The Abolition of the "Five Classifications" in Defense Equipment Exports Reflects Japan's Strategic Dilemma

On February 15, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported on the review of the operational guidelines for the three principles of defense equipment transfers, which at first glance appears to be a technical policy adjustment. However, from the perspective of the author, who has served in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force for 25 years, this is an extremely difficult attempt to balance the survival crisis facing Japan's defense industry with the pacifist principles that post-war Japan has upheld.

The Restraint of the "Five Classifications"

The current operational guidelines limit exportable equipment to five classifications: "rescue, transport, surveillance, monitoring, and mine sweeping." While this may seem like a reasonable restriction at first glance, it has become a fatal constraint for the actual defense industry.

For example, the latest Mogami-class destroyers of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force are frigates equipped with excellent anti-submarine warfare capabilities and versatility. Although navies in Southeast Asian countries have shown interest, under the current rules, they can only be exported as "surveillance vessels" with their onboard armaments removed. This significantly diminishes their value as combat ships.

The government's consideration of abolishing this "five classifications" as early as this spring can be seen as a judgment that reflects the realistic needs of the defense industry. However, the problem lies beyond that.

A New Framework of Hierarchy Based on Lethality

According to reports, the government plans to classify equipment based on lethality and to stage the review process.

• High lethality equipment (missiles, tanks, destroyers) → Decided by the National Security Council (NSC)
• Advanced weapons (fighter jets, hypersonic glide weapons) → Requires cabinet approval
• Non-lethal equipment (bulletproof vests, surveillance radars) → Decided at the administrative level

At first glance, this appears to be a transparent system design. However, what concerns the author is the ambiguity of the "lethality" criterion.

For instance, the P-1 anti-submarine patrol aircraft can carry torpedoes but is typically engaged in surveillance missions. Is this classified as "surveillance equipment" or "high lethality equipment"? The Aegis destroyer's air defense radar system does not directly kill people but is central to missile defense. How should this be classified?

Most defense equipment has multipurpose capabilities. Drawing a clear line will likely be extremely difficult in practice.

The Reality Facing Japan's Defense Industry

Behind this policy review lies a serious structural problem within Japan's defense industry.

The domestic market alone limits production scale, leading to rising unit costs. The development of an improved model of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile is said to cost several hundred million yen per unit, but domestic procurement numbers are limited. If overseas exports become possible, it could reduce unit costs through economies of scale and lower the procurement costs for the Self-Defense Forces.

Even more importantly, there is the need to maintain the technological base. Manufacturers of tanks and artillery are facing uncertainty in continuing their businesses due to declining domestic demand. If export markets are not opened, Japan may lose its ability to produce its own armored vehicles and heavy weapons within ten years.

This is not merely an industrial issue. The self-sufficiency of defense equipment is fundamental to national security.

Is Coexistence with Pacifism Possible?

However, there lies a unique dilemma for Japan.

The expansion of equipment exports clearly contradicts the image of Japan as a "peaceful nation that does not export weapons," which has been built since the post-war period. While efforts are being made to ensure transparency through the establishment of a political decision-making process at the NSC, will this alleviate the concerns of the public?

Reports indicate that export destinations will be limited to countries that have signed agreements on the transfer of defense equipment. Currently, agreements have been concluded with a dozen countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. However, some of these countries are actually involved in conflicts.

It is impossible to fully control how the equipment exported by Japan will be used in the future. The condition of "use based on the UN Charter" can be interpreted in various ways.

The Real Question is "What is the Purpose of the Exports?"

The author believes that there is a certain rationality in the expansion of defense equipment exports itself. However, the government should provide a more candid explanation to the public.

This policy change is not about "contributing to peace." It is a highly pragmatic choice aimed at maintaining Japan's defense industrial base and strengthening strategic cooperation with allied and friendly nations.

The abolition of the five classifications and the new framework of review at the NSC will likely be formally decided this spring. However, more important than the system design is whether the government can clearly explain "which equipment, to which country, and why it is being exported" in the first export approval.

This initial judgment will determine the credibility of this new system. And it will serve as a litmus test for the overall transparency of Japan's defense policy.