Russian Military Explores Northern Japan's Air Defense Response with Two Consecutive IL-20 Flights

In a flight path diagram released by the Joint Staff Office on May 27, the first thing I noticed was the line of the Russian military's IL-20 reconnaissance aircraft moving from the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk, and further into the Pacific Ocean. The previous day's report on May 26 indicated that the same IL-20 flew over the Sea of Japan, approached off the coast of the Noto Peninsula, and then returned towards the Russian mainland. In other words, on May 21 and 22, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) urgently scrambled fighter jets in response to reconnaissance aircraft in the northern front.

Differences Indicated by Two Flight Paths

According to the Joint Staff Office, the IL-20 on May 21 flew over the Sea of Japan from morning to afternoon, prompting a response from JASDF aircraft. USNI News summarized that this aircraft entered the Sea of Japan from the Russian mainland, advanced to the waters off the Noto Peninsula, and then turned back. The announcement on the following day, the 22nd, was somewhat broader. The IL-20 was confirmed over the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Pacific Ocean, and after descending southward towards the waters off Iwate Prefecture, it returned again to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk.

Even though it is the same reconnaissance aircraft, the nature of the flights on May 21 was more about confirming responses over the Sea of Japan, while the flight on the 22nd was more about confirming the route that circled from the north to the Pacific side. This does not constitute a violation of airspace. However, flying across multiple airspace zones along the air defense identification zone is a classic method for measuring the Japan Air Self-Defense Force's alert control, fighter jet launches, handovers, and fuel planning.

IL-20 is Old, but Its Mission is Not

The IL-20 is not a new aircraft. It is a reconnaissance aircraft based on a four-engine turboprop design, and the Ministry of Defense refers to it as a "reconnaissance aircraft." It is not an aircraft that can compete with modern fighter jets in terms of speed or survivability, but its mission lies in gathering electronic information, communication information, and radar operations. Similar to the Soviet aircraft's circumnavigation flights experienced by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the JASDF during the Cold War, what is important is not the performance of the aircraft itself, but rather when, from which direction, and across which control zones it crosses.

The notable feature this time is that Russia continues its reconnaissance flights in the Far East despite bearing a significant burden from the Ukraine war. While there is no need to overestimate the activity levels of the Russian Pacific Fleet and air forces, the fact that their activities have not ceased cannot be overlooked. The northern front is not as closely watched as the southwestern islands, so even repeated flights by a small number of aircraft can accumulate pressure on the air defense posture without being easily visible.

Background of 595 Emergency Scrambles

Stars and Stripes reported that, according to the Joint Staff Office's statistics for fiscal year 2025, the JASDF's emergency scrambles totaled 595, a decrease from 704 in fiscal year 2024. Of these, 366 were in response to Chinese aircraft and 214 to Russian aircraft. Looking at the total numbers alone, it may seem that the burden has decreased, but the operational significance differs between the Russian aircraft that the Northern Air Defense Force responds to and the Chinese aircraft that the Southwestern Air Defense Force primarily faces.

In the southwestern front, the quantity of the Chinese naval and air forces is a concern. In the northern front, a small number of Russian reconnaissance aircraft probe the alert posture over a wide airspace that includes the Soya, Tsugaru, and Sanriku waters. The flight paths connecting the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Pacific Ocean, like on May 22, should be viewed as flights testing the speed of information sharing not only for the Northern Air Defense Force but for the entire Air Defense Command.

Side Effects of Southwestern Concentration

Japan's defense discussions tend to focus on the Taiwan Strait, the Senkaku Islands, and the southwestern islands. This is rational in itself. Given China's capability enhancement and the density of its naval and air activities, it is natural for the southwestern front to be prioritized. However, the two consecutive flights of Russian aircraft remind us that air defense in the north is not a "secondary task that can be handled with spare capacity."

If a crisis were to occur in the southwest, it does not necessarily mean that Russia would launch large-scale actions in the north. Rather, it is more realistic to consider the possibility of combining reconnaissance flights by aircraft like the IL-20, show-of-force flights by bombers, and the passage of naval vessels to disperse the attention and numbers of the JASDF. This requires separating capabilities from intentions. While Russia's ability to conduct a large-scale offensive on the Japanese front is limited, the intent to observe Japan's air defense responses and create friction in alliance operations is certainly plausible.

The True Issue

It would be a waste to treat this IL-20 flight merely as a "confirmation of Russian aircraft." On May 27, it was also announced that the Chief of Joint Staff would head to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and then visit Vietnam. Japan is expanding its defense cooperation in the south while facing traditional Russian reconnaissance in the north. The diplomatic map is spreading southward, while the reality of air defense remains in the north.

In my view, the issue is not whether we can track the IL-20. That is a task the JASDF has been performing for many years. The question is how much we can treat the repetitive reconnaissance flights in the north, amidst the concentration of equipment, personnel, and political interest in the southwestern islands, not as "noise in peacetime," but as part of a composite deterrence strategy. The older the aircraft, the more convenient it is to measure our old weaknesses.

Main Sources

• Japan Joint Staff, Russian aircraft activity around Japan, May 27, 2026
• Japan Joint Staff, Russian aircraft activity around Japan, May 26, 2026
• USNI News Western Pacific Pulse, May 22, 2026
• Stars and Stripes, China scaled back airspace challenges and drone flights in fiscal 2025, May 7, 2026