The Alliance of Sahel States Facing ECOWAS: Militarization as the Only Response to Terrorism

The year 2026 marks a decisive turning point in the geopolitical and security reshaping of West Africa. On February 25 and 26, the Defense, Security, Development, and Diplomacy ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger gathered in Ouagadougou to approve the roadmap for the second year of the Sahel States Alliance (AES). This meeting, chaired by Burkina Faso's Defense Minister Celestin Simpore, reflects the institutional consolidation of a project aimed at redefining the regional security architecture outside of Western frameworks and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The creation of the Unified Force of the AES, officially commissioned in December 2025, is the central element of this strategy. With a contingent of 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers according to sources, this joint force aims to enhance cross-border coordination and pool the military capabilities of the three nations led by military juntas. The stated objective is to counter jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, whose attacks have intensified in the region despite more than two decades of international engagement in counter-terrorism. This initiative comes in a context marked by the definitive French withdrawal from the region, the expulsion of American forces, and the end of the United Nations MINUSMA mission in Mali.

The strengthening of Russian military presence is one of the pillars of this new security architecture. According to reports from Critical Threats dated February 26, 2026, Mali is now reportedly paying $35 million monthly to maintain the forces of the Africa Corps on its territory. This partnership, negotiated during the visit of Malian junta leader Assimi Goïta to Russia in June 2025, illustrates the ongoing geopolitical shift. Russian instructors and fighters are gradually replacing Western training, bringing a different operational approach, but its effectiveness on the ground remains to be demonstrated in the face of a jihadist insurgency that now controls vast rural territories in the three countries.

In response to this consolidation of the AES, ECOWAS announced in August 2025 an ambitious plan to create a joint counter-terrorism force of 260,000 soldiers, with a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion for logistical support and frontline operations. On September 15, 2025, during a meeting of Finance and Defense ministers in Abuja, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel Fatau Musah, confirmed the deployment of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 soldiers in 2026, with an initial mobilization of 2,000 military personnel planned by the end of the year. These figures, although impressive on paper, raise legitimate questions about the actual operational capacity of such a force, given the logistical, financial, and political challenges of coordinating multiple national armies with unequal capabilities.

Recent military operations illustrate the continuation of an essentially kinetic approach to the terrorist problem. Between March 3 and 8, 2026, Nigerien security forces conducted special operations Niya and Garkuva, during which a significant number of militants were reportedly eliminated and two logistical centers for the production of improvised explosive devices were destroyed. For their part, the United States maintains a selective operational presence: on March 8, 2026, Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted an airstrike against the Islamic State in Somalia, in coordination with the Somali federal government. These targeted interventions, which are part of the continuity of the American approach since the establishment of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative in 2005, face a complex reality: over $3.3 billion in American security assistance to the Sahel over two decades has not prevented the territorial expansion of armed groups.

The analysis of this growing militarization reveals a fundamental paradox that several experts and international organizations have continuously highlighted. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) openly questions the ability of the Unified Force of the AES to succeed where the G5 Sahel Joint Force has failed. The latter, created in 2017 with the support of France and the European Union, never reached its full operational capacity before faltering with the rupture between the Sahelian juntas and their former Western partners. The central question remains: can authoritarian consolidation, massive reliance on military force, and alignment with new external partners produce different results from those achieved by previous strategies?

Field data suggest otherwise. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), conflict-related violence in the region continues to escalate, with an increase in the number of civilians killed and displaced. Human Rights Watch, in its 2026 World Report published on February 4, documents an escalation of human rights violations perpetrated by both Islamist armed groups and government forces and their auxiliaries. The expulsion of regional and international organizations and the weakening of accountability institutions create an environment conducive to abuses, while the militarized approach fuels local grievances and facilitates recruitment by insurgent groups.

The withdrawal of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) from the Lake Chad basin is another symptom of regional security fragmentation. Established in 2015 to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), this coalition comprising Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria suffered a major setback when Niger announced its withdrawal in March 2025, illustrating the primacy of political considerations over the imperative of cross-border coordination in the face of armed groups that do not recognize borders.

The American intervention on December 25, 2025, described by President Donald Trump as a powerful and deadly strike against the terrorist scum of the Islamic State in northwestern Nigeria, and his promise of many more strikes to come, are part of a strategic American continuity that favors remote targeting operations over direct ground engagement. This approach, while it may occasionally neutralize high-value targets, does not address the root causes of the insurgency—poverty, marginalization, failing governance, climate change—nor the regenerative capacity of armed groups in an environment where states struggle to provide basic services and security for populations.

The institutional competition between the AES and ECOWAS reflects a deeper fracture in the vision for the future of West Africa. On one side, the military juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger advocate for radical sovereignty, a rejection of Western tutelage, and alignment with partners like Russia. On the other side, ECOWAS, despite its limitations and contradictions, represents a framework for regional cooperation rooted in democratic principles, however imperfectly they may be respected. The ban imposed by the United States starting January 1, 2026, on nationals of the AES, justified by national security concerns, terrorism, visa overstays, and information sharing, and the reciprocal response from AES countries, illustrate the internationalization of a regional conflict whose implications far exceed the borders of the Sahel.

The fundamental question raised by Al Jazeera in its analysis on January 23, 2026, remains more relevant than ever: can the militarization of the Sahel defeat terrorism? The two decades since the launch of the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002, followed by the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative in 2005, the French Serval operation in 2013, the Barkhane operation from 2014 to 2022, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and MINUSMA, provide a discouraging empirical answer. Despite billions of dollars invested, thousands of soldiers deployed, and tens of thousands of presumed combatants neutralized, jihadist groups today control more territory than in 2012, and violence now affects not only central Sahel but extends to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea.

The multidimensional approach advocated by some analysts—combining targeted security operations, inclusive governance, economic development, transitional justice, and dialogue with communities—remains largely absent from current strategies. The Unified Force of the AES, like the projected ECOWAS counter-terrorism force, focuses on military capacity rather than building a renewed social contract between the state and its citizens. Niger's Niya and Garkuva operations, while they may temporarily disrupt jihadist networks, do not address the structural factors that allow these groups to thrive in areas where the state is perceived as predatory, distant, or absent.

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) observes that the Sahel will define the next decade of counter-terrorism operations by directing security resources to the region and shaping acquisition priorities and operational activities. This prediction raises a legitimate concern: the exclusive focus on the military dimension risks reproducing the mistakes of the past on an even larger scale, with increasingly severe humanitarian consequences for civilian populations caught between the violence of armed groups and the operations of security forces.

The security future of the Sahel will depend less on the size of deployed forces or the volume of military budgets than on the ability of state and regional actors to fundamentally rethink their approach. The meetings in Ouagadougou in February 2026 and the announcements from ECOWAS reflect intense diplomatic and institutional activity, but the roadmap that emerges seems to favor continuity over strategic innovation. As long as militarization remains the dominant response to a multidimensional problem, the Sahel risks remaining trapped in a cycle of violence whose outcome remains tragically predictable.