NATO’s 2026 Test Is Whether Europe Can Replace America’s Precision Fires
S.WNATO’s 2026 Test Is Whether Europe Can Replace America’s Precision Fires
Europe is being asked to carry more of NATO’s military weight at exactly the moment the alliance is discovering how expensive that promise will be. The question is no longer whether European governments will spend more. It is whether they can replace the American capabilities that make their spending useful.
That is the uncomfortable meaning of recent warnings from NATO’s top commander. In a September 24 interview reported by Reuters and Defense News, U.S. Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich said Washington would continue providing critical but more limited capabilities as European allies take greater responsibility for defending the continent. He also said the number of U.S. troops and capabilities that might remain in Europe has no predetermined outcome. About 80,000 American troops are currently stationed on the continent.
The American contribution is not just manpower
European debates often reduce the transatlantic bargain to troop numbers. That misses the harder problem. The United States supplies the high-end enablers that allow NATO forces to see, decide and strike across distance: intelligence collection, strategic lift, air and missile defence, command networks, logistics and long-range precision fires.
Those capabilities are difficult to buy quickly because they are not interchangeable with ordinary brigades. A European army can add battalions and still remain dependent on American satellites, targeting data, tanker aircraft and munitions stocks. A missile launcher is visible in a procurement table. The invisible architecture that turns it into a reliable operational weapon takes years to build.
The equipment issue is therefore less about one named missile than about the full precision-strike chain. Long-range systems require secure communications, persistent surveillance, battle damage assessment and trained staffs that can coordinate effects across national borders. Europe has pieces of this chain, but not yet enough depth to assume that the United States can step back without creating a dangerous gap.
Russia is testing the gap below war
Denmark’s defence intelligence service warned on September 24 that Russia was likely to intensify hybrid warfare against the West in the coming months. Reuters reported that the assessment included a low but growing risk of a limited military attack against one or more NATO countries bordering Russia. Grynkewich described a recent series of incidents, including an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport and a Russian vessel firing flares toward a Danish military helicopter.
These are not separate irritations. They are a stress test. Sabotage, cyberattacks, coercive maritime behaviour and drone incidents force NATO to spend attention and air-defence capacity before a conventional conflict has even begun. Moscow can probe the alliance at a cost far below that of an open attack, while exploiting uncertainty over who has authority to respond.
“We should be calm and confident,” Grynkewich told Reuters. Calm is useful. Confidence without magazine depth, resilient networks and political agreement is not.
The alliance also has to treat public attribution as part of deterrence. Russia denies involvement in hybrid operations. NATO governments may still know more than they can publish, but delayed or fragmented responses invite another probe. The purpose of a hybrid campaign is not always to destroy a target. Sometimes it is to make every response look disproportionate.
Europe cannot buy autonomy by slogan
European leaders are right to demand greater responsibility. The handover of NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk to a British army general, alongside a European taking charge of Joint Force Command Naples, is a political signal that the old division of labour is changing. Norfolk oversees operations in the Arctic and northern Europe and protects the transatlantic resupply routes that would matter in a war with Russia.
But a European flag on a headquarters does not automatically create European capacity. Command responsibility must be matched by access to intelligence, stockpiles, air defence, maritime surveillance and transport. Otherwise the alliance will have European commanders operating inside a system whose most important inputs remain American, while Washington is simultaneously narrowing its commitment.
This is where the debate over America’s missile inventory matters. Defense News reported that Grynkewich rejected the idea that Russia would exploit U.S. expenditure of long-range precision weapons in the war with Iran. That reassurance may be correct today. It does not answer the procurement question for 2027 or 2028. If the United States is replenishing its own stocks while supporting Europe and deterring China, the industrial base becomes part of NATO’s frontline.
The next NATO target is resilience
Europe should measure progress by operational outputs, not only by defence budgets. Can European forces sustain precision strikes after the first week of a crisis? Can they protect ports and rail lines from drones and sabotage? Can they replace damaged satellites or communications nodes? Can a Baltic reinforcement convoy move without depending on one national escort and an American intelligence picture?
The answers are uneven. That is not a failure of European soldiers. It is the result of decades in which the United States supplied the strategic margin and Europe treated it as permanent. The margin is now being repriced.
Washington’s reduced but continuing role could ultimately strengthen NATO if it forces Europe to build the capabilities it has postponed. It could also produce the worst of both worlds: less American mass before European substitutes are ready. Russia will be watching that transition closely, especially in the grey zone where an alliance must decide whether an incident is criminal, military or both.
What to watch next
Three indicators will reveal whether the change is real. First, whether European governments fund precision munitions and the surveillance systems that make them effective, rather than announcing another round of headline targets. Second, whether NATO gives its European commanders the authorities and intelligence access needed to respond quickly to hybrid attacks. Third, whether the United States publishes a credible outline of the capabilities it will retain in Europe.
The strategic conclusion is blunt. Europe cannot replace America by buying more uniforms or renaming headquarters. It must build the sensors, networks, munitions and industrial capacity that turn defence budgets into usable combat power. NATO may still be the most powerful alliance in history, as Grynkewich said. In 2026, the uncomfortable question is whether it can remain that way during the handover.
Sources
NATO is evaluating Europe's capacity to assume greater military responsibilities amid concerns over Russian hybrid threats. U.S. General Grynkewich highlighted the limitations of American military support, emphasizing the need for Europe to develop its own capabilities. The report indicates a potential shift in NATO's operational dynamics, with European leaders taking command roles while still relying on U.S. military assets. This transition is critical as Europe seeks to enhance its defense capabilities against evolving threats.
- NATO is shifting military responsibilities to Europe.
- Russia is likely to intensify hybrid warfare against NATO countries.
- U.S. General Grynkewich emphasized the limitations of U.S. military support in Europe.
- European forces need to develop their own capabilities to replace U.S. support.
- The handover of NATO command to European leaders signals a change in military strategy.