Large-Scale Gathering of Chinese Fishing Vessels in the East China Sea: The Power Projection of Maritime Militias and Its Impact on Regional Security

From late 2025 to early 2026, an unprecedented gathering of Chinese fishing vessels was confirmed in the East China Sea. Analysis of satellite tracking data revealed that between 1,300 and 2,000 fishing boats were forming a geometric formation of long parallel lines in waters approximately 300 kilometers northeast of Taiwan. This phenomenon was observed at least twice, on December 25, 2025, and January 11, 2026, with each instance maintaining the formation for about 30 hours.

Tracking data from Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals corroborated that these fishing vessels exhibited behavior patterns clearly different from normal fishing activities. Notably, the formation was maintained under weather conditions close to strong winds. During the same period, South Korean fishing boats were returning to port due to bad weather, while the Chinese fishing fleet continued to hold its formation. Professor Chisako Masu of Kyushu University’s Faculty of International Relations pointed out, "Such a large-scale mobilization is unprecedented," and analyzed that it could be seen as pressure on Japan and Taiwan.

The scale of this phenomenon far exceeds the gathering of 200 to 300 Chinese fishing vessels that occurred around the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name: Diaoyu Islands) in 2016. Jason Wang, CEO of satellite analysis firm ingeniSPACE, stated, "Straight lines are rarely seen in nature. I sensed that something was not right," emphasizing the artificial nature of the formation. Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative testified, "I have never seen so many Chinese fishing vessels gathered outside a port."

Former Australian Navy combat officer Jennifer Parker assessed this phenomenon as "demonstrative behavior through a military lens," asserting that fishermen "have never operated at such close distances and such concentration. Whatever they were doing, it was certainly not fishing." Professor Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College described it as a "massive, precisely geographically coordinated flash mob," pointing to the possibilities of signaling, mobilization training, or actual combat training.

The large-scale deployment of these maritime militia must be understood as a crucial component of China's strategy for unification with Taiwan. Thomas Shugart, a former U.S. Navy officer, pointed out that the People’s Liberation Army lacks dedicated landing ships, and in operations against Taiwan, civilian vessels, particularly fishing boats, play an "absolutely central" role. The Chinese maritime militia is formally organized as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and is trained, equipped, and organized by the local command of the People’s Liberation Army. They operate under a military command structure while maintaining their professions as civilians engaged in fishing and maritime industries.

According to a 2024 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the maritime militia could be used to implement a maritime blockade or isolation measures against Taiwan. By diverting all commercial maritime traffic away from Taiwan, it could deliver a severe blow to Taiwan's trade-dependent economy. Furthermore, by using law enforcement vessels and civilian ships, China gains options to enforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea in ways that are less significant than if the Navy or Coast Guard were involved.

The deployment of this maritime militia has broader regional implications in the context of the ongoing 2025-2026 Japan-China diplomatic crisis. On November 7, 2025, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in a parliamentary discussion that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a "crisis situation for Japan's existence" under the 2015 peace and security legislation. This is a legal prerequisite for Japan to exercise collective self-defense, even if Japan is not directly attacked.

In response to Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks, Xue Jian, the Consul General of China’s Osaka Consulate, posted a threatening comment on X (formerly Twitter), stating, "We have no choice but to cut off the dirty head that has lunged at us without a moment's hesitation. Are you ready?" This post was deleted after protests from the Japanese government but significantly heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that China would lodge complaints against Japan, which needs to reflect on its historical crimes and stop interfering in China's internal affairs.

China has implemented multi-layered retaliatory measures against Japan. On November 15, the China Maritime Safety Administration announced that the People’s Liberation Army would conduct live-fire exercises in the central Yellow Sea from November 17 to 19, prohibiting navigation during this period. From December 6 to 7, the aircraft carrier Liaoning passed through the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako Islands, conducting takeoff and landing training for Shenyang J-15 fighter jets. The Japanese Defense Minister condemned two incidents on December 6 in which J-15 fighter jets launched from the Liaoning illuminated the fire control radar of Japanese F-15 fighter jets near the Miyako Strait.

In economic and cultural terms, on November 14, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a recommendation for Chinese citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan. China is the largest source of tourists to Japan, and this measure has had a significant impact on the Japanese economy. In November 2025, the number of tourists from China to Japan was 562,600, a mere 3.0% increase compared to the same month the previous year, and a significant drop from 715,700 in October (22.8% increase). In December, the number further declined to 330,400 (45.3% decrease), and in January 2026, it fell to 385,300 (60.7% decrease). According to analyses by The Washington Post, Sankei Shimbun, and Bloomberg, by November 20, approximately 543,000 airline tickets from China to Japan (about 40% of total Chinese airline bookings, equivalent to 20% of Japan-China air routes) had been canceled.

On January 6, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced an immediate ban on the export of all dual-use items for military purposes to Japan. On January 7, the Ministry began a dumping investigation regarding imports of dichlorosilane from Japan. On January 8, The Wall Street Journal reported that China had begun to impose export restrictions on rare earth materials to Japan. On February 24, the Ministry announced the addition of 20 companies to the dual-use export ban list and another 20 companies to the export control watch list. This includes subsidiaries of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, IHI, Fujitsu, NEC, and research institutions such as the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the National Defense Medical College.

From the perspective of the Japan-U.S. alliance, this series of events has significant implications for Japan's defense posture and regional strategy. A U.S. State Department spokesperson stated, "China's actions do not contribute to regional peace and stability," reaffirming the alliance with Japan. On December 10, two U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers conducted joint flights with three Japanese F-35 fighters and three F-15 fighters, with the Japanese Defense Ministry announcing, "We reaffirmed our strong determination to prevent attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force."

The strategic value of the maritime militia lies in its ambiguity. As a gray zone operation, the maritime militia exerts military pressure while reducing the risk of direct military conflict. As Professor Erickson points out, "The reality that this third maritime force is engaged in threatening gray zone operations and war preparation activities that affect Taiwan, Japan, regional security, and U.S. vital interests in both the South China Sea and East China Sea is emphasized."

For Japan, the large-scale deployment of this maritime militia raises multiple policy challenges. First, there is an urgent need to enhance the capabilities of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard. On June 30, 2022, the Ministry of Defense announced the construction of 12 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to strengthen maritime security around the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. However, a more comprehensive approach is needed to address the scale of the maritime militia exceeding 1,000 vessels.

Second, improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities is essential. The fact that this phenomenon was revealed for the first time through satellite tracking data underscores the importance of continuous maritime monitoring. Japan needs to expand its space-based ISR assets and enhance its real-time maritime situational awareness capabilities.

Third, deepening collaboration with allies and friendly nations is required. The alliance with the United States remains the foundation of Japan's security, but multi-layered security cooperation with countries such as Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan is essential for maintaining regional maritime order. In particular, informal information sharing with Taiwan directly contributes to stability in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

The large-scale deployment of the Chinese maritime militia in the East China Sea indicates a new phase in the regional military balance. This is not merely a show of force but part of a concrete capability-building effort toward the strategic goal of unification with Taiwan. Japan must comprehensively promote the strengthening of its defense posture, deepening of alliances, and enhancement of deterrence to respond to this new reality. As the Japan-China diplomatic crisis continues, tensions in the East China Sea may further escalate, and Japanese policymakers are called upon to seek strategic responses with a long-term perspective.