Strikes on Ukraine's Energy Infrastructure: A Return to the 2022 Strategy and Limits of Effectiveness

On February 7, 2026, Russia launched a large-scale strike on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, using a combined package of cruise missiles, Kinzhal-type air-launched ballistic missiles, and drones. The targets included the Burshtyn and Dobrotvor thermal power plants, as well as key substations and 750 kV and 330 kV power transmission lines—the backbone of the Ukrainian energy system. This strike was the second large-scale attack in a week following the formal end of the "energy truce" agreed upon between Putin and Trump until February 2. The figure of 450 drones and over 70 missiles in one night (February 3) speaks volumes: this is not just a tactical operation, but a return to the strategy of attrition that Russia employed during the winter of 2022-2023.

The Logic of Energy Warfare: From Tactics to Strategy

Strikes on energy infrastructure are not merely attempts to deprive the enemy of light and heat. This is a strategy aimed at creating long-term dependence on external assistance and undermining economic stability. Unlike strikes on military targets, the effects of which are measured in days or weeks, damage to major transformer substations and generating capacities creates a cascading effect that can last for months. Ukrainian energy companies, including the private DTEK, characterize the strike on February 3 as "the most powerful strike of the year," which is confirmed not only by the number of munitions used but also by the accuracy of hits on critical nodes of the grid.

However, the strategy of energy warfare that Russia has employed since the fall of 2022 has its limits of effectiveness. Firstly, the Ukrainian energy system has adapted: decentralization, backup capacities, and emergency assistance from neighboring countries (particularly Poland, which already provided emergency electricity on February 7) reduce the long-term impact of each strike. Secondly, the cost of such operations for Russia is increasing: the production of high-precision missiles like the X-101 and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles requires time and resources, which are becoming increasingly scarce for the Russian defense industry under the pressure of sanctions (according to open sources, the growth rate of the defense industry in 2025 was only 1% compared to 5.6% the previous year).

Kinzhal as a Symbol: Hypersonics Against Patriot

The use of the 9A-7760 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles (classified as Kh-47M2 in the West) in strikes on energy infrastructure raises questions about the rationality of such a decision. The Kinzhal, launched from a MiG-31K, was developed as a means to strike naval targets and fortified structures, not civilian infrastructure. Its use against thermal power plants and substations is more of a demonstrative act than a military necessity. The goal is to show that Russia has means that (theoretically) can overcome Ukrainian air defense, including American Patriot systems.

However, the reality is more complex. Ukrainian military representatives, including Major Ilya Evlash, have stated that Patriot and SAMP/T systems are capable of intercepting the Kinzhal in the terminal phase of flight, when the missile slows down to speeds of about 4.5 Mach. Western analysts, including former Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharpe, confirm this assessment based on the analysis of past interceptions. In other words, the "hypersonicity" of the Kinzhal is a marketing term, not a guarantee of invulnerability. The use of such expensive systems against infrastructure targets indicates either a lack of alternatives or an attempt to create a psychological effect.

Energy Truce as a Tactical Maneuver

The formal "energy truce" declared by Putin at the "personal request" of Donald Trump and lasting until February 2 was not used by Russia for de-escalation, but rather for preparing a new wave of strikes. According to estimates from Ukrainian military monitoring resources, during this period, the Russian side updated target maps, increased missile stocks, and coordinated the actions of aviation and missile units. The strike on February 3 is the result of such preparation: 450 drones and over 70 missiles of various types cannot be deployed spontaneously.

This episode resembles the situation in the winter of 2022 when Russia used pauses in strikes to build up forces and subsequently deliver massive strikes. The tactic of "accumulation — strike — pause — accumulation" has become standard operating procedure for the Russian Aerospace Forces. However, the effectiveness of this tactic is decreasing as Ukrainian air defense becomes more layered and the energy system becomes more resilient to pinpoint strikes.

Prospects and Limits

The return to the strategy of energy warfare in February 2026 indicates that the Russian military command sees no alternative ways to exert strategic pressure on Ukraine in conditions where ground operations are not yielding significant results. However, this strategy faces two limitations: the depletion of stocks of high-precision missiles and the growing resilience of Ukrainian infrastructure.

The Russian defense industry is capable of producing X-101 and 3M14 Kalibr missiles, but production rates are lagging behind consumption rates. According to estimates from Western analysts, Russia produces about 40-50 cruise missiles per month, which barely covers the costs of one or two large-scale operations. Kinzhal missiles are produced in limited quantities due to the complexity of the technology and a shortage of components. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian side, with the support of Western partners, is enhancing air defense and energy infrastructure capabilities faster than Russia can destroy them.

Energy warfare will continue, but its results will become increasingly less convincing. Russia will be able to strike, but it will not achieve the strategic effect it hoped for in the winter of 2022. The cost of each missile is rising, while the effect of each strike is diminishing. This is a war of attrition, where the victor is not the one who strikes more, but the one who can endure the pace of recovery longer.