Sahel: The ECOWAS-AES Rivalry Redefines the Regional Security Architecture

The security architecture of West Africa is undergoing a profound transformation, marked by the emergence of two competing visions of counter-terrorism. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) announces the deployment of a regional force of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — officially launched its own unified force of 5,000 military personnel in December 2025. This institutional fragmentation occurs in a context of escalating terrorism, as illustrated by the Islamic State's attack in the Sahel province (EI-Sahel) against the Tahoua airport in Niger on March 10, 2026, targeting the Nigerien army's Bayraktar TB2 drone fleet.

The decision by ECOWAS, formalized during a meeting of chiefs of staff in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in February 2026, is part of an attempt to reaffirm the authority of the regional bloc in the face of the defection of three of its most strategic members. ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel-Fatau Musah, confirmed in September 2025 the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel, a number increased to 2,000 during the March meeting. This force, whose initial budget is estimated at $2.6 billion according to diplomatic sources, will face major logistical and financial challenges. Several participating countries have already announced their contributions in personnel, but the mechanisms for sustainable financing remain unclear, raising doubts about the actual operational capacity of this initiative.

In response to this mobilization by ECOWAS, the AES has opted for a radically different approach. The launch ceremony of the AES Unified Force, held on December 21, 2025, marks the operationalization of a commitment made since the formation of the alliance in September 2023. This force of 5,000 military personnel — more than double the number planned by ECOWAS — benefits from political cohesion strengthened by the joint withdrawal of the three countries from ECOWAS in January 2024 and their exit from the International Criminal Court. General Abdourahamane Tchiani, president of the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland in Niger, stated during the AES summit on December 23, 2025, that the alliance had ended its security dependence on Western powers and intended to conduct large-scale joint operations against jihadist armed groups.

The geopolitical dimension of this reconfiguration cannot be ignored. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have gradually turned their backs on their traditional Western partners — notably France, whose Operation Barkhane was dissolved in November 2022 — to draw closer to Russia. Moscow has deployed military instructors and provided war equipment to the three countries, including combat helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, and drones. This Russian presence is part of a broader strategy to penetrate the African continent, where the Wagner Group — renamed Africa Corps — is now responsible for an increasing share of security operations. This strategic pivot has raised concerns within the international community, particularly in Europe and the United States, which fear a loss of influence in a region considered crucial for the global counter-terrorism effort.

The attack on the Tahoua airport, which occurred in the early morning of March 10, 2026, illustrates the persistence of the jihadist threat despite these institutional reorganizations. Suspected fighters from EI-Sahel stormed a military airbase housing the Nigerien Air Force's Bayraktar TB2 drone fleet. These aircraft, supplied by Turkey, are a major asset in reconnaissance and strike operations against terrorist groups. According to African Security Analysis, the two-hour assault resulted in the elimination or capture of all assailants but achieved its main objective: to demonstrate the capability of armed groups to strike strategic military installations and undermine state authority. The analysis highlights that this attack represents a notable operational escalation for EI-Sahel, an organization affiliated with the Islamic State that now controls vast territories in the Liptako-Gourma region, at the border between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Data on insecurity in the region is alarming. According to UN estimates, approximately 2.6 million people are currently displaced across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, a direct consequence of violence perpetrated by jihadist groups and community militias. The number of civilian and military deaths related to terrorism in the Sahel exceeded 10,000 in 2025, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), marking a 23% increase compared to 2024. Terrorist groups — notably Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and EI-Sahel — have expanded their operations into the coastal states of West Africa, with attacks reported in Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2025 and early 2026.

In the face of this deteriorating security situation, analysts remain skeptical about the effectiveness of the two competing architectures. On one hand, the ECOWAS force suffers from a legitimacy deficit in the countries most affected by terrorism, which are precisely those that have left the organization. On the other hand, the AES force, while having a larger personnel count, is hampered by limited financial resources, still embryonic operational coordination, and an increasing dependence on external partners, notably Russia and Turkey. Experts have pointed out that the excessive militarization of the security response, without taking into account socio-economic factors and governance, risks exacerbating community tensions and fueling the recruitment of armed groups.

The evolution of the situation in the Sahel will largely depend on the ability of regional actors to overcome their political rivalries to adopt a coherent and multidimensional approach to counter-terrorism. This involves not only coordinated military operations but also massive investments in economic development, education, justice, and community reconciliation. The competition between ECOWAS and AES risks, in the short term, further fragmenting security efforts and opening new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit institutional and territorial gaps.