Sudan 2026 — 23 dead in El-Obeid and the drone war suffocates Kordofan

El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, was struck on the night of June 10 to 11 by a series of drones that hit residential neighborhoods, a funeral gathering, a gas station, a food supply truck, and the outskirts of military positions. According to Emergency Lawyers, the toll reached 23 civilians killed and 19 injured. Local health authorities cited by AP and Al Jazeera provide a more cautious toll, at least 15 dead and more than 10 injured. The difference matters. It mainly indicates that the information fog remains thick in this city, which has been partially surrounded for months by the Rapid Support Forces, the RSF.

What is less uncertain, however, is the tactical trend. Kordofan is becoming a drone theater. Not just a space where one camp strikes the opposing line, but an area where the points that sustain the population are treated as military pressure points. Cemetery, market, fuel station, civilian vehicles, water source, care route. The map is no longer drawn solely by the garrisons.

A sequence of strikes, not an isolated incident

On June 11, Al Jazeera, citing AFP and AP, reported that the strikes against El-Obeid had killed up to 23 people. Emergency Lawyers attributed the attack to the RSF, who did not immediately claim responsibility. The same sources indicate that the drones struck civilian areas and sectors near the Sudanese Fifth Infantry Division. It is precisely this mix that makes the war in Kordofan difficult to read from the outside. Military targets and living places are close, sometimes intertwined, and each camp uses this proximity to justify or deny.

The Darfur Network for Human Rights had already documented, for the period from June 6 to 8, at least 18 civilians killed in North Kordofan. It cites strikes in Abu Zaima, Hamrat El Sheikh, Sudri, and El-Obeid, with a total of at least 33 civilians killed in the week leading up to June 8. Again, the qualification must remain cautious. Local NGOs often work without full access to sites, under political and security pressure. But several independent accounts point to the same trend: drones are striking civilian nodes.

• June 6: strike on the Abu Zaima market, at least 11 civilians killed according to Emergency Lawyers.
• June 7: reported strike on the Charter station in El-Obeid, with explosion and panic in nearby neighborhoods.
• Evening of June 7: two civilian vehicles hit in Adeid Raha, in the locality of Sudri, as passengers were heading north for care.
• June 10-11: new wave in El-Obeid, with a maximum toll announced of 23 dead.
• June 12: Sudan Tribune reports a strike attributed to the army against a water point in Al-Baqari, in the Wadi Al-Malik area, killing at least one civilian.

Why El-Obeid matters

El-Obeid is not just a point on the road. The city commands part of the axis between Darfur, Kordofan, and the more central areas controlled by the army. It serves as a logistical lock, a hospital hub, and a transit point for goods and fuel. When a drone strikes a gas station or a food truck, the effect goes beyond the immediate toll. It reduces mobility, increases prices, slows medical evacuations, and makes every movement suspect.

On the ground, an army can lose without losing a city. It loses when its convoys hesitate, when its wounded take too long to evacuate, when traders no longer want to load trucks, when families avoid markets. This is a logic we have seen in the Sahel with the roadside ambushes of JNIM, but in Sudan it is now taking on an aerial form. The drone sometimes replaces the pickup column. It costs less, exposes fighters less, and allows for terrorizing a road without occupying the ground.

A low-cost air war

Since the beginning of 2026, drones have been playing an increasingly prominent role in the Sudanese war. The United Nations indicated in May that at least 880 civilians had been killed by drone strikes in the country between January and April. AllAfrica, citing Dabanga and Sudanese NGOs, reports that more than 30 people were killed this week in drone attacks, with North Kordofan recording the heaviest toll. This figure does not only describe a technical escalation. It shows an operational adaptation.

The RSF need to bypass the army's strong points and maintain pressure on the cities they are encircling. The Sudanese army, for its part, strikes areas controlled or traversed by the RSF to cut off flows to Darfur. In both cases, the drone allows for targeting infrastructure and producing an immediate psychological effect. A station explodes, a road empties, an ambulance remains at the depot. For a force that lacks conventional air assets or wants to deny direct responsibility, it is an ideal tool.

But technical precision does not guarantee political precision. A drone capable of targeting a gas station can also turn that station into a massacre scene if the intelligence is poor, if the payload is poorly chosen, or if the command too easily accepts the civil risk. This is where the line between operational fault and method of warfare becomes thin.

The humanitarian corridor becomes a target

The most worrying signal may come from the Chad-Sudan border. Médecins Sans Frontières reported on June 4 that 116 injured individuals had been treated since early May at the Tiné hospital in Chad, following the intensification of strikes around Tina, on the Sudanese side. Between May 17 and 26, 69 injured were admitted. On May 24, a strike on a cafeteria in the Tina market sent 35 people to the hospital in a single day. MSF notes an increase in the number of women and children among the injured.

This detail is operationally important. When the injured arrive after hours of travel, with burns, blast trauma, and multiple fractures, the strike does not stop at the point of impact. It consumes the neighboring healthcare system. It forces Chad to absorb part of the Sudanese shock. It transforms the border into a medical valve, then into a bottleneck.

In a drone war, the real objective is not always the vehicle struck. Sometimes it is the next vehicle that will not depart.

Kordofan as a strategic hinge

Since the RSF took El-Fasher last year, Kordofan connects the fronts more than political maps suggest. To the west, Darfur provides depth, recruits, and smuggling routes. To the east and northeast, the army retains its economic and administrative centers. Between the two, El-Obeid and its road axes form a hinge. Whoever makes this hinge unusable does not need to hold all the territory.

The RSF do not seem capable, today, of turning every strike into urban conquest. The Sudanese army also does not seem capable of preventing the regular penetration of drones against cities that are supposed to remain under its control. This negative symmetry is dangerous. Each camp can injure the other, neither truly protects civilians, and local actors find themselves caught in a siege economy without a clear front line.

The next area to watch is the El-Obeid - Bara - Hamrat El Sheikh axis, then the roads leading up to the health and commercial crossing points. If strikes continue to target markets, fuel stations, and care vehicles, Kordofan will not only experience military intensification. It will experience paralysis. And in this region, paralysis often kills before the fighters even arrive.

Main sources

Sources consulted: Al Jazeera, Associated Press, Darfur Network for Human Rights, Sudan Tribune, AllAfrica, Médecins Sans Frontières. The tolls remain provisional and several responsibilities claimed by local NGOs have not been independently confirmed by all parties.