The South Korean Military's 20,000 Drone Plan Opens Practical Challenges for Japan-South Korea Defense Cooperation in 2026

What caught attention at the South Korean Ministry of National Defense press conference in Seoul was not a model of a new weapon, but the expression "second personal firearm" used by Minister of National Defense An Gyeong-bak. The drone and anti-drone policy presented on June 26 was quite ambitious, involving the procurement of over 20,000 low-cost expendable drones, the K-LUCAS long-range unmanned combat attack system, and operational training for approximately 500,000 soldiers.

Decentralization of Authority Rather Than Abolishing Command

According to The Korea Times, the South Korean military is restructuring the traditional drone operations command, which directly commanded combat units, to decentralize reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack missions to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The command headquarters will be reorganized into a Defense Drone Headquarters directly under the Ministry of National Defense, shifting its focus to acquisition support, collaboration with the private sector, and the development of operational concepts.

This may seem like a downgrade of the command at first glance. However, from a practical standpoint, it appears to lean towards a decentralized operation model similar to that seen in the Ukraine war. Drones are not equipment that a single specialized unit uses collectively; their effectiveness is lost unless connected to the decision-making speed of divisions, brigades, battalions, and, in some cases, companies. It is noteworthy that South Korea is attempting to incorporate this lesson into its institutional framework.

The Significance of the Numbers and Their Impact on Maritime Defense

Herald Business reported that the South Korean Ministry of National Defense plans to rapidly procure over 20,000 low-cost systems, including short-range reconnaissance drones and small loitering munitions, and to increase the number of training drones to about 11,000 this year and approximately 60,000 by 2029. The figure of 500,000 refers not to the number of drones but to the aim of equipping all soldiers with basic operational capabilities.

From the experience of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, such reforms are not limited to land warfare. In the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, and Tsushima Strait, low-altitude, slow-moving, small targets significantly increase the identification burden during peacetime. If the South Korean Navy and Marine Corps begin to regularly use small unmanned aircraft, the granularity of information that Japan and South Korea's vessels, coastal radar, and Air Self-Defense Force's air defense control units need to share will also change. Traditional common operational pictures centered on aircraft, vessels, and missiles will no longer suffice.

The Real Agenda of the Japan-South Korea Defense Ministerial Meeting

The same report indicates that Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi is scheduled to visit South Korea for the first bilateral defense ministerial meeting in 11 years. Politically, the symbolism will likely be emphasized. However, from a practical standpoint, the operation of GSOMIA, responses to North Korean unmanned aircraft, maritime and air identification around the Tsushima Strait, and the sharing of low-altitude target information in trilateral training involving U.S. forces are the weighty topics on the agenda.

The mass deployment of drones is a pressure test for the identification and decision-making system, rather than just equipment procurement.

Ars Technica cited a Reuters report stating that the South Korean side explicitly references lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East. However, whether South Korea can quickly establish a domestic or quasi-domestic supply chain free of Chinese components is another matter. In the commercial drone market, the influence of Chinese companies remains significant, and as training volume increases, constraints related to parts, batteries, communication modules, and maintenance training may become apparent.

Points Japan Should Not Overlook

For Japan, the important aspect is not the number of 20,000 drones from South Korea itself. Rather, it is the fact that the South Korean military is decentralizing drone missions across the various branches, which blurs the boundaries between maritime, air, and land operations. This is also relevant to the defense of the southwestern islands. If the Ground Self-Defense Force's island units, the Maritime Self-Defense Force's escort ships, and the Air Self-Defense Force's air defense control cannot understand low-cost unmanned aircraft and loitering munitions at the same speed, Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation will remain merely on paper.

In my view, this reform in South Korea also serves as pressure on Japan. The Self-Defense Forces are accustomed to acquiring high-performance equipment, but they are not adept at integrating large quantities of equipment designed to be inexpensive and disposable into their educational systems. The real challenge is not how many drones to buy, but who will operate them during peacetime, who will distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft, and who will issue politically responsible response orders within minutes.