JNIM and the Islamic State Gain Ground in the Nigeria-Niger-Benin Triangle — 504 Deaths in 2026

In Kaiama, in Kwara State, the forest is no longer just a refuge for bandits and traffickers. It is becoming a theater of jihadist operations. Networks associated with the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) have claimed attacks near the Beninese border, while the Islamic State Province in the Sahel (EIS) has claimed actions in Kebbi and Sokoto. In 2026, Sahelian militant groups are linked to 504 deaths in northwestern Nigeria, compared to 136 in 2025 and no recorded casualties in the comparable period of 2024, according to data from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported by Africa Eye.

It is important to be precise. These figures do not describe a unified jihadist army advancing southward. They rather signal the convergence of three phenomena: the establishment of cells linked to JNIM and EIS, the persistence of Ansaru in northwestern Nigeria, and the criminal economy of kidnappings. On the ground, alliances change depending on the village, the road, and the expected profit. Speaking of a single command would be to move faster than the available intelligence.

A Border That Is Not a Line

The Nigeria-Niger-Benin triangle is difficult to control because it is not a border in the classical military sense. Around Lake Kainji and Kainji Lake National Park, forests, nature reserves, and poorly administered rural areas provide routes for movement and hiding places. The same paths are used by herders, local markets, and informal trade. A sudden closure of these routes can therefore produce a paradoxical effect: it hinders the locals before it hinders the fighters, who already have clandestine circuits.

The strategic depth of this area is now energy-related. The Niger-Benin export pipeline runs for about 1,980 kilometers, from Nigerien oil fields to the Sèmè-Kpodji terminal on the Beninese coast. Sections located in the Nigerien regions of Dosso and Tahoua have already been targeted by EIS. This is no longer a theoretical vulnerability. Each attack on a pipeline, a convoy, or a maintenance team provides armed groups with an economic and political leverage greater than the tactical value of the explosion itself.

Abuja Responds, but the Map Expands

After the deadly attack in Woro, Kwara State, Abuja has reinforced its deployments and launched Operation Savannah Shield in Kwara and part of Niger State. In August, authorities announced the release of 308 people held in the forests of Kainji Lake Park: 163 kidnapped in Woro and 145 from Niger State. The army is also set to increase from eight to twelve divisions, with an additional 28,000 recruits and a new division in Ilorin.

These decisions add more mass to the response. They do not resolve the central problem: forces must monitor an operational border that crosses forests, pastoral paths, and markets, without cutting off legitimate flows. An additional division can hold posts. It does not replace a local human network, a permanent link with Benin and Niger, or intelligence capabilities capable of tracking a group that blends into a community before reappearing twenty kilometers away.

The Borno Front Reminds of the Threat in the East

The pressure does not come solely from the western corridor. On September 7, in Pulka, in the Gwoza local government area, troops from Operation Hadin Kai repelled an attack attributed to EISWAP against a military position. The Nigerian army claims that air support provided intelligence, struck fleeing elements, and allowed the position to be held. One soldier was injured in the arm. The statement does not provide a confirmed toll for the attackers; thus, it is necessary to distinguish the announced defensive success from the actual scale of jihadist losses.

Pulka and Kaiama do not constitute a single front. However, they reveal the same weakness: the Nigerian state must simultaneously defend the Lake Chad basin, the forests of the center-west, and infrastructure that connects a landlocked country to the coast. Armed groups, on the other hand, choose the least monitored axis. Their advantage does not lie in the lasting conquest of a city, but in the ability to shift violence and tax roads, kidnappings, and exchanges.

The Risk for Benin and Niger

The regional paradox is visible in the statistics. The Africa Center reports a 78% decrease in deaths related to Islamist violence in Benin and Togo during the studied period, while activity associated with Sahelian groups increases in certain Nigerian areas. A lull in one country does not mean that the network is destroyed. It may mean that the pressure has shifted to an area where surveillance, cooperation, and administrative presence are weaker.

For Cotonou, Niamey, and Abuja, the operational priority is not to proclaim a new coalition. It is to share intelligence on forest corridors, identify intermediaries linking jihadists and criminals, and protect pipeline teams without turning every border village into a no-go zone. Coastal states still have a window to act. But it closes with each kidnapping that finances a cell and with each raid that proves that a border remains just a line on the map.

Sources: Africa Eye, September 24, 2026; Vanguard, report from the command of Operation Hadin Kai.