Sahel: The Unified Force of the AES Facing the Jihadist Escalation of March 2026

The first quarter of 2026 marks a new critical phase in the Sahel security crisis, as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) deploys its newly created Unified Force in response to a spectacular resurgence of terrorist attacks. The events of February and March reveal not only the persistence of the jihadist threat but also the structural challenges faced by the new regional security architectures.

The Unified Force of the AES, officially inaugurated in December 2025 in Bamako, represents the culmination of a year of intensive preparation. Composed of approximately 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, this force, under the command of Burkinabè General Daouda Traoré and based in Niamey, embodies the ambition of the three military juntas to replace their own collective defense mechanisms with traditional regional structures. Unlike the former Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, which suffered from erratic funding and dependence on Western partners, the AES claims total strategic autonomy, although observers question the budgetary viability of such an undertaking.

This declared autonomy is set against a radically transformed geopolitical context. Between 2024 and 2025, the three member states of the AES successively broke their military cooperation agreements with the United States, France, and other Western partners. The expulsion of American forces from Niger in 2024, followed by the definitive withdrawal of the last French contingents from Mali and Burkina Faso, created a security vacuum that jihadist groups quickly exploited. The Sahelian juntas then sought new partnerships, notably with Russia and Turkey, but these new alliances still struggle to compensate for the loss of Western intelligence and air support capabilities.

It is in this weakened context that Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main jihadist coalition affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Sahel, launched a coordinated campaign of unprecedented scale in February 2026. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), this offensive primarily targeted Burkina Faso but also extended to central Mali and as far as Benin, demonstrating the group's growing operational capacity. Analysts note that this campaign reveals a new tactical sophistication, with synchronized attacks on multiple fronts, simultaneously targeting isolated military camps and strategic communication routes.

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), although geographically more confined to northern Burkina Faso and western Niger since its clashes with JNIM that began in 2020, demonstrated its capacity for disruption in March 2026 through a series of bold assaults on positions near regional capitals. The two-hour nighttime attack carried out in early March, although repelled with the elimination or capture of all assailants, achieved its strategic objective: to undermine confidence in security forces and prove that terrorist groups remain an active threat despite the intensification of counter-terrorism operations. Experts from African Security Analysis view this as a deliberate operational escalation by the EIGS, seeking to test the rapid response capabilities of government forces.

The increase in these attacks comes as Sahelian armed forces face major logistical challenges. In Burkina Faso, the inability of ground infantry units to reinforce the city of Djibo or secure vital supply routes has allowed insurgents to isolate entire towns and strike with impunity. In Niger, the military camp at Mossipaga in the Tillabéri region was overwhelmed by JNIM, illustrating the fatal consequences of prolonged reinforcement delays and restricted mobility in areas where state presence remains symbolic. These tactical failures reveal a structural issue: most Sahelian units remain dependent on roads, vulnerable to improvised explosive devices, and unable to project power quickly into contested areas.

In the face of this deteriorating security situation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), from which the three AES states formally withdrew in January 2024, is attempting to develop its own military response. In August 2025, the organization announced an ambitious plan to activate a joint counter-terrorism force of 260,000 personnel, supported by a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion for logistics and frontline support. However, successive announcements reflect a more modest reality: in September 2025, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel-Fatau Musah, confirmed the planned deployment in 2026 of a Rapid Deployment Force of only 1,650 personnel. In March 2026, this figure was revised to 2,000 soldiers by the end of the year, a deployment that was symbolically welcomed but largely insufficient to reverse the short-term insecurity dynamic.

This institutional fragmentation between the AES and ECOWAS raises concerns among security experts, who call for collaboration rather than competition. The Accra Initiative, a security mechanism established in 2017 to counter the growing threat to West African coastal states, also struggles to materialize due to a lack of dedicated financial resources. Observers highlight the paradox of a region that theoretically has multiple security cooperation frameworks, yet where political rivalries and strategic divergences paralyze collective action.

The developments of March 2026 have also attracted international attention. On December 25, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump authorized what he called a powerful and deadly strike against the terrorist scum of the Islamic State in northwestern Nigeria, promising many more interventions and reaffirming that the United States would not allow radical Islamic terrorism to thrive. This statement came less than a week after the inauguration of the AES Unified Force and illustrates the persistence of a U.S. military presence in the region, despite the formal expulsions from bases in Niger. Analysts interpret these strikes as a signal that Washington, while reducing its ground presence, maintains remote strike capabilities and intends to retain a role in the Sahel counter-terrorism effort.

The operational effectiveness of the AES Unified Force remains to be demonstrated. While it theoretically benefits from better cross-border integration than its predecessor, the G5 Sahel, it inherits the same structural constraints: limited budgets, fragile logistics chains, insufficient intelligence, and a critical deficit in air support and helicopter mobility. The experience of the G5 Sahel, which had substantial international support but never achieved its full operational capacity, should serve as a warning. Without resolution of issues related to unified command, sustainable funding, and coordination with local security forces, the Unified Force risks replicating past failures.

The political dimension of this security crisis cannot be overlooked. The three juntas of the AES, which came to power through coups between 2020 and 2023, have largely justified their takeovers by the inability of previous regimes to ensure security. Their legitimacy thus partly relies on their ability to demonstrate tangible results in the anti-jihadist struggle. The escalation of February-March 2026 thus represents not only a military challenge but also a political test for these regimes. Sahelian public opinion, initially favorable to the new military authorities due to a sovereignist and anti-French discourse, may become less patient if the security situation continues to deteriorate.

The regional implications of this crisis extend far beyond the borders of the three AES states. Togo, whose Foreign Minister Robert Dussey recently stated that joining the AES was not impossible and could strengthen regional cooperation and provide access to the sea for member countries, illustrates the potential appeal of this new alliance for other states facing security pressures. However, such expansion could also exacerbate tensions with ECOWAS and further fragment the West African security architecture.

The question of funding remains central. The AES claims budgetary autonomy, but the three member states are among the poorest on the continent and face considerable economic challenges, exacerbated by international sanctions and partial diplomatic isolation. ECOWAS, for its part, struggles to mobilize the announced $2.5 billion, as most member states themselves face budgetary constraints. This economic reality stands in stark contrast to the scale of operational needs, creating a gap between stated ambitions and available resources.

The early months of 2026 thus outline a Sahel at a crossroads. On one side, the AES represents a bold attempt to create an endogenous security architecture, free from Western tutelage and capable of responding to local specificities. On the other, the persistence and intensification of jihadist attacks, regional institutional fragmentation, and logistical and financial challenges raise serious doubts about the viability of this approach. The coordinated campaign by JNIM in February and the assaults by the EIGS in March serve as a brutal reminder that sovereignist rhetoric and institutional reorganizations are insufficient to defeat an insurgency deeply rooted in local dynamics of marginalization, failing governance, and exploitation of community grievances.

The evolution of the situation in the coming months will be decisive. If the AES Unified Force manages to demonstrate real operational capacity, effectively coordinate cross-border operations, and inflict significant losses on jihadist groups, it could legitimize the security integration model advocated by the Sahelian juntas and potentially attract other states. Conversely, if attacks continue to intensify and civilian populations do not perceive tangible improvements in their security, the window of legitimacy for the military regimes could close rapidly, with unpredictable political consequences.