Key Resources Depend on Imports, Forging Capability Severely Insufficient, New Report Reveals U.S. Military Weapons Supply Chain Crisis

[Global Times Special Correspondent Chen Yang] In recent years, the U.S. military has frequently encountered difficulties such as the slow production of new equipment and inadequate replenishment of ammunition. The U.S. website "Power" reported on November 2 that the latest report indicates that behind these difficulties lies a crisis involving the overall equipment supply chain of the U.S. military. The causes of the crisis include not only the interruptions in the supply of key resources frequently hyped by U.S. media but also the long-standing structural problems within the U.S. defense industry.

An F-35 stealth fighter requires 900 pounds of rare earth elements

When mentioning the supply chain crisis of the U.S. military, the first issue that comes to mind is the supply of strategic resources such as rare earths. The "Power" website reported that the "Special Competitive Studies Project," a think tank founded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, recently released a report quantifying the overall situation of the U.S. defense industrial base's supply chain. The report utilized artificial intelligence intelligence from the supply chain technology company Exiger to assess how many unique components of the U.S. military, identified by National Item Identification Number (NIIN), contain key minerals such as antimony, gallium, germanium, and tungsten, which have high external dependencies. "After assessing nearly 9 million components and 3,000 U.S. military weapon systems, the company identified over 28,000 unique components containing these four key elements across 1,400 weapon systems."

The report states that the U.S. military weapon system with the highest risk of supply chain interruption is the Virginia-class attack submarine, which is the only attack submarine currently in production for the U.S. Navy. There are currently over 20 in service, accounting for about half of the total procurement quantity, while the other half is still under construction or awaiting commencement. This submarine requires over 300 core components containing the aforementioned four key minerals, including 190 components containing germanium. Germanium is primarily used in night vision systems, optoelectronic/infrared devices, etc. The report states that "China controls about 68% of the world's refined germanium," while most of the germanium products in the U.S. need to be imported. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) shows that the annual demand for refined germanium in the U.S. remains around 30 tons. In January of this year, the Pentagon announced an investment of $18 million in the only germanium production facility located in St. George, Utah, to expand refined capacity sevenfold to over 20 tons per year, but did not disclose a specific timeline for achieving this.

The report states that compared to germanium, for which the U.S. has some strategic reserves and production capacity, the U.S. is even more dependent on imported gallium. Gallium is primarily used in semiconductors, solar cells, and advanced radar. "China controls up to 99% of gallium production, and each Virginia-class attack submarine requires 50 unique components containing gallium." The report also mentions that "China controls about half of the antimony production—antimony is used to harden ammunition and manufacture optical and electronic devices; China also controls 80% of tungsten supply—tungsten is used to manufacture tools, warheads, and heat-resistant components." The stable supply of these strategic mineral resources is crucial for the production of advanced equipment for the U.S. military.

This does not even account for the U.S. military's dependence on more critical rare earth resources. The Pentagon report states that each Virginia-class attack submarine requires 9,200 pounds of rare earth elements, while an F-35 stealth fighter requires 900 pounds.

Over 241 foundries have closed or consolidated in 20 years

However, compared to the U.S. military's dependence on these key mineral resources, the structural problems within the U.S. defense industry are the main focus revealed by this report. The report states that a recent war game simulation found that if a large-scale conflict were to break out, insufficient casting and forging capacity would prevent the U.S. military from quickly replenishing lost vessels, aircraft, and ammunition. U.S. National Defense magazine reported in January 2025 that over 241 foundries in the U.S. have closed or consolidated in the past 20 years. Although the Pentagon launched a $2 billion plan in 2024 aimed at revitalizing the industry, the effects have not been significant.

The report found that there are 1,700 safety-critical components in the U.S. military supply chain that require casting, forging, or extrusion processes, and the limited metal casting, forging, and extrusion capacity in the U.S. is causing significant delays in the production schedule of U.S. military weapons. The report states that China accounts for about half of the global casting output and "is often the only option for large castings." The Virginia-class attack submarine is already burdened by its dependence on critical strategic resources, with the overall construction schedule lagging three years behind the planned timeline, "partly due to the lack of domestic large casting capacity."

Compared to U.S. Navy vessels, U.S. military aircraft, including main battle fighters, are more susceptible to the risks posed by the supply chain for casting and forging parts. The report shows that the top 10 U.S. military weapon systems with the highest demand for metal castings are all aircraft. Among them, the F/A-18 "Hornet" series fighter jets used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, including the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, rank first in terms of reliance on steel castings, with 3,800 individual components requiring this process. Following closely is the KC-135 tanker, which involves 2,570 components.

At the same time, military aircraft also require the most cadmium-plated components among U.S. military weapons. The report explains that cadmium plating is a process that makes aerospace components corrosion-resistant. Due to factors such as the safety limits set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 2008, the domestic supplier base has shrunk. The top 10 U.S. military weapon systems with the highest demand for cadmium-plated components are all aircraft, with the KC-135 leading with 2,780 unique components, while the C-130 "Hercules" transport aircraft, B-52 "Stratofortress" bomber, and C-5 "Galaxy" transport aircraft each have over 2,000 components.

U.S. official reports have also issued similar warnings. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) explicitly listed castings and forgings as one of the eight priority areas in the Department of Defense supply chain in a report released in July 2025, warning that there is only one foundry in the U.S. capable of producing large titanium castings required for certain critical weapon systems. Particularly, the U.S. has essentially lost its large titanium casting capability, forcing new nuclear submarines to rely on foreign suppliers for a large number of titanium castings.

Single supplier poses potential risks

The report mentions another crisis in the U.S. military weapon supply chain: the potential risks of single suppliers. The report cites an example where a fire in February 2025 caused a fastener manufacturer in Jenkins Township, Pennsylvania, to shut down. This company was responsible for producing components for over 1,000 U.S. military weapon systems and was critical to 90 systems, including the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, Super Hornet fighter jet, and Abrams main battle tank. It was also the sole source supplier for equipment such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and Black Hawk helicopter. The report states that since the company will not be able to resume operations until at least 2028, the shutdown caused by the fire has "severely disrupted" the U.S. military's equipment supply chain.

The report states that similar situations are not uncommon, "highlighting the enormous risks posed by the U.S. defense industrial base's reliance on single suppliers." Internal Pentagon reports show that over 40% of the U.S. Navy's ship maintenance and repair contracts are awarded to single suppliers, making it difficult for the military to quickly find alternatives if that supplier encounters problems. There is only one factory in the U.S. that produces the iron castings required for howitzers, and one company produces the engines for Javelin anti-tank missiles. Reports indicate that this situation largely stems from the decline of U.S. manufacturing. "In the entire defense sector, the number of small suppliers in the U.S. has decreased by 43% over the past decade."

Additionally, the Pentagon's cumbersome procurement processes, compliance regulations (such as cybersecurity and export controls), and qualification certification costs have kept many U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises at bay. The report cites an example in the B-52 bomber modernization project, where two seemingly insignificant components, the wing rib airfoil and fuel vent valve, took over 400 days from production scheduling, material procurement, processing, inspection, certification, document approval to final delivery. Part of the reason is that these components must meet military specifications established by the Pentagon decades ago, many of which are now outdated, not only extending delivery times but also resulting in a very limited number of compliant suppliers.