Sudan War: Colombian Mercenaries, Emirati Complicity, and Libyan Implosion — The International Ramifications of a Forgotten Conflict

The Sudanese conflict, which erupted on April 15, 2023, between the regular army of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, enters its fourth year with an intensity that shows no signs of weakening. According to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the war has already resulted in at least 59,000 deaths, a toll likely much lower than the reality given the difficulty of accessing combat zones. But beyond the Sudanese theater itself, two reports published in recent days reveal the extent of the international ramifications of this conflict, implicating the United Arab Emirates, Libya, and a network of Colombian mercenaries operating thousands of kilometers from their continent of origin.

The first report, from the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya and covering the period from October 2024 to February 2026, documents in detail the role of the Subul al-Salam battalion, a militia affiliated with the Libyan National Army of Marshal Khalifa Haftar, in the transfer of fighters, weapons, and fuel to the RSF across the southern Libyan border. The city of Kufra, a strategic crossroads at the borders of Sudan, Chad, and Egypt, is said to have served as a logistical hub. The report highlights that the RSF had a rear base located about 75 kilometers southwest of Kufra, as well as access to the city's airbase, used as a transit point for Colombian fighters and as a site for modifying vehicles imported via Libya. In June 2025, the Subul al-Salam battalion reportedly deployed ground units to escort elements of the RSF across Libyan territory, facilitating their supply of fuel and spare parts. This operation allowed the RSF to advance toward the Uwaynat area, a border triangle between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, while reportedly weakening the security of the southern Libyan border.

The second report, produced by the Conflicts Insights Group (CIG) led by Justin Lynch, provides what its authors describe as definitive evidence of the direct involvement of the United Arab Emirates in the Sudanese conflict. By exploiting commercially available data, the CIG tracked around fifty electronic devices used by Colombian fighters in Sudan between April 2025 and January 2026. These mercenaries, integrated within the Desert Wolves brigade, associated with a UAE-based company having documented links to high-ranking Emirati government officials, reportedly operated as drone pilots, gunners, and instructors. The report also mentions activities involving the training of child soldiers, an additional potential war crime in a conflict already rife with them. The capture of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, by the RSF in October 2025 after an 18-month siege that starved the population, is the most significant event attributed in part to the support of these mercenaries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had described the abuses committed during this takeover as intense violence of a shocking scale, constituting war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. The U.S. Department of the Treasury confirmed the presence of Colombian mercenaries in El-Fasher during the city's fall.

Meanwhile, the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, which began in late February 2026, has introduced an additional aggravating factor for the Sudanese populations already in a state of extreme humanitarian distress. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and disruptions to maritime routes passing through Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi have caused a 20 percent increase in transportation costs, according to the United Nations, and significant delays in the delivery of aid. The International Rescue Committee reported that medications worth $130,000, including amoxicillin, benzylpenicillin, prednisolone, and ibuprofen, intended for Sudan were stuck in Dubai for weeks before being routed overland to Oman and then by air to Port Sudan. The last delivery of medications to certain rural clinics, such as the one in Qoz Nafisa serving about 5,000 people, dates back to December 2025. Sudan, plunged into a humanitarian crisis that the United Nations describes as a forgotten catastrophe, has not received international aid shipments for months.

The regional dimension of this Sudanese implosion does not stop at Libya. In an interview with France 24 on April 23, Burundian Foreign Minister Édouard Bizimana mentioned the visit of President Évariste Ndayishimiye, also the current chair of the African Union and the AU's special envoy for the Sahel, to the leader of the Burkinabé junta, Ibrahim Traoré. This initiative is part of a desire to reintegrate the countries suspended from the African Union, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, into the continental organization. While the Burundian minister was careful to clarify that this was not a legitimization of the ruling juntas, the move reflects an unavoidable geopolitical reality: the institutional fragmentation of the African continent complicates the coordinated management of security crises, from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa.

At the United Nations Security Council, Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh warned the same day about the critical situation in Libya, a country whose economy is described as a distorted political economy where oil revenues are instrumentalized for the benefit of rival factions. The United Nations' regional response plan for Sudan, which includes Libya, aims to support nearly 600,000 Sudanese refugees and host communities, with funding needs estimated at over $115 million for 2026. Libyan Ambassador Taher Al-Sunni called for the adoption of a consensual constitutional framework to allow for elections, the only way, in his view, to end the prolonged transitional phases that undermine the country's institutional legitimacy.

All these developments paint a striking picture of conflicting interdependencies. A local power conflict between two Sudanese generals has spawned a network of international complicities involving a Gulf state, a Libyan militia, South American mercenaries, and now the collateral effects of a war in the Middle East that is suffocating humanitarian supply chains. The civilian populations of Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum continue to pay the highest price for this convergence of crises, in an international indifference that contrasts with the scale of the suffering endured.