Russian Drone Troops Achieve 98.7% — Contract Army Changes the War in Ukraine in 2026

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Russian Drone Forces Reached 98.7% — Contract Army Changes the War in Ukraine in 2026

The figure of 98.7% looks like a success until another one appears alongside it — the overall plan for recruiting contract soldiers into the Russian army for 2026 has only been fulfilled by 89.3%. The gap of 9.4 percentage points shows not just the popularity of drones. It indicates that the Russian Ministry of Defense is already building a separate market for military labor, where a drone operator is valued higher than a regular infantryman, and technological specialization becomes a way to compensate for the shortage of personnel.

98.7% Recruitment Does Not Mean 98.7% Combat Readiness

Russian Geran attack drone used in Ukraine war operations

Deputy Defense Minister Viktor Goremykin reported on November 18 that the recruitment of drone forces has reached 98.7%. According to him, there are 96 selection points for contract service operating in Russia, covering administrative centers in 87 out of 89 federal subjects. The most important clarification is that these forces are staffed exclusively by contract soldiers, and potential candidates are sought not only among active servicemen but also among university and college students (EAN, November 18, 2026; “Profile,” November 18, 2026).

However, the percentage of plan fulfillment is an administrative indicator, not a measure of combat effectiveness. It does not reveal how many candidates have undergone technical training, how many have remained after the first months of service, and what proportion of personnel can operate under conditions of electronic warfare. Russian bureaucracy loves to count incoming applications. War, unfortunately for the bureaucracy, counts operational drones, flight hours, and completed missions.

Why the Kremlin is Betting on Separate Forces

The creation of specialized drone forces meets three needs at once. The first is tactical. On the Ukrainian front, cheap reconnaissance and strike drones have become a constant consumable rather than a rare support asset. The General Staff of Ukraine reported that by November 18 alone, the Russian side lost 1,223 operational-tactical UAVs, 34 artillery systems, and 1,970 servicemen. Even if Ukrainian estimates are exaggerated, the very intensity of drone usage requires a sustainable personnel framework for their production, programming, launch, and repair.

The second need is institutional. When drones are distributed among regular motorized rifle units, accountability for results dissolves among the company commander, artillery, signalers, and operators. A separate branch of troops allows for the creation of a vertical structure, its own training centers, training standards, and a career ladder. This resembles the Soviet logic of forming independent technical troops: initially, a new asset is considered an attachment to infantry, then a separate management system is created around it.

The third need is political. A contract with drone forces is easier to sell to a young person than service in assault infantry. The promise of working with electronics, software, and technology lowers the psychological barrier to war. But this does not eliminate the risk: an operator far from the front line is still part of the combat cycle and remains a target for Ukrainian strikes.

Students as a Reserve and Hidden Cost of Recruitment

The intention to attract students from civilian universities and colleges is particularly indicative. Russia is trying to turn the civilian education system into a reserve for military specialization without announcing a new mobilization. The academic leave mentioned by Vladimir Putin in December 2025 is becoming not an exception but a mechanism for channeling young people into the army. This reduces the immediate political cost of recruitment but creates long-term burdens for universities, the regional labor market, and demographics.

There is also a more specific problem. A good UAV operator is not just someone who can hold a remote control. They need navigational literacy, an understanding of radio channels, basic meteorology, the ability to quickly interpret intelligence data, and work in a team. Training such a specialist takes more time than processing a contract. If the state accelerates training to meet quarterly plans, the 98.7% will turn into a pretty number with low practical returns.

Demographic Arithmetic of the Russian War

According to Dmitry Medvedev, in 2025, over 422,000 people signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense, and about 32,000 were volunteers. Moscow showcases these figures as proof of the system's resilience. However, the increase in the number of contracts simultaneously speaks to the cost of war: to maintain army numbers, financial incentives and recruitment geography must be constantly expanded. If the overall plan for 2026 is fulfilled by 89.3%, and the drone direction is nearly closed, it means the state is already reallocating limited human resources in favor of those specialties that provide maximum effect on the battlefield.

This is not a transition to an army of the future in a promotional sense. Rather, it is an attempt to adapt a mass war army to a shortage of personnel. Russia is not abandoning artillery, armored vehicles, and assault units; it is adding a layer of operators, engineers, and analysts above them. As a result, the war becomes less dependent on the number of rifles but more dependent on the quality of training and the stability of communications.

What Will Change on the Front

In the coming months, we should expect not a sudden technological breakthrough but a more systematic application of drones. Specialized forces will be able to transfer successful tactical solutions between fronts more quickly, centralize procurement of components, and link reconnaissance with fire strikes. At the same time, such centralization creates vulnerability: if the Ukrainian side disrupts communication channels, strikes training centers, or eliminates key instructors, the damage will spread throughout the entire vertical.

The figure of 98.7% should therefore be read cautiously. It indicates the priority of drones in Russian military reform but does not yet prove the existence of a mature system. The Kremlin has indeed found a way to direct part of the youth and contract soldiers into the fastest-growing sector of war. The question is whether it can retain these individuals and turn them into professionals rather than just filling staffing tables. The Russian army will likely gain more UAV operators in 2027, but the quality of this replenishment will be determined not by the recruitment percentage but by how many specialists survive the first six months and retain the ability to operate under continuous electronic warfare conditions.

Sources

Classification
Region
Russia & CIS
Analytical Domain
Strategic
Primary Category / Secondary Categories
Political-Military / Weapons & Equipment
SALUTE Report
Size
422,000 contract soldiers, 32,000 volunteers
Activity
Recruitment of drone operators and establishment of specialized drone forces
Location
Russia
Unit
Russian Armed Forces
Time
November 18, 2026
Equipment
dronesartillery systems
Summary

Russian Armed Forces reported a 98.7% recruitment success for drone operators as of November 18, 2026, while overall contract soldier recruitment stands at 89.3%. This indicates a strategic shift towards specialized drone units to meet operational demands on the Ukrainian front. The Ministry of Defense is also targeting students from civilian universities to fill military roles, reflecting a broader effort to adapt to personnel shortages in the ongoing conflict.

Key Facts
  • Russian drone forces achieved 98.7% recruitment success as of November 18, 2026.
  • The overall recruitment plan for contract soldiers is only 89.3% fulfilled.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense is focusing on specialized drone units to enhance military effectiveness.
  • There is a significant loss of Russian drones and personnel reported by the Ukrainian military.
  • Russia is attempting to recruit students from civilian universities to bolster military personnel without formal mobilization.