Russian Report: Why Can the Houthis Press Saudi Arabia Step by Step?

Reference News Network reported on October 25 The Russian newspaper "Independent" published an article titled "Why Saudi Arabia Cannot Defeat the Houthis" on October 23, authored by military observer Larisa Shashouk. The full text is excerpted as follows:

The scruffy, slipper-wearing armed militants—this almost comical image of the Houthis has long been ingrained in the impressions of those who follow the Yemen conflict through media reports. However, this image starkly contrasts with their actual combat capabilities. It has been proven that they can not only launch attacks but can even strike distant targets. They have organized a series of strikes against Saudi Arabian energy facilities and airports, targeting facilities of Saudi Aramco and Riyadh International Airport. The region is likely on the brink of a new escalation. The U.S. government's order for its diplomatic personnel to evacuate Saudi Arabia is clear evidence of this. On October 22, Houthi senior official Mohammed Bukhaiti stated in a televised address directed at Riyadh that "the possibility of launching a ground invasion of Saudi Arabia is being considered."

Despite Saudi Arabia and its allies having significant advantages in military spending, air power, and modern weaponry, the Houthis maintain the capability to launch missile strikes and use drone systems, continuously applying military pressure on their opponents. To explain this situation, several interrelated factors must be considered: the external military-technical support received by the Houthis, their accumulated combat experience, the geographical features of Yemen, and the military-political strategies of the conflict participants.

External Support Combined with Indigenous Tactics

The Houthis formed in northern Yemen in the 1990s, and in the early 21st century, they erupted into armed conflict with the central government. In 2004, the Houthis had their first large-scale conflict with government forces. In September 2014, against the backdrop of a political crisis and the fragmentation of state institutions, the Houthis took control of the capital, Sana'a, seizing the government military's arsenal and infrastructure, significantly enhancing their combat capabilities.

At the same time, international experts generally believe that the formation of the Houthis' military capabilities relies not only on domestic resources. There is substantial evidence of military-technical cooperation with Iran, although there are differing assessments regarding the specific forms and scale of this support. UN analysts have repeatedly pointed out that the weapon models used by the Houthis bear similarities to Iranian research and development results, and that weapon components come from abroad.

The scale of local production by the Houthis and their degree of autonomy in developing complex systems are also points of contention: asserting that their missiles are entirely self-developed is as erroneous as viewing the Houthis as purely Iranian proxies.

External military-technical support has facilitated the expansion of the Houthis' arsenal, enabling them to acquire more complex missile and drone systems. However, obtaining modern weaponry is only the first step in building military capability: using these weapons requires personnel training, technical infrastructure, and a stable supply of components. These conditions determine whether the Houthis can effectively use the acquired weaponry over the long term in the face of systematic enemy airstrikes.

Meanwhile, the Houthis have expanded the use of drone systems, employing them not only to strike ground targets but also to attack commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In such operations, drones are used in coordination with anti-ship ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, broadening the threat to international shipping.

The Houthis have dispersed their missile launchers and weapon reserves, weakening the effectiveness of enemy airstrikes, as destroying individual targets does not lead to the loss of all their weapons. Repairing damaged infrastructure allows them to maintain combat capability under prolonged military pressure. The resilience of the Houthis is less about possessing specific weapons and more a comprehensive reflection of external military-technical support, organizational capability, and adaptability to opponent actions. Their tactics enable them to maintain combat capability even in the face of significant enemy military advantages. Therefore, as long as they can retain their command structure, well-trained armed personnel, and the ability to quickly replenish losses, material losses do not necessarily lead to political defeat.

Long-Range Disruption Offsets Opponent Advantages

The joint military operation launched in 2015 under Saudi Arabia's leadership has failed to restore control of the capital and other territories occupied by the Houthis to the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Despite ongoing battles and airstrikes, the Houthis still control most of northwestern Yemen.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia possesses a modern air force, missile defense systems, and substantial financial resources. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the country's military spending is estimated to be around $83.2 billion by 2025. However, the scale of the military budget does not guarantee the achievement of set goals: the effectiveness of the military depends not only on the quantity and quality of weaponry but also on the extent to which these assets align with the nature of the specific conflict.

The Houthis do not seek to achieve air superiority nor do they intend to defeat Saudi armed forces in direct confrontation. Their mission is to maintain the capability to launch attacks using missiles and drones, posing a threat to infrastructure and forcing their opponents to expend resources on defense. The asymmetry of this confrontation lies in the fact that both sides pursue different objectives and employ different military capabilities.

Another factor limiting the operational effectiveness of the coalition is the fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp. Despite Saudi Arabia's efforts to unify the various factions supporting the internationally recognized Yemeni government under a single command, contradictions surrounding power distribution and the future system of Yemen persist. The UAE supports the Southern Transitional Council, and its withdrawal of troops from Yemen has not eliminated divisions: many forces continue to operate independently, complicating the formulation of a unified anti-Houthi strategy. The internationally recognized government advocates for the preservation of Yemen's unity, while the Southern Transitional Council seeks separation for the southern region. The struggle for control over strategic locations and infrastructure (including oil and gas fields in Hadhramaut province and southern coastal ports) further complicates the situation. (Translation/He Yingjun)