The aircraft carriers Abraham Lincoln and Gerald Ford advance towards the Gulf — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman urge Washington to avoid war

On the same day that American and Iranian delegations sit at the negotiating table in Geneva, the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford continues its course from the Caribbean towards the Gulf, joining its counterpart USS Abraham Lincoln, which has been stationed in the region since January 26. The scene is clear: Washington is negotiating while arming itself at the same time. Meanwhile, the Gulf states — Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Muscat — are watching this scene with a concern that is hard to hide.

Geneva Negotiations — The Last Bet Before Confrontation

On Tuesday, February 17, 2026, Washington announced the resumption of nuclear talks with Tehran in Geneva, led by American envoy Steve Wittekov and Jared Kushner. The American message is twofold: an offer of diplomacy on one hand, and a display of unprecedented military power on the other. Trump stated that he would be an "indirect observer" of the talks, adding that Iran "wants an agreement because it does not want the consequences."

However, in practical terms, the situation is more complicated than the White House's rhetoric suggests. Iran announced its openness to settlements regarding energy, mining, and aircraft deals if sanctions are lifted, according to statements from an Iranian minister on February 15. But Tehran enters these talks having suppressed internal protests with blood — which weakens its rhetorical position internationally but does not diminish its military arsenal.

What Do Aircraft Carriers Mean for the Gulf States?

The short answer: they mean danger and reassurance at the same time — and this is the essence of the Gulf dilemma.

Any military personnel who has served in the region knows that American bases in Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait do not only protect the Gulf states but also make them primary targets in any confrontation with Iran. Since early February, the Gulf states have warned Washington that Iran still possesses short-range ballistic missiles and its launchers are at combat readiness, capable of striking American interests and Gulf oil infrastructure. This warning is not merely a matter of excessive caution — it is a specific intelligence assessment.

On February 3, six Iranian Revolutionary Guard boats attempted to inspect an American tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. The attempt was thwarted with the escort of the USS McFaul. But the Iranian message was clear: we control the waterways, and we can disrupt navigation at any moment.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi — An American Partnership Without Immunity

Saudi Arabia has publicly called for a "peaceful diplomatic solution." This position is neither weakness nor hesitation — it is an accurate expression of strategic interest calculations. Riyadh does not want the Iranian regime to fall any more than Washington does, because the collapse of Iran means a massive security vacuum on its northern borders and in Iraq and Yemen.

The Gulf Cooperation Council as a whole — including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman — is pressuring Washington to avoid military strikes. Oman, in particular, plays a pivotal role as an unofficial channel of communication between Tehran and Washington for years.

But there is an unresolved contradiction: the Gulf states host more than 35,000 American soldiers, thereby practically supporting American pressure on Iran. You cannot publicly call for a peaceful solution while allowing aircraft carriers to use your ports and air bases as a launch point for potential operations.

The Fatal Gap — The Fragmented Gulf Defense System

In my view, the problem is not the absence of weaponry. The Gulf states possess Patriot and THAAD systems, F-15SA aircraft, and modern Rafale jets. The weaponry is there. But what is lacking is operational integration.

Let’s apply the "capability triangle" that I always use in analyzing armies: the equation is the combination of equipment, training, and institutional framework. The Gulf has purchased equipment worth hundreds of billions. Training has improved relatively in recent years. But the institutional framework — which is the foundation of everything — remains organically linked to American support. In clearer terms: the Saudi THAAD system does not operate at full capacity without American technicians on the ground, which I have previously written about.

This is not a problem of this week — it is a problem that has accumulated over two decades of a policy of purchasing without building. And when the Gulf needs to defend itself from Iranian ballistic missiles, it will discover that it possesses a shield it cannot operate without its original owner.

What Will Happen After Geneva?

There are two main scenarios. The first: Washington and Tehran reach a transitional agreement, involving a freeze on uranium enrichment in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions. This would provide short-term relief for the Gulf but would not resolve the structural contradiction: a halted nuclear Iran is more dangerous than a fully monitored Iran.

The second: the negotiations collapse. At that point, Trump will face a real choice between a limited military strike and a costly diplomatic retreat. In either case, the Gulf will pay the highest price — not necessarily militarily, but economically: any mistake in the Strait of Hormuz means an immediate rise in oil prices and a blow to maritime trade that the diverse Gulf economy relies on.

Conclusion — The Partnership with America Is Not a Comprehensive Insurance Policy

The reality that Gulf governments avoid discussing publicly is as follows: the American military presence in the region provides deterrence against existential threats, but at the same time makes these countries hostages to American decision-making. When Washington slides towards confrontation, the Gulf cannot object — because its bases, ports, and airspace are what make the American military option possible in the first place.

This is the equation that makes the Gulf's "call for peace" always seem hollow: you call for peace while your armies are organically linked to the potential war. The contradiction lies not in intentions — but in the strategic infrastructure of the alliance itself.

Sources: Wikipedia (2026 US military buildup in the Middle East), Reuters, New York Times, Gulf International Forum, BBC, Critical Threats, Reuters (Feb 15 - Iran nuclear deal stance)