Sahel: Between Territorial Reconquests and Strategic Reconfiguration, the Anti-Jihadist Offensive Marks a Turning Point in March 2026

The first weeks of March 2026 revealed an unprecedented military dynamic in the Sahel region, marked by significant territorial reconquests in Burkina Faso and an unexpected diplomatic realignment between Washington and Bamako. These developments occur in a fragmented regional context where the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) continues its autonomous trajectory while ECOWAS attempts to rebuild a weakened collective security architecture.

In February 2026, the Burkinabè armed forces regained control of several strategic localities that had been occupied since 2019 by terrorist armed groups. According to the Burkina Information Agency, operations conducted with the support of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) led to the liberation of Tongomayel, Béléhédé, and Pobé Mengao in the Sahel region. These towns, which had fallen into the hands of jihadists seven years ago, represented symbolic strongholds whose loss had deeply affected the morale of the populations and defense forces. On February 16, 2026, the BIR 29 unit operating in the village of Pini neutralized several enemy fighters while recovering weapons and equipment. On the same day, in Kantchari, militants abandoned their positions, leaving behind arms and supplies.

The intensity of the fighting in the north of the country reflects the determination of armed groups to maintain these strategic positions. Operations have extended to Diapaga, Djembédé, Lankoué, Koro, Lei, and Bantoro near the Mouhoun region. Later in the month, security forces also repelled an attack in Kombouari, in the eastern part of the country near Fada N'Gourma. Between February 21 and March 6, 2026, the Malian and Burkinabè armed forces eliminated over a hundred militants during coordinated operations, notably in the Sikasso province in Mali and the Djibo area in Burkina Faso. Airstrikes played a crucial role in these tactical successes, reflecting an increased operational capacity of AES forces.

This military dynamic is accompanied by a major diplomatic evolution: the United States is on the verge of concluding an agreement with Mali allowing the resumption of reconnaissance flights over Malian territory. According to official U.S. sources, Washington lifted sanctions on February 27, 2026, targeting the Malian Minister of Defense and other senior officials accused of links with Russian mercenaries. This decision is a direct response to the requests of the Bamako government and marks a break from the approach adopted by the Biden administration.

The Trump administration seeks to rebuild relations with Mali after years of tension. Washington's main objective is to resume intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations over the vast Malian territories where jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, notably Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), have gained ground. This initiative is partially motivated by the search for an American pilot kidnapped while working for Christian missionaries in neighboring Niger. The pilot is currently believed to be held in Mali by JNIM.

Nick Checker, the U.S. special envoy for Africa, visited Bamako in February 2026 to meet with Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop. The goal was to convey Washington's desire to "forge a new path in the bilateral relationship and move beyond past political mistakes," according to the State Department, an apparent reference to the policies of the Biden administration. Diop welcomed U.S. efforts to revive the relationship with a new approach based on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference.

This strategic realignment sharply contrasts with the tensions that led to the departure of U.S. forces from Niger in 2024. The Biden administration had insisted on promoting democracy following coups, which triggered a rupture with Niamey. Niger had ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from a newly constructed drone base in Agadez, worth several million dollars, after a poorly conducted meeting with Biden administration officials.

Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has launched a new specialized military force of 2,000 soldiers to combat the growing jihadist threat in West Africa. The first units are already operational, although at a level well below their full capacity. This initiative faces significant funding challenges, and for now, no coordination mechanism exists between ECOWAS and the AES.

The lack of coordination between these two regional structures reflects the institutional fragmentation of the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, members of the AES, have left ECOWAS but remain, according to Nigerian Ambassador Yusuf Tuggar, "integral to the regional security and counter-terrorism strategy." This paradoxical position illustrates the complexity of relations between the military regimes of the AES and their coastal neighbors who remain loyal to traditional multilateral structures.

In Niger, attacks by the Islamic State in the Sahel in early February 2026 against the main airport and military base of the country remind us that the threat persists despite tactical successes. In Mali, Malian forces, supported by Russian troops, managed to reopen several roads by the end of 2025, alleviating fuel shortages in Bamako. However, insecurity persists along the main roads. In Burkina Faso, up to 10 percent of the population remains displaced due to ongoing jihadist attacks.

The security situation in Nigeria also illustrates the geographical expansion of the threat. On February 3, 2026, armed men from the militant group Lakurawa, affiliated with the Islamic State, attacked the villages of Nuku and Woro in Kwara State after residents rejected their demands to adopt Sharia law, killing at least 162 people. Between March 8 and 9, 2026, Islamist militants killed at least 12 soldiers and three civilians during coordinated attacks in northeastern Nigeria.

This resurgence of violence comes as the United States strengthens its military cooperation with Abuja, with ongoing discussions regarding the potential establishment of a drone base. The debate intensifies: does this alliance effectively combat terrorism through better training and intelligence, or does it fail to address the root causes such as governance failures, economic inequalities, and regional spillovers from the Sahel?

The African Lion 2026 exercises, scheduled in Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana with about 600 participants from the United States, France, Italy, and various African partner nations, demonstrate a willingness to maintain military interoperability despite regional fragmentation. However, the effectiveness of such initiatives in a context where major Sahel states have broken away from traditional multilateral frameworks remains uncertain.

The territorial reconquest in Burkina Faso and the diplomatic normalization between Washington and Bamako undeniably mark a turning point. However, these tactical developments should not overshadow the persistent structural challenges: insufficient funding for regional forces, lack of coordination between the AES and ECOWAS, and above all, the ongoing inability to address the socio-economic factors fueling the jihadist insurgency. As long as these fundamental issues remain unresolved, military successes are likely to remain ephemeral.