Naval Aviation Conducts Day-Night Anti-Submarine Training in the South China Sea in July, PLA's Shark Hunting Network Begins to Emphasize Data Review

On July 14, a report from the China Military Network revealed an anti-submarine training exercise in the South China Sea, where the most interesting aspect was not the eye-catching phrase "Night Shark Hunting," but two details: first, the joint confrontation between anti-submarine patrol aircraft and submarine forces; second, the playback of flight data and sonar records after the training concluded. When viewed together, these two details are more valuable than simply stating that several sonar buoys were deployed.

Public reports indicate that a certain unit of the naval aviation organized day-night confrontation training in a specific area of the South China Sea. After the anti-submarine patrol aircraft arrived in the mission area, they first completed the calibration of the mission cabin system and scanned the target sea area, then deployed sonar buoys based on vague radar signals. After several buoys were sequentially released from the aircraft's belly, they formed a buoy array, and the crew adjusted their heading and flight path according to the array's position to maintain stable reception of sonar signals. During the night phase, underwater targets employed countermeasures and continuously changed direction and speed using complex underwater terrain. The crew ultimately locked onto the target and conducted a simulated attack by supplementing buoy deployment, enhancing listening, and reinterpreting noise.

The Real Change Lies in Training Design

There have been many such reports in the past, but this time the expression clearly emphasizes "confrontation." The original text from the China Military Network stated that the unit abandoned the routine of enemy situation settings, simplified special situation designs, and proceduralized confrontation training, instead creating a realistic battlefield environment. In plain language, as Li Minghui would say, they are no longer satisfied with the aircraft flying a circle according to the plan, the sonar position reporting a point according to the process, and finally simulating a bomb drop to conclude, but are treating submarines as real opponents that can escape, deceive, and utilize the underwater environment.

The greatest fear in anti-submarine operations is not a small indicator of poor equipment performance, but rather instability in some link of the system chain. The advantages of fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft lie in their speed, large coverage, and ability to quickly deploy sonar buoy arrays; however, the weaknesses are also evident. If any one of the buoy quantity, data link stability, acoustic interpretation capability, sea conditions, or hydrological data falls short, the so-called shark hunting network will become a net full of holes. The report specifically mentioned intermittent sonar signals, target mobility, buoy resupply, and continuous search, indicating that the training focus is shifting from "detecting targets" to "how to reorganize the search after losing the target."

July 19 Live-Fire Assessment Provides Another Clue

On July 19, the China Military Network released images of a live-fire ground target assessment conducted by a certain regiment of the Naval Aviation University. The article discussed rocket attacks on ground targets, which superficially seems unrelated to anti-submarine operations, but it reveals the same direction of training reform: in the past, hitting the target center would yield high scores, but now tactical indicators such as attack angle, entry heading, penetration speed, and exit timing are weighted together with hit accuracy for scoring. During the debriefing, pilots first review flight data rather than the impact point visuals.

This corroborates the debriefing logic from the July 14 anti-submarine training. One involves ground rocket attacks, while the other involves maritime search and attack on submarines; one looks at trajectory and penetration windows, while the other examines sonar records and flight path organization. But the core issue is the same: the PLA Navy's aviation is transforming "hitting the target" into "hitting the target with a higher probability of survival under complex conditions." This change is not glamorous, but it is crucial.

Implications at the Equipment Level

Public information does not specify the types of aircraft involved in the training. The outside world often associates the Chinese Navy's fixed-wing anti-submarine capabilities with the Y-8 and Y-9 series platforms, but this article cannot deduce specific models. What can be confirmed is that the training subjects involve mission cabin coordination, initial radar exploration, sonar buoy arrays, stable cruise speed and altitude control, acoustic signal interpretation, and simulated attacks. This is no longer a single flight technical subject, but a typical crew system operation.

• First, the logic of sonar buoy consumption and resupply will force the support system to adapt. The closer anti-submarine training gets to real combat, the greater the pressure on buoys, maintenance, data processing, and training area support.
• Second, day-night training indicates that naval aviation anti-submarine operations are addressing shortcomings in nighttime and long-duration subjects. On June 1, the China Military Network disclosed that a certain regiment of naval aviation organized long-duration search and attack training, which also included handover, buoy resupply, simulated attacks, and single-engine emergency procedures.
• Third, joint confrontation with submarine forces is more valuable than simply setting up targets. Real submarines can maneuver, evade, and utilize hydrological conditions, making the training difficulty and assessment value different.

Anti-Submarine Pressure in the Context of the South China Sea

The hydrological environment in the South China Sea is complex, with islands, deep-water basins, merchant ship noise, and seasonal sea conditions all affecting acoustic searches. For the PLA, anti-submarine operations have always been a necessary lesson as the Navy moves into deep waters. The number of surface vessels is increasing rapidly, with aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and large destroyers being very prominent, but if the underwater situation around deep-sea formations is unclear, all high-value platforms will be forced to use caution.

I believe this training should not be interpreted as a sudden leap. The technical details in public reports are still limited; we cannot see the buoy models, deployment intervals, data link methods, nor the actual search radius and target retention time of the crew. However, from several consecutive reports, it is evident that the training evaluation of the naval aviation is becoming more detailed. In the past, propaganda often emphasized "successfully completing the mission," but now it begins to mention intermittent signals, target loss, data review, and weighted scoring, which are more credible.

The real question worth pursuing is whether the PLA's anti-submarine aviation will expand this data-driven review to large-scale joint sea-air exercises in the future. It is one thing for a single aircraft to weave a network; it is another to connect multiple platforms, multiple batches, and multiple sea areas, which is the hard question for anti-submarine capabilities in the South China Sea.

Main sources: China Military Network - PLA Daily, July 14, "Night 'Shark Hunting,' Naval Aviation Unit Conducts Confrontation Training with Submarine Forces"; China Military Network - PLA Daily, July 19, "Live-Fire Ground Target Assessment Images from a Certain Regiment of Naval Aviation University"; China Military Network - PLA Daily, June 1, "Day-Night 'Shark Hunting' Between Sea and Sky, Directly Observing Long-Duration Search and Attack Training."