Sahel: The Forest Strategy of Terrorist Groups Disrupts Regional Security

The security situation in the Sahel is experiencing a dramatic deterioration that reveals a paradigm shift in the operational methods of terrorist groups. Between January and December 2025, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded 3,737 security incidents that resulted in the deaths of 9,362 people in the central Sahel region, encompassing Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. This surge in violence is accompanied by a major tactical evolution: the systematic use of forested areas as strategic bases.

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State Province in the Sahel (ISSP) no longer view forests as mere temporary refuges, but as deliberately chosen strongholds for their strategic value. In February 2026, JNIM launched a series of coordinated attacks over a week across eastern and northern Burkina Faso, demonstrating increased operational capacity and mobility over vast territories. This offensive perfectly illustrates the new doctrine of these groups, which exploit the tactical advantages offered by forested areas to extend their grip.

The W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) complex, which spans Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has become a laboratory for this strategy. Between 2021 and 2024, more than 120 soldiers were killed near the "triple point," this vast area where the three countries meet. In January 2025, nearly 30 soldiers were killed in northern Benin, followed by 54 others in May during a JNIM attack near the borders with Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria. These figures reveal the extent of the challenge posed by these forest sanctuaries, where terrorist groups have managed to establish effective territorial control.

The Kainji Forest in western Nigeria, covering 5,341 square kilometers and bordering Niger State, illustrates this deadly dynamic. In February 2026, the terrorist group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), affiliated with Boko Haram, killed nearly 200 people during an attack in the town of Woro, located in Kwara State. Analyst Nnamdi Obasi from the International Crisis Group emphasizes that this attack "reflects the growing strength of jihadist groups around Kainji National Park." The reserve is now compared to the Sambisa Forest in northeastern Nigeria, which has become infamous as the base of the kidnappers of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014.

The exploitation of forests by terrorist groups goes far beyond mere concealment. According to the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), these areas now serve for recruitment, funding, smuggling, logistics, and establishing parallel governance. Terrorist groups insert themselves into pre-existing illicit and informal economies, including fuel smuggling, artisanal gold mining, cattle grazing, and poaching. In southern Burkina Faso, at the border with Côte d'Ivoire, JNIM controls illegal gold extraction operations that fund its activities. Analysts Samir Bhattacharya and Shrestha Medhi from ORF observe that "forests are no longer mere hideouts; they are deliberately selected strongholds that allow armed groups to withstand military pressure while integrating into local economic and social systems."

Combat methods have also evolved. Terrorist groups now systematically use sieges, threats, kidnappings, improvised explosive devices, drones, and landmines as deliberate tactics to control supply routes and expand their areas of influence. The increasing reliance on airstrikes, drones, IEDs, and rocket and mortar fire by JNIM and ISSP has contributed to indiscriminate violence that causes massive civilian casualties and likely constitutes war crimes.

In the face of this threat, military responses have intensified, but often at the cost of human rights violations. The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Russian African Corps, formerly known as the Wagner Group, have been involved in possible war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate airstrikes, rape, and sexual violence. In Niger, the army has strengthened its counter-insurgency operations and declared a "general mobilization" in December 2025, granting extensive powers to requisition civilians and resources. On March 21, 2026, the Nigerien army announced it had "neutralized" 27 terrorists in the west and northwest of the country, reflecting the increased security pressure in the region.

The Tillabéri region in southwestern Niger became the deadliest area in the central Sahel in 2025 according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED), with the highest level of civilian targeting, primarily by ISSP, followed by the Nigerien army and then JNIM. Alleged militants killed more than 50 civilians during two major attacks in early 2026. In February, ISSP launched an unprecedented attack on the international airport in the capital, marking a worrying escalation in the group's operational capabilities.

The international dimension of the crisis is manifested by the U.S. redeployment in Nigeria. In March 2026, the United States deployed several MQ-9 Reaper drones and approximately 200 military personnel to support the fight against Islamist insurgents in northern Nigeria. These forces, based at the Bauchi airfield in the northeast, provide training and intelligence support but are not integrated into Nigerian frontline units. The drones, capable of flying at high altitudes for over 27 hours, are used exclusively for surveillance. This deployment comes after the United States closed its $100 million drone base in Niger in 2024, which housed around 1,000 soldiers, following a request for withdrawal from the Nigerien junta.

Major General Samaila Uba, director of defense information at Nigeria's defense headquarters, confirmed that this partnership relies on the U.S.-Nigeria intelligence fusion cell, which provides actionable intelligence to Nigerian field commanders. A U.S. defense official told Reuters: "We view this as a shared security threat." This cooperation aims to enhance Nigeria's capacity to identify, track, and respond to terrorist threats while maintaining the sovereignty of Nigerian military operations.

The three military regimes in the central Sahel established the Sahel States Alliance (AES) in 2023 and formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States in January 2025, launching the AES Unified Force, a joint security mechanism, in December. This regional fragmentation further complicates the coordination necessary to address a cross-border threat. Wilfried Léandre Houngbédji, spokesperson for the Beninese government, lamented after the April 2025 attack: "The points where these attacks on April 17 occurred are at the border, so you can understand that if there were a force like ours on the other side of the border, these attacks would not happen in this way or would not even occur."

The humanitarian crisis is worsening alongside the security deterioration. Islamist armed groups have extended their control along major roads, destabilizing markets and isolating entire communities, increasingly including in urban areas. In besieged areas, these groups block humanitarian aid to civilians, causing famine, imposing forced taxes, and strategically destroying civilian property, including places of worship, health centers, food reserves, and water services. The New Humanitarian reported that arrests of humanitarian workers have increased in recent months, targeting both national and international staff, while new policies introduced in 2025 restrict the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate effectively.

The lack of accountability remains a major obstacle to resolving the crisis. Although the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Iyad Ag Ghaly, leader of the Islamist armed group Ansar Dine, and convicted Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz for war crimes and crimes against humanity, few alleged perpetrators have been arrested, prosecuted, or tried for international crimes. The announced withdrawal of the ICC by the military regimes further weakens the avenues for justice and redress for victims of heinous crimes.

The repression of civic and political space constitutes an additional dimension of the crisis. In January 2026, the Burkinabè government announced measures to dissolve all political parties. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights continues to receive allegations of enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests in Burkina Faso. In Mali, former Prime Minister Moussa Mara was sentenced in February 2026 to two years in prison for "discrediting the state" following a social media post expressing solidarity with detained political and civil society figures.

The forest strategy of terrorist groups in the Sahel thus represents much more than a mere tactical evolution. It reveals a sophisticated adaptation to the realities on the ground, exploiting the structural weaknesses of regional governance, the porosity of borders, and pre-existing informal economies. Forests are no longer marginal spaces in this war, but strategic territories where the future of regional stability is at stake. Without a coordinated approach that combines military pressure, economic development, respect for human rights, and enhanced cross-border cooperation, this crisis is likely to intensify further in the coming months, threatening not only the Sahel but all of West Africa.