Strategic Reconfiguration of JNIM in the Sahel: From the Malian Blockade to the Burkinabe Offensive

Since the beginning of 2026, Western Sahel has been experiencing a significant shift in the dynamics of armed conflicts. The Jamāʿat Nusrat al-Islām wa-l-Muslimīn (JNIM), the Sahelian branch of Al-Qaeda, has made a major tactical adjustment by reducing its operations in Mali while intensifying its military pressure in Burkina Faso. This shift, far from being trivial, reflects a profound strategic reconfiguration whose security, political, and humanitarian implications warrant rigorous analysis.

The fuel blockade imposed by the JNIM starting September 3, 2025, constituted an unprecedented escalation in the group's history. By targeting the Kayes region, a commercial choke point between Senegal and Bamako, and then extending its strikes to key regional transit routes, the JNIM demonstrated a formidable capacity for economic warfare. Consolidated reports indicate over 300 fuel tankers set ablaze and 27 drivers killed during the year 2025. The objective was clear: to economically suffocate the Bamako regime by paralyzing the energy supply to the capital and surrounding regions.

However, several converging indicators suggest a considerable easing of this strategy since January 2026. The last documented attack against a fuel convoy dates back to January 29, when JNIM fighters reportedly destroyed dozens of tankers under Malian military escort. Since that date, local Malian media and the semi-official propaganda outlets of the group, such as al-Fathou, have reported no significant new operations against oil infrastructure. Even more revealing, the series of videos released by the JNIM during Ramadan, from February 17 to March 19, 2026, remained completely silent on the issue of the blockade, focusing exclusively on theological themes. This contrast is striking compared to the much more combative statements made during Eid al-Fitr 2025, when a prominent figure of the movement denounced the massacres perpetrated by Sahelian governments and their alliance with Russia.

The quantitative analysis of attacks claimed by the JNIM corroborates this trend. Throughout 2025, Burkina Faso had already borne the brunt of the group's operations, with 502 claimed attacks compared to 330 in Mali. But the dynamics of the blockade briefly reversed this proportion in September and October 2025, with Mali temporarily becoming the main theater. Since January 2026, a return to normalcy is evident: the claimed attacks in Burkina Faso have once again far exceeded those carried out in Mali. The number of claimed victims in Mali has dropped dramatically, from 165 in November 2025 to only 10 victims in March 2026, marking the lowest level recorded in over a year.

These developments inevitably raise the question of a possible tacit arrangement between Bamako and the JNIM. The Malian government has formally denied any truce, but several elements fuel speculation. Local media reported a release of JNIM prisoners in mid-March 2026, presented by some analysts as the counterpart of an agreement aimed at reopening fuel import corridors. At the same time, the Bamako authorities announced the establishment of a national strategic fuel reserve described as "revolutionary," suggesting a restored import capacity.

The JNIM's redeployment to Burkina Faso occurs against a backdrop of increased vulnerability in that country. The Burkinabè Armed Forces are facing multi-front pressure. The average number of victims per attack in Burkina Faso, estimated at 4.2 throughout 2025 compared to 1.5 in Mali, reflects a significantly higher intensity of fighting. The potential arrival of fighters and resources previously allocated to the Malian theater can only exacerbate an already critical security situation, particularly in the Northern, Central-Northern, and Eastern regions.

The regional dynamics of the JNIM are not limited to the Mali-Burkina Faso pair. The maintenance of significant operational capacity in neighboring Niger, as well as links with affiliated groups in coastal West Africa, notably in Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire, indicate that the group is pursuing a long-term territorial expansion strategy. The potential release of military resources in Mali could accelerate this expansion towards the Gulf of Guinea states.

In parallel to this situation in the central Sahel, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to face a growing terrorist threat from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), affiliated with the Islamic State. On April 20, 2026, the Ugandan army announced the release of at least 200 civilians held captive in an ADF camp along the Epulu River in Ituri Province. Joint Ugandan-Congolese operations, intensified since the beginning of the year, have led to the neutralization of several fighters and the seizure of weapons. Nevertheless, ADF attacks against civilians have intensified, with at least 43 people killed in early April in a single attack.

The current reconfiguration of the Sahelian security landscape calls for heightened vigilance from the international community and regional actors. Any potential détente between the JNIM and Bamako, if confirmed, would not constitute a lasting pacification but rather a tactical redeployment likely to further destabilize Burkina Faso and neighboring states. The JNIM's ability to adapt its strategy, alternating between economic warfare and direct military actions, and to exploit local political vulnerabilities, makes it an actor whose movements deserve constant analytical attention.