Nigeria 2026 — Boko Haram and ISWAP replace 82 students at the center of the war

In Mussa, in the Askira-Uba area, the edge of the Sambisa forest is not an abstraction. It is a line of vegetation, sandy tracks, and villages where it is well known when an armed group has passed. Between May 13 and 15, 2026, according to Amnesty International cited by the Associated Press, at least 82 students were abducted in several attacks on schools in Nigeria, including one in Borno State and another in Oyo State. The Nigerian police attributed the attack in Borno to Boko Haram and its dissidence affiliated with the Islamic State, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

The number is less spectacular than Chibok in 2014 or some mass raids in the northwest. However, it is militarily more concerning. It comes at a time when Abuja is communicating tactical successes against the Islamic State, with more visible American cooperation, airstrikes, and the announcement of 92 hostages released on May 24 along the Buratai-Kamuya axis in the Biu region. On the ground, these two realities coexist. The army can rescue captives on one road, while armed groups prove they can still enter the school space.

Geography matters more than the statement

Askira-Uba is located south of Maiduguri, in this transitional area between the foothills of the Mandara mountains, access to Sambisa, and secondary roads to Biu. On an administrative map, these are boundaries of local government areas. On the ground, these are routes for retreat, resupply, and intelligence. A school in this sector is never just a school. It is a fixed point, known, vulnerable, with regular hours and families that cannot move quickly.

This detail explains why the attack is significant. Boko Haram and ISWAP do not need to hold Mussa to achieve an operational effect. They only need to make it clear that the state does not control movements between villages, tracks, and clearings. In a counter-insurgency war, this impression sometimes counts more than a conquered position. It forces parents to withdraw their children from classes, pushes teachers to leave, and transforms a contested area into empty space for administration.

A narrative setback for Abuja

Since mid-May, Nigerian authorities have been highlighting a favorable sequence. The army announced joint operations with the United States against the Islamic State, first with more than 20 fighters killed, then with a toll raised to 175 Islamic State members eliminated. It also reported the death of Abd-al Wahhab, presented as an important financial and logistical official. These results are not negligible. In the Lake Chad basin, abducting a financial officer often counts more than destroying a few pick-ups.

But the abductions of students attack another center of gravity. They tell the population that airstrikes, even successful ones, do not necessarily protect the village in the morning. It is an old lesson from Barkhane that I have never forgotten in the Sahel: a special operation can break a cell, but it does not automatically close the track that this cell was using. If no one holds the track the next day, the group returns in another form.

Boko Haram and ISWAP, rivals but useful to each other

The police spoke of Boko Haram and ISWAP for the attack in Borno. Caution is necessary. In this region, the exact identification of a commando is often incomplete in the first hours, and local sources sometimes mix the names. But perhaps the most important thing is not the precise label. The hard point is that the two jihadist families, despite their rivalry, exploit the same environment: Sambisa, the corridors to Lake Chad, fuel markets, village intelligence networks, and ransoms.

The competition between Boko Haram and ISWAP has long helped Abuja. When factions fight each other, they consume men, ammunition, and trust. But this competition also produces an escalation. A group that loses ground may seek a high-value symbolic act. A school abduction provides exactly that: visibility, political pressure, and leverage.

The Malian lesson reaches Borno

The analysis published by The Conversation Africa and picked up by AllAfrica on May 23 reminds us of a point that many in Abuja still observe from afar: Mali and Nigeria are separated by about 1,000 kilometers, with Niger as a buffer, but they now share the same logic of fragmentation. In Mali, cooperation between JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front has shown that a tactical alliance between different actors can strike the state at multiple levels. In Nigeria, sustainable coordination between jihadists, bandits, and criminal networks would be of a different nature, but the idea is no longer theoretical.

The school zone is a good indicator of this fragmentation. When a group attacks a base, it seeks a military victory. When it attacks a school, it also seeks a social victory. It cuts off transmission, imposes fear, and shows communities that the state can be present in the speeches of Maiduguri or Abuja without being present at the classroom door.

What the coming weeks will reveal

Three things need to be monitored. First, the destination of the abducted children. If they are moved to Sambisa or to enclaves closer to Lake Chad, negotiation and rescue will not have the same cost. Next, the reaction of schools around Askira-Uba, Biu, and Damboa. A spontaneous chain closure would be a jihadist success without a fight. Finally, the Nigerian capacity to maintain a nighttime presence on secondary axes, not just to conduct raids afterward.

The war in Borno is therefore not only played out in the number of fighters killed. It is played out in the distance between a military post and a school, in the time it takes a unit to leave the main road, and in the trust of a parent who decides, in the morning, whether or not to send their child to class. If that trust breaks, Boko Haram and ISWAP will not need to take Maiduguri. They will have already gained ground where the state is most fragile: in civilian routine.

Sources

• Associated Press, May 17, 2026, attacks on schools in Nigeria and more than 80 children missing.
• Associated Press, May 24, 2026, Nigerian announcement of 92 hostages released in Borno State.
• Associated Press, May 18-19, 2026, Nigerian and American operations against the Islamic State in the northeast.
• The Conversation Africa via AllAfrica, May 23, 2026, analysis of lessons from the Malian crisis for Nigeria.