U.S. Media: Europe Faces Three Major Obstacles on the Path to Defense Independence

Reference News Network reported on February 17 The U.S. magazine "National Interest" published an article titled "Three Major Obstacles to Europe's Move Towards Defense Independence" on February 13, authored by Jason Davidson, a senior researcher at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. The main content is summarized as follows:

As global geopolitical elites gather at the Munich Security Conference, many European analysts and decision-makers urge their governments to develop self-defense capabilities in response to the policy trends of the Trump administration over the past year.

First, there are differences between the U.S. and Europe regarding values and sovereignty.

Second, President Trump has repeatedly demanded that the U.S. control Greenland, an island belonging to NATO ally Denmark.

Finally, the Trump administration has repeatedly insisted that European allies be responsible for their own security, allowing the U.S. to play only a supporting role.

Trump's policies have led many European countries to no longer believe that the U.S. will fulfill its collective defense obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, as European leaders explore measures to achieve defense independence, they face three major obstacles.

1. Europe Still Relies on the U.S. for "Critical Capabilities"

Given the Trump administration's demand for European countries to take on more defense responsibilities, it is reasonable for them to urge allies to increase military spending, but simply increasing military expenditure will not achieve defense independence. European allies must vigorously develop the "critical capabilities" they still rely on the U.S. to provide.

These "critical capabilities" include integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, strategic airlift, missile defense, and the ability to suppress enemy air defense systems. To acquire these capabilities, European allies also need to strengthen coordination among themselves, and effectively deploying these capabilities to defend the European continent will still take time.

2. Different Views on Russia Among European Countries

My research (which includes 98 interviews with decision-makers and analysts from six major NATO countries) indicates that European allies have differing perceptions of Russia and varying assessments of the threat it poses. For over a decade, countries like Poland have been highly concerned about the threat posed by Russia and are willing to take all necessary measures to respond.

In Germany, I also heard similar views that Russia poses a significant threat to German and European security. The differing perceptions of such threats in Poland and Germany explain their decisions to increase defense spending in recent years.

However, France and the UK are not as alarmed by the threat posed by Russia. Decision-makers and analysts in both countries believe that the UK and France possess independent nuclear arsenals, which means that Russia is unlikely to directly attack the UK or France, making the threat from Moscow seem less urgent. Reports indicate that both the UK and France are unlikely to meet NATO's defense spending targets before 2035.

3. Post-Imperial Identity of the UK and France and Pacifist Identity of Italy and Germany

The historical experiences and identities of major European allies pose ultimate challenges to Europe's path towards defense independence. Many people I interviewed in France and the UK believe that their countries hold the status of global powers, stemming from their experiences during the imperialist era. Today, this identity supports the global military posture of both countries.

The global power identity of the UK and France also means that their military systems are at least partially built around the need to deploy small, elite forces globally. However, if Europe is to achieve defense independence, it must involve everyone and work together; the military posture and structure of European allies (including the UK and France) must also focus on the threat from Russia.

In Italy and Germany, the disastrous expansionism of World War II has left some historical legacies, leading the populations of both countries to harbor deep doubts about increasing defense spending and using military force. These concerns are reflected in the German debate over conscription—the military ultimately accepted a voluntary service model, but many believe this is insufficient to address the threat from Russia.

Italy's pacifism is evident in the lack of public support for increasing defense spending, as well as the fact that the country's military has primarily been used for overseas peacekeeping operations and domestic security tasks in recent years. The pacifist stance of Germany and Italy hinders their necessary contributions to Europe's move towards defense independence.

In the face of these obstacles, what actions should Europe take? Decision-makers need to clearly and continuously explain to the public that governments in European countries must take costly measures to be responsible for their own defense, which is necessary. In this process, they must be keenly aware of issues such as threat perception and identity.

For example, German General Alexander Solfrank recently stated: "Deterrence is only effective under credible circumstances. We must be prepared for combat; only then can we avoid combat." He pointed out that European leaders must explain to their citizens that sacrifices are necessary to ensure that the European continent does not fall into war in the future. (Translation/yang xuelei)