Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean Navy Resume Search and Rescue Training After 9 Years, Filling Gaps in Japan-U.S.-South Korea Missile Defense

In a photo taken in front of the South Korean honor guard at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and South Korean Defense Minister An Kyung-duk stand side by side. This is not a flashy weapons announcement. However, what caught my attention was the joint search and rescue training that was resumed just before their meeting, involving the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean Navy. According to NHK WORLD, this training has not taken place for about nine years, and both ministers highly praised it during their meeting on June 28.

Practical Items Discussed in the One-Hour Meeting

This meeting marked the first visit to South Korea for Minister Koizumi since taking office, and UPI reported that it is the first time a Japanese defense minister has visited South Korea primarily for bilateral discussions since 2015. The two ministers agreed on the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the continuation of Japan-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation, and the regularization of mutual visits between defense authorities. Additionally, topics included maritime search and rescue, exchanges between the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the South Korean Air Force's aerobatic teams, and cooperation in advanced scientific and technological fields, including AI.

As reported by the English version of the Mainichi Shimbun, it was also confirmed that discussions to advance equipment and technology cooperation would take place. This is not merely a friendly atmosphere. As North Korea continues its nuclear and missile development and deepens military cooperation with Russia, Japan-South Korea defense cooperation is shifting from a "politically desirable" stage to a "operationally necessary" stage.

Search and Rescue is Low Intensity but Not Low Value

From the perspective of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, search and rescue training is the least politically resistant entry point. Searching for missing persons, communication procedures, reporting positions of helicopters and vessels, and transferring command at the scene are all easily explained as humanitarian training. However, they are also the fundamental grammar of maritime operations.

• The main concern for Japan is the protection of SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea.
• For South Korea, dealing with North Korean submarines, missile launches, and debris in the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan is a practical challenge.
• For the United States, the stability of the rear support lines connecting Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Busan is a prerequisite for the operation of the Seventh Fleet.

In other words, while search and rescue may be a small door, behind it lie issues of communication compatibility, common situational maps, aircraft control, encrypted communication, and legal authority. Discussing ballistic missile defense or anti-submarine warfare without addressing these issues is putting the cart before the horse.

Time Lag in Response to North Korean Missiles

Japan, the U.S., and South Korea have already established a system for the immediate sharing of North Korean missile information. However, the flow of information and the ability of forces to act at the same speed after political decisions are separate issues. When North Korea combines short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and special forces infiltrations, decisions at sea require judgments in minutes.

During the Cold War, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force invested heavily in anti-submarine cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The difference today is that the adversaries are not just the Soviet Pacific Fleet, but also the activities of North Korea, China, and Russia. As long as the relationship with the South Korean Navy remains unstable, a kind of information delay zone will emerge in the northern half of the Sea of Japan. This cannot be filled by equipment performance alone.

Not a Historical Issue, but a Continuity of Operations Issue

Japan-South Korea defense cooperation is prone to being halted by domestic political winds. Conflicts over radar illumination issues, export controls, and historical recognition have not completely disappeared. Therefore, we should not overestimate the significance of this meeting. A single visit will not immediately fill the nine-year gap.

In my view, the significance of this meeting lies not in "reconciliation" but in whether a system can be created to ensure that training does not get interrupted.

While AI and equipment technology cooperation are eye-catching, the areas where results will first be questioned are likely to be more mundane. Annual plans for joint training, the permanent presence of liaison officers, communication procedures for vessels and aircraft, and delineation of responsibilities in the event of an accident. If these are not documented, they will stop again with the next political friction.

The True Utility for the Japan-U.S. Alliance

We are no longer in an era where Japan can respond alone to North Korea's missile and maritime threats. As the U.S. responds to multiple fronts in the Indo-Pacific, it is essential for Japan and South Korea to autonomously maintain at least minimal maritime cooperation, which reduces the burden on U.S. forces. At the same time, it demonstrates a connection in the northern part of the first island chain against China.

However, it is important to note that if Japan-South Korea cooperation is overly emphasized in terms of encircling China, it may provoke political backlash within South Korea. I believe that starting with practical matters such as maritime search and rescue, disaster response, and North Korean missile countermeasures will ultimately strengthen the alliance as a whole.

The real challenge is not the performance of missile detection radars. It is whether Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington can look at the same maritime map and make decisions at the same speed after detection. The search and rescue training, resumed after nine years, has become a small litmus test for this.