Saudi, UAE, and Qatari Investments in Alternatives to Hormuz Reveal the Limits of Gulf Security in 2026

Six months into a war that has subjected the Gulf to the most dangerous test of energy routes in decades, the question in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha is no longer how navigation in the Strait of Hormuz can return to its former state, but rather how much it costs to reduce reliance on it, even partially. The figures that emerged during August do not speak of successful deterrence, but rather of a practical acknowledgment that the maritime artery that used to carry around 20 million barrels per day before the war is no longer a passage upon which economic security can be solely built.

From a military perspective, this shift is significant because it reveals something any officer who has served in the region knows: when a state begins to invest heavily in logistical bypass routes, it implicitly states that the original protection system is no longer sufficient. The Gulf is not building an alternative to Hormuz today because it has achieved deterrence, but because it has tested the failure of deterrence in preventing threats or even in ensuring the swift restoration of passage.

The Numbers That Changed the Calculations

The data circulating this week paints a harsh picture. Traffic through Hormuz has dropped from an average of 88 ships per day before the war to about 16 ships after six months, while Gulf oil exports remain significantly below pre-February levels. Saudi Arabia has redirected a larger portion of crude to the East-West pipeline towards the Red Sea, the UAE has increased reliance on the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah route outside the Gulf, Iraq has expanded its bet on Kirkuk-Ceyhan and is looking for additional routes, while Kuwait remains the weakest geographically as it lacks an independent alternative of the same scale.

• Saudi Arabia theoretically has the advantage of the Petroline with a capacity of nearly 7 million barrels per day.
• The UAE has benefited from the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah pipeline and has increased exports from the Sea of Oman by about 1 million barrels per day.
• Qatar has been affected by strikes on gas facilities, which has made the maritime route issue intertwine with the problem of infrastructure safety itself.
• Kuwait and Iraq remain more exposed to the dilemma of narrow geography and reliance on external transit arrangements or understandings.

These are not just energy numbers. In my view, they are national security numbers. Every barrel that passes through an alternative pipeline means that the decision-maker now considers the port or strait a zone of continuous danger rather than a passing incident.

The Dilemma Is Not in the Pipeline but in the Triangle of Power

I always warn against being dazzled by infrastructure as some are deceived by purchasing a new weapon platform. The pipeline is not a substitute for deterrence, and the alternative port is not a substitute for control over the maritime domain. The Gulf is here reproducing its old problem in a new form: focusing on the element of equipment and facilities more than on the elements of training and institution.

It is true that Saudi Arabia can theoretically transport large quantities westward, and that the UAE has built a more flexible option through Fujairah in recent years, but what are these projects actually protecting if the adversary can shift from targeting the strait to targeting pumping stations, refineries, and export ports, and even the alternative route itself? The strikes on Ras Tanura, Ruwais, and Ras Laffan in recent months have shown that the adversary does not need to close Hormuz alone to disrupt exports; it is enough for them to distribute fire across the logistical nodes.

In Arab armies, we sometimes say that the backup route does not become a solution if the enemy sees the same map.

For this reason, I do not see investments in ports and pipelines as evidence of complete strategic independence, but rather as evidence of the Gulf's transition from unilateral fragility to distributed fragility. This is better than nothing, but it is not a victory.

Why the Red Sea Is Not a Safe Haven as It Seems

The most important alternative route for Saudi Arabia has been the Red Sea, but this alternative itself has come under pressure as Houthi threats escalated at Bab al-Mandab and against facilities linked to the Kingdom's exports. Here, the structural contradiction becomes clear: escaping from Hormuz does not take the Gulf out of the economy of narrow corridors, but rather shifts it from one bottleneck to another. Relying on Bab al-Mandab after Hormuz is like moving ammunition from an exposed warehouse to another warehouse that is slightly less exposed but still within the range of fire.

The more dangerous aspect is that this shift raises costs, consumes time, and puts pressure on transport and insurance fleets, but it does not necessarily create additional combat capability. In other words, the state is spending billions to maintain economic flow, not to radically change the military balance of power. This is a difference that should not be lost amid the celebration of expansion and connectivity projects.

What These Investments Say About the Post-War Phase

Politically, the message is clear. Gulf states no longer trust that a return to the previous situation is possible even if Hormuz is diplomatically opened for a time. Militarily, the message is clearer: the American umbrella is still necessary, but it is no longer sufficient on its own to reassure capitals that passage will remain safe in the first week of a crisis, let alone in its sixth month. Therefore, we see a simultaneous rush to expand ports, enhance pipelines, diversify partners, and distribute risks across multiple fronts.

However, practically, ports and pipelines cannot purchase what has not yet been built: a cohesive regional system for early warning, integrated air and maritime defense, and protection of critical infrastructure with a common doctrine rather than scattered reactions. The Gulf is trying today to buy time, not to buy a solution.

And here lies the paradox that will accompany the region after the 2026 war. The more Gulf states invest in bypassing Hormuz, the more they confirm at the same time that their security remains hostage to the same corridors they are trying to escape from. The problem is not a lack of maps or pipelines; the problem is that infrastructure can maneuver around geography a little, but it cannot alone eliminate politics, missiles, or the limits of deterrence.