The 2026 Participation of Type-25 in Japan-U.S. Exercises Demonstrates Japan's Denial Defense

In the large-scale Japan-U.S. joint exercises in October, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Type-25 anti-ship guided missile participated for the first time. This equipment was only recently deployed to a base in the southwestern region in March, and the focus this time is not on the success of the launch tests, but on whether long-range firepower can be integrated into actual joint operations.

Verifying "Counterattack Capability" in Exercises

According to Kyodo News, the Type-25 has been deployed as equipment responsible for counterattack capability, marking its first participation in large-scale exercises. Since the Ministry of Defense has not disclosed details such as range and warhead, one should not overestimate its performance. However, the fact that the Ground Self-Defense Force's missile units are integrated into the same command and information flow as the Maritime Self-Defense Force's escort ships and U.S. air and naval forces represents a practical change in the defense of the southwestern islands.

Simply placing missiles does not constitute denial defense. The updating of target information, repositioning after launch, resupply, and decision-making procedures during communication disruptions must all be integrated to create uncertainty in the adversary's approach plans. What is being questioned in the exercises is this integration rather than the catalog values of the equipment.

Connecting Japan-U.S. Discussions and the Missile Industry

During the Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meeting on October 28, the strengthening of Japan's "denial defense capability to prevent invasion" was confirmed, and both countries agreed to establish final assembly and inspection facilities for advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles in Japan. Although this is a separate matter from the Type-25 itself, it should be understood as a plan to support both land-based anti-ship firepower and air power through domestic production and maintenance infrastructure.

At the same time, cooperation against cyber attacks was also on the agenda. For dispersed missile units, if communication networks and authentication procedures are severed, long-range capabilities may actually exacerbate delays in decision-making. The vulnerability of denial defense may lie more in temporary silence of the network than in insufficient range.

Blind Spots from the Perspective of Maritime Traffic Routes

The setting of the talks in the Philippines cannot be overlooked. The firepower of the southwestern islands not only deters landings on the islands but also ties into crisis management of maritime traffic routes extending from around Taiwan to northern Philippines. However, even if coastal denial is successful, if the capabilities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy responsible for escorting merchant ships, port recovery, and ammunition resupply are insufficient, operations will not last long.

In the author's view, the participation of the Type-25 this time is evidence that the Japan-U.S. alliance has begun to treat firepower, production, and cyber protection as a single operational challenge, more than just the news that "Japan has long-range missiles." The true test is not the hit rate, but who decides to launch and who protects the maritime traffic routes during the 72 hours of communication disruption.

Sources

• Ministry of Defense "Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 2026)"
• NHK WORLD-JAPAN "Japan, US defense chiefs discuss security in Philippines" (October 28, 2026)
• Kyodo News "Japan SDF to incorporate long-range missiles into drill with U.S. in Oct."