The Alliance of Sahel States Facing the Challenges of Information Warfare: Between Institutional Consolidation and Disinformation

The security and political landscape of the Sahel is undergoing a profound transformation since the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023. This confederation comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger represents much more than a mere mutual defense pact: it embodies a major geopolitical reorientation in a region plagued by instability for over a decade. However, as this alliance attempts to consolidate institutionally, it faces an insidious yet formidable threat: a massive disinformation campaign orchestrated on social media.

The official exit of the three countries from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 29, 2025, after a one-year notice, marks a historic turning point for West African regional integration. At the time of their departure, these states collectively represented 54.35% of the land area of ECOWAS, 17.4% of its population, 10% of its GDP, and 20% of its members. This withdrawal constitutes a major geopolitical and institutional upheaval for the region. The three landlocked Sahelian countries, forming the northern border of the community, have thus created a profound rupture in the collective security architecture that had prevailed for decades.

The genesis of this separation dates back to the military coup in Niger on July 26, 2023. The unprecedented reaction of ECOWAS, which four days later recognized the ousted government of President Mohamed Bazoum and mentioned the possibility of military intervention to restore constitutional order, hastened the formation of the AES. This stance marked a significant break from previous practices, notably the 2017 intervention in The Gambia, where an initially force-focused approach evolved into a diplomatic resolution supported by the United Nations Security Council. The creation of the Liptako-Gourma Charter in September 2023 thus introduced a parallel collective security framework that made coexistence within the same institutional order increasingly untenable.

Under the leadership of Captain Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani in Niger, the AES has gradually institutionalized itself. In May 2024, the three countries finalized in Niamey a draft text formally creating the confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States, aimed at operationalizing and further institutionalizing this alliance. In December 2025, the Unified Force of the AES was officially launched, constituting a joint security mechanism intended to confront the jihadist groups that continue to terrorize the region, notably the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS).

Paradoxically, while these military regimes attempt to distance themselves from the West and strengthen their ties with Russia, they become the target of a sophisticated information war. Since late 2025, a vast ecosystem of fake accounts on social media has targeted the countries of the AES and their military leaders. An investigation conducted by the fact-checking unit of RFI and the Observers of France 24 revealed the alarming extent of this disinformation network that is spreading across West Africa.

Several social media accounts bearing names such as Scoop Africa, La Dépêche africaine, and La Voix du Faso pose as legitimate news outlets to discredit the governments of the three AES member countries. One of the most blatant operations occurred on March 1, 2026, the day after the start of the war initiated by the United States and Israel against Iran. A video clip, apparently from the news broadcast of Burkina Faso's Radio and Television (RTB), announced that the leader of the Burkinabè junta, Ibrahim Traoré, had decided to deploy "two infantry battalions to Tehran" to support Iran. This video, which seemed to be a genuine news bulletin, had actually been produced using artificial intelligence, as confirmed by several AI detection tools.

Although RTB quickly disavowed this clip on its Facebook page, it was shared thousands of times. A post on X (formerly Twitter) from the account La Dépêche africaine surpassed 500,000 views. This viral spread illustrates the formidable effectiveness of these disinformation operations, even when they are quickly denied by official sources.

Analysis of the followers, shares, and "likes" of posts from Scoop Africa and La Dépêche africaine reveals a network of about ten similar accounts active on X, Facebook, and TikTok. These accounts coordinate their disinformation campaigns with a precision that evokes the methods of Russian influence operations observed in recent years on the African continent and against Western countries. Imitation of legitimate media, the use of deepfakes, and the coordinated dissemination of false information are the pillars of this strategy.

The account attributed to Nikolai Piotr Melnikov, who presents himself as a "Russian political scientist, whistleblower, and investigative journalist," illustrates the sophistication of these operations. On October 29, 2025, this account claimed that Russia had called on its nationals to leave Mali due to a deterioration of the security situation around Bamako, linked to the presence of Islamist groups. The post, written in Russian, used an image imitating the Russian state media Sputnik. The Russian embassy in Mali quickly denied the information. Since February 2026, this account has been operating under the name Scoop Africa, after previously using the name Le Continent.

Harouna Drabo, a journalist specializing in information influence strategies in Francophone Africa, observes that this activity intensified during the failed coup attempt in Benin in December 2025. "This acceleration occurred as massive disinformation was being spread by pro-AES accounts during this event, targeting Beninese President Patrice Talon," he told RFI.

Since late October 2025, the list of anti-AES disinformation operations on social media platforms has continued to grow. One of the most recent was the false announcement in early February 2026 of the sale of a Burkinabè power plant to Russia. The claim was based on a doctored report from RTB, with the presenter’s voice manipulated. The original report had aired a few days earlier and did not mention such a sale at all.

Despite a limited audience—Scoop Africa has 2,000 followers on X and 20,000 on Facebook, while La Dépêche africaine has 10,000 on X and 1,800 on Facebook—their disinformation campaigns have reached millions of users. "Some of their false information is sometimes picked up by journalists," explains Drabo. "Through my contacts on the ground, I see that this content reaches end users, whether in the Sahel or in neighboring countries."

Other fake accounts posing as legitimate media in the region have proliferated since May 2025, including Ouaga FM, La Voix du Faso, Info CivikTogo, and La Voix du Togo. According to the joint investigation by RFI and France 24, this network has participated in at least ten disinformation campaigns. The Ouaga FM page, with 2,000 followers on Facebook, also spread false information about the sale of the Burkinabè power plant, as well as a deepfake targeting the Chief of Staff of the Burkinabè Armed Forces, Célestin Simporé, initially published by La Dépêche africaine.

It is difficult to determine who is behind these profiles. According to information provided by Facebook, most of the pages flagged by the RFI/France 24 investigation are located in Côte d'Ivoire. "In several countries like Côte d'Ivoire, which are constantly attacked by pro-AES disinformation agents, some actors have clearly decided to respond with the same weapons. In Burkina Faso, for example, we know that those spreading disinformation are linked to the junta," said a regional expert who requested anonymity. "However, we do not know precisely who is behind this ecosystem based in Côte d'Ivoire. There is no way to attribute it with certainty."

Philip Brant, a researcher specializing in jihadism in West Africa, emphasizes that this proliferation of disinformation complicates the work of monitoring and documenting by experts in the region. "All this content discredits the information published by journalists who might be critical of the juntas," he told RFI. "For example, if these accounts constantly spread false information about civilian massacres, when such massacres actually occur, that information loses all credibility."

The risk, as journalist Drabo pointed out, is to "find ourselves in total informational chaos, where the population will no longer understand what is true or false." This situation is all the more concerning in a context where the three AES countries are facing a jihadist insurgency that has caused thousands of deaths and displaced millions of people. The ability of citizens to distinguish verifiable information from propaganda becomes crucial for the stability of these states.

The Alliance of Sahel States thus finds itself at a crossroads. On one hand, it seeks to build a viable collective security architecture, to strengthen its sovereignty against former colonial powers, and to effectively combat the terrorist groups that threaten its populations. On the other hand, it must navigate a toxic informational environment where deepfakes, fake accounts, and coordinated disinformation undermine public trust and complicate governance.

The future of this alliance will depend not only on its military capacity to contain the jihadist threat but also on its resilience against this invisible yet devastating information war. The military regimes of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey will need to develop sophisticated counter-disinformation strategies while preserving freedom of expression and public trust in institutions. A significant challenge for governments already facing criticism regarding the arbitrary detention of journalists, enforced disappearances, and illegal forced military conscription reported by human rights defenders.

The battle for the Sahel is not only fought on physical battlefields against jihadists but also in the digital space, where the truth itself has become a strategic weapon.