrison.

The next test will be Nigerian depth

In the short term, the most serious risk is not a spectacular offensive on a large city. It is the slow establishment of cells, funded by extortion, protected by local complicities, and activated against isolated posts. An attack in Maiyama, an ambush on a supply route, or an attempt against a market may hold more value for ISWAP than a battle lost in advance around a capital.

The situation remains partially uncertain: information on transfers comes from human sources and not from a common official tally. But uncertainty should not serve as an excuse for inaction. If Abuja, Niamey, and Bamako continue to treat Lake Chad, northwestern Nigeria, and Ménaka as three separate files, the jihadists will have already won the battle of mobility.

Sources

• Institute for Security Studies, Fragmented security allows terrorists cross-mobility across Lake Chad and Sahel
• ACLED, Conflict in the Sahel
• The Guardian, Al-Qaida and IS-linked violence in Africa’s Sahel belt
• Sahel Liveuamap, tracking regional incidents