Strikes on Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure: Escalation of the Winter Campaign and Limits of Effectiveness

408 drones and 39 missiles in one night — this is the scale of the Russian airstrike on February 6-7, 2026. Of these, 382 drones and 24 missiles were shot down by Ukrainian air defense, but the remaining 34 strike assets hit targets in 19 locations. Notably, for the first time since October 2022, the Russian Armed Forces systematically attacked 750 kV and 330 kV substations that support the operation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). This represents a qualitative shift in the logic of strikes on energy infrastructure, requiring analysis from the perspective of military doctrine and the limitations of Russian missile-strike potential.

Strike Architecture: Targets and Methodology

According to data from "Ukrenergo" and the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, the main targets were high-voltage substations that form the backbone of the energy system: 750 kV — the main transmission level, 330 kV — regional distribution. The strikes targeted the Burshtyn TPP (Ivano-Frankivsk region), the Dobrotvorsk TPP (Lviv region), and key nodes supplying energy blocks of NPPs. The result: forced reduction of generation at nuclear power plants and increased duration of outages across the country. In Burshtyn (Ivano-Frankivsk region), 600,000 subscribers were left without electricity, heating, and water supply (as of February 7).

The structure of the strike package is typical for Russian missile-drone operations in 2025-2026: 21 X-101 cruise missiles (Tu-95MS), 16 "Kalibrs" (submarines and surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet), 2 anti-ship "Zircons"/"Onyxes" (adapted for ground targets), and mass use of kamikaze drones of the "Shahed" type. The ratio of drones to missiles — 10.5:1 — reflects the realities of the Russian military-industrial complex: domestically produced drones (based on Iranian technology) are significantly cheaper than long-range missiles.

Tactics of "Moratorium-Accumulation-Strike": Cynical Calculation or Forced Measure?

From January 29 to February 1, 2026, the Russian side observed an unofficial moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure — presumably in the context of a negotiation process initiated by the U.S. in Abu Dhabi. Western media and some Ukrainian experts perceived this as a "gesture of goodwill from the Kremlin." However, the data suggests otherwise: during the four-day pause, the Russian side accumulated strike assets for two massive strikes — February 2-3 (71 missiles + 450 drones) and February 6-7 (39 missiles + 408 drones). In total: over six days after the end of the "moratorium" — 110 missiles and 858 drones.

This tactic resembles the Soviet concept of "fire raids," adapted to the conditions of a limited missile arsenal. The Russian military-industrial complex produces approximately 40-50 X-101 cruise missiles per month (according to estimates from the Royal United Services Institute, RUSI, at the end of 2025), which amounts to 480-600 units per year. The expenditure of 110 missiles over six days represents more than 18% of annual production capacity, indicating the impossibility of maintaining such a pace without depleting strategic reserves. Thus, the moratorium was not a "gesture," but a technical necessity: it was necessary to replenish arsenals after the December-January series of strikes.

Substations of NPPs as a Strategic Target: Logic and Risks

The attack on substations that support the operation of nuclear power plants is a step that the Russian side has avoided since the fall of 2022. The reason is obvious: the unpredictability of the consequences. Ukrainian NPPs (Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, South Ukraine) operate on the Soviet design of VVER-1000, where in the event of sudden power loss, diesel generators are activated to cool the active zone. However, repeated outages increase the risk of technical failures — especially under conditions where the plants are operated in overload mode due to a shortage of TPP capacities.

From a military-strategic perspective, strikes on NPP substations have a dual effect: they maximize chaos in the energy system (nuclear power plants provide base load; their shutdown collapses the entire network) and simultaneously create international resonance. The West traditionally reacts painfully to threats to nuclear safety — just recall the rhetoric surrounding the Zaporizhzhia NPP in 2022-2023. The Kremlin likely hopes that the fear of a nuclear catastrophe will compel Kyiv and Washington to accelerate negotiations on Russian terms.

However, there is a miscalculation here. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly stated that shelling energy infrastructure of NPPs violates nuclear safety principles. If one of the reactors encounters a critical failure, Russia will automatically find itself in the role of the culprit of a potential catastrophe — with corresponding consequences for its international isolation. This risk appears to be one that the Russian military command is willing to bear.

Effectiveness of Strikes: 9.4% Penetration vs. Critical Need for Air Defense

Out of 447 strike assets (408 drones + 39 missiles), Ukrainian air defense shot down 406 units — a 90.6% interception efficiency. At first glance, this is an impressive figure. But the 34 objects that broke through to their targets (13 missiles + 21 drones) were sufficient to inflict critical damage on the energy system. This illustrates a fundamental problem: Ukrainian air defense is effective, but not absolute, and the Russian side can afford to "flood" it with mass attacks.

The key deficit is missile defense systems like "Patriot," capable of intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles at medium altitudes. According to open sources, Ukraine has 8-10 "Patriot" batteries (each with 48-96 interceptors depending on configuration), which is insufficient to simultaneously cover all critical facilities. "Shahed" drones flying at low altitudes are effectively shot down by mobile groups with MANPADS and machine guns, but heavy air defense systems are needed for X-101 and "Kalibr" missiles — and there is a catastrophic shortage of them.

Comparison with the 2022 Campaign: What Has Changed?

The autumn-winter campaign of 2022 (October-December) aimed at the complete collapse of the Ukrainian energy system. The Russian side expended about 1200 missiles over three months, striking TPPs, HPPs, and transformer substations. The result was partial: prolonged outages, but not a collapse of the system. The reason was the rapid recovery by Ukrainian energy workers and Western supplies of equipment (transformers, turbines).

In 2026, the logic is different. The Russian side is not seeking a one-time collapse — it is betting on systematic depletion. Strikes are carried out in series, with intervals of several days, preventing the system from recovering. "Shahed" drones have been modified: some carry mines and cluster munitions, complicating repair work and increasing downtime for facilities. This is "war of attrition" in its purest form — not blitzkrieg, but slow strangulation.

Forecast: Continuation Until Spring, Pause in Summer

The current intensity of strikes (over 100 missiles in six days) is unstable. The Russian military-industrial complex physically cannot maintain such a rate of expenditure without degrading strategic reserves. A likely scenario: series of mass strikes will repeat every 7-10 days until the end of March, while the cold persists and the need for heating is at its maximum. From April, when temperatures rise and energy consumption decreases, strikes will become less frequent — as was the case in spring 2023.

The key factor is the negotiation process. If the U.S. is indeed insisting on an agreement by March (as reported by Reuters), the Russian side will use energy strikes as leverage. The logic is simple: the more suffering the civilian population of Ukraine endures, the stronger the pressure on Kyiv to accept unfavorable terms. A cynical but effective tactic, well known from the practices of the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the Chechen campaigns of the 1990s.

The Ukrainian energy system will endure. But the price of survival is thousands of hours of outages, frozen cities, and economic damage measured in billions of dollars. The West can reduce this price by supplying more air defense systems. The issue is not technology — it exists. The issue is political will.