The Alliance of Sahel States: A Unified Force Against the Challenges of Funding and Regional Cohesion

The Sahel States Alliance (AES) took a decisive step in December 2025 with the official launch of its Unified Force, a joint military initiative bringing together 6,000 soldiers from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Based in Niamey, this force represents the third attempt by the central Sahel states to create a joint security mechanism, following the failure of the Multinational Force of Liptako-Gourma in January 2017 and the collapse of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in July 2017. While the ambition is clear, the structural and political challenges that have doomed previous initiatives remain ever-present.

The AES Unified Force distinguishes itself from its predecessors by its stated willingness to preserve the sovereignty of its member states and to break away from dependence on external funding. This orientation finds its roots in the collective rejection of Western influence, particularly French, which culminated in the coups that occurred between 2020 and 2023 in the three countries. Unlike the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which heavily relied on financial contributions from the European Union and other Western partners, the AES relies on domestic funding mechanisms. Burkina Faso mobilizes its Patriotic Support Fund, Niger its Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland, and Mali its Fund for Support of Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects.

On March 28, 2025, the three countries took a further step by introducing a 0.5% import tax intended to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified Force. This financial approach, enshrined in the founding charter of the AES which states that "the financing of the Alliance will be ensured by contributions from member states," aims to guarantee operational autonomy. However, this strategy relies on economies already drained, weakened by years of conflict and instability. The ability of the three states to maintain regular and substantial contributions remains an open question, especially as their tax revenues are already stretched to the limit.

Militarily, the Unified Force benefits from a centralized command structure under the leadership of Burkinabè General Daouda Traoré, which grants it complete operational authority over the deployed troops. Unlike the G5 Sahel battalions, confined to specific geographical sectors with a pursuit radius limited to 100 kilometers on either side of national borders, AES units are authorized to operate across the entire territory of the three countries. This freedom of movement is essential to combat insurgent groups that exploit porous borders and vast ungoverned territories in the Liptako-Gourma region.

The Unified Force has already demonstrated its ability to coordinate joint operations, notably during the tripartite Yereko 2 operation conducted between February and March 2025 in the tri-border area. This mission neutralized several fighters affiliated with the Islamic State and seized significant quantities of equipment. Nevertheless, these tactical successes should not overshadow the structural challenges facing the alliance.

The first of these challenges lies in the internal fragility of each member state. Mali, the historical epicenter of the insurgency, sees violence spreading from the arid north to the center of the country, where the state struggles to maintain control. Burkina Faso has become the scene of the deadliest violence in the region, with insurgent groups controlling vast territories and besieging entire towns, cutting off supply routes and leaving populations isolated. Niger, once perceived as a reliable partner of the West, has spiraled into a volatile security situation since the coup in July 2023. These three crises are not distinct; they are manifestations of the same fire burning across porous borders and ungoverned spaces. An insurgent chased from Mali finds refuge in Burkina Faso. A stockpile of weapons in Niger fuels fighters in all three countries. Violence moves where governments cannot follow.

For the AES to survive, these three states must place collective security above their own immediate survival. But this is a difficult gamble when your own capital is threatened. A government struggling against rebels at its capital's gates will hesitate to send its best troops or rare equipment across the border to assist a neighbor. When the state itself struggles to control its own territory, engaging in an alliance begins to feel like a luxury it cannot afford. This is the central tension at the heart of the AES, and one that could undo it.

The second challenge concerns dependence on external partners, despite the rhetoric of autonomy. The AES has diversified its military partnerships, procuring equipment and weapons from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China. The Russian Africa Corps has become the AES's preferred security partner, although the terms of engagement vary significantly. In Mali, Russia provides military equipment and the Africa Corps is involved in combat operations. In Burkina Faso and Niger, the engagement is limited to training. This diversification avoids dependence on a single external actor, but it does not resolve the fundamental issue: without substantial technical, logistical, and financial support, the Unified Force risks replicating the shortcomings of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which severely lacked air assets and a functional intelligence system, two critical elements for counter-terrorism operations.

The third challenge, and perhaps the most critical, is the regional isolation of the AES. The three countries have broken away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and have engaged in diplomatic conflicts with their neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea, including Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. However, the effectiveness of the Unified Force will depend on its ability to cooperate with the armies of these neighboring states, many of which also face threats from extremist violence and transnational criminal networks. Illicit supply channels and smuggling of operational resources (weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones) to armed groups cross many borders in the region. A siloed approach that treats the Sahel in isolation from neighboring West African countries has been the major trap of international interventions over the past decade. The AES cannot afford to replicate this mistake.

Despite their political disputes with non-member states of the AES, regional stability requires that the three countries maintain or strengthen their military and security cooperation with their immediate neighbors. The Tarha Nakal exercise, conducted in May 2024 in Tillia, Niger, by the armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Togo, demonstrated these countries' ability to pool their resources and coordinate their operations. The African Union is well-positioned to resolve tensions between AES countries and their Gulf of Guinea neighbors. Politically, mediation efforts could restore trust and ease tensions. In terms of counter-terrorism, the AU could promote cooperation between the ECOWAS counter-terrorism force and the AES Unified Force.

The future of the AES will depend on its ability to overcome these multiple challenges. Its model of sovereignty first, self-funding, pooling resources, diversifying partners, and linking security to economic development is the most serious attempt to date to break free from the dependence that has plagued previous frameworks. For the first time, they have the tools to try: the BCID-AES bank, the import tax, and patriotic funds provide them with self-financing options that the G5 Sahel never had.

However, the internal challenges each member state faces, from active insurgencies to political legitimacy, threaten to undermine the collective project. The history of regional alliances in Africa, including the collapse of the G5 Sahel and the unilateral withdrawals of organizations like IGAD, serves as a warning. The AES could prove to be a new sustainable model of African security regionalism, or it could join its predecessors as another ephemeral pact undone by insufficient resources, divergent national interests, and the relentless pressure of insurgent violence. The force that came together in Bamako asserts that the Sahel can defend itself without relinquishing its sovereignty. But this assertion will not be proven in summit speeches or official charters. It will be tested in the border areas where insurgents move freely, in the budgets that must stretch further than they ever have, and in the barracks where soldiers decide which orders to follow.