PLA's Controversy Over Flares Near Subi and Mischief Reefs in the South China Sea Escalates, 2026 Gray Zone Operations Enter Close Air Phase

On September 7, a Philippine Coast Guard aircraft conducting maritime situational awareness missions flew near Subi Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. The Philippine Coast Guard released a video on September 10, claiming that the Chinese side fired multiple flares at this unarmed aircraft from the direction of an artificial island. The footage shows what appears to be the Subi Reef lighthouse, runway, hangars, radar, and port facilities, but the publicly available video alone cannot independently confirm the flare launch platform, distance, or whether it constitutes intentional proximity. As of the time of this report, Beijing had not responded to this accusation. Therefore, this article defines it as an aerial confrontation pending confirmation, rather than a confirmed "attack."

The Value of Facilities Behind the Flares

Subi Reef and Mischief Reef are both part of the Chinese-controlled artificial islands in the Spratly Islands. Public satellite images show that both locations have airports, hangars, communication and radar facilities, and can provide supplies, maintenance, and command support for coast guard and maritime militia vessels. For a low-speed, unarmed situational awareness aircraft, flares themselves may not be a high lethality means, but they can create a strong deterrent effect under nighttime or low visibility conditions. What they convey is not "Can I shoot you down?" but rather "I can turn your reconnaissance route into my law enforcement scene."

This distinction is crucial. Fighter jet interceptions are typically handled by the military according to air rules, while flare deterrents implemented by the coast guard or garrison forces on artificial islands package military presence as routine control around the reefs. The most dangerous changes in the South China Sea disputes are often not large-scale exercises, but rather the gradual transformation of originally exceptional actions into fixed procedures.

Echoing Recent Actions in the Western Pacific

The South China Sea incident is not an isolated news story. The Singapore Straits Times cited analysts pointing out that in recent weeks, China has conducted bomber patrols and joint maritime activities with Russia, the coast guard has continued operations east of Taiwan, and a nuclear-powered submarine conducted a rare long-range ballistic missile test from the Pacific direction. Public evidence is insufficient to prove that these actions were coordinated under a single operational order, but they collectively indicate a trend: the PLA and related law enforcement forces are increasingly making activities beyond the first island chain more frequent and easier for surrounding countries to "get used to."

The significance of the Subi Reef incident, in my opinion, lies in its connection to two levels. The upper level is the demonstration of long-range maritime and air power, while the lower level is the pressure exerted by the coast guard and reef facilities on specific routes. The former is responsible for changing regional expectations of China's far-sea capabilities, while the latter is responsible for altering the actual boundaries of how close an aircraft or a government vessel can fly and how long they can stay. The two do not need to operate in complete joint combat to amplify each other's political effects.

Choices Facing the Philippines and the United States

In recent years, the Philippine Coast Guard has increased its maritime situational awareness flights in the Spratly Islands, aiming not only to collect imagery but also to maintain a "visible presence" in disputed waters. If every approach to Chinese-controlled artificial islands encounters flares, bright lights, or radio deterrents, Manila will face a real dilemma: reducing patrol frequency will result in a loss of on-site records, while continuing to approach may escalate a dangerous action into a collision or misjudgment. Joint patrols by the U.S. and the Philippines will raise political costs but will not automatically resolve the immediate risks faced by pilots at distances of hundreds of meters to several kilometers.

From the perspective of Chinese military industry and system construction, such actions test not only whether there are radars on the islands. The real shortcoming lies in sensor identification, command authorization, communication between the coast guard and military, and safety procedures for nighttime interceptions. If flares are standardized deterrent tools authorized for use, it indicates that relevant forces are forming more refined operational options "below the threshold for opening fire"; if they are merely improvised responses by on-site personnel, it instead exposes instability in crisis management. Current public information cannot answer this question.

One flare is an incident; a set of repeatable, controllable, and accountable deterrent processes is the capability.

Three Signals That Truly Need Observation

• Whether the Philippines will release more complete flight paths, distances, radio records, or original videos.
• Whether the Chinese coast guard, PLA Southern Theater Command, or diplomatic departments will provide a consistent explanation of the actions.
• In the coming month, whether there will be continuous flares, radio, or escort deterrents when similar aircraft approach Subi Reef and Mischief Reef.

The most prudent judgment at present is that this incident has increased the risks of gray zone operations in the South China Sea, but it is not yet sufficient to prove that Beijing has decided to turn the area around the artificial islands into a formal no-fly zone. What is truly worth questioning is not who fired the flare first in the video, but whether there will still be a set of rules that allows aircraft to leave safely during the next patrol.

Sources

South China Morning Post, September 11, 2026, Report on the Flare Incident Near Subi Reef and Mischief Reef; Channel NewsAsia, July 2026 Analysis of China's Recent Maritime and Air Operations in the Western Pacific. Original language: English; Chinese content is original analysis.