The black Saturday of April 25: the unprecedented offensive of JNIM and FLA shakes Mali and tests the Alliance of Sahel States

April 25, 2026, will be etched in the recent history of the Sahel as the day when the Malian security edifice wavered on its foundations. At dawn, around 5:30 AM, hundreds of fighters belonging to the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), the Sahelian branch of Al-Qaeda, launched an unprecedented coordinated offensive, simultaneously striking six Malian cities: Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. The front extended over more than 1,200 kilometers, from deep in the north to the gates of the capital, a maneuver never seen in fourteen years of conflict.

The speed and precision of the attack caught the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and their Russian allies from the Africa Corps, the entity that succeeded Wagner in Mali, off guard. In Kidal, FLA fighters raised the Azawad flag at the central crossroads after breaching defensive checkpoints mounted on pick-ups, armored vehicles, and motorcycles. In Kati, the junta's stronghold located a few dozen kilometers from Bamako, the assault had devastating consequences: the Minister of Defense, General Sadio Camara, was killed in the attack targeting his home, carried out with the help of a car bomb driven by a suicide bomber. The explosion, of considerable power, completely destroyed the minister's residence. At 47 years old, Camara was one of the key figures of the junta in power since 2020 and the principal architect of the strategic rapprochement with Russia. His disappearance represents a loss that the transitional authorities will struggle to fill, both militarily and symbolically.

The attacks resulted in at least 23 deaths according to hospital sources, a provisional toll that could rise given the scale of the fighting. Two strong detonations were heard near Bamako airport, causing panic in the capital. The complete material and human toll remains difficult to establish, as Malian authorities maintained cautious, even minimalist, communication in the hours following the events.

What makes this offensive particularly striking is the unprecedented and overt alliance between JNIM and FLA. Until now, relations between jihadist groups and Tuareg independence movements in Mali had been marked by periods of tactical cooperation followed by violent ruptures, as in 2013 when Tuareg rebels from the MNLA were driven from their positions by their former jihadist allies. This time, the alliance seems deeper, more structured, and better coordinated. According to available information, this strategic convergence was developed in utmost secrecy in the months leading up to the offensive, taking advantage of the gradual weakening of the Malian military presence in the north of the country.

The territorial consequences of this offensive are considerable. After the capture of Kidal, armed groups advanced northward, seizing the strategic camp of Tessalit, located near the Algerian border. This camp, the oldest base built by the French colonizer in the region, has a large, well-maintained runway capable of accommodating helicopters and military transport aircraft. Its capture represents a major logistical asset for the armed groups. According to local and independence sources, the Malian army and its Russian allies abandoned their positions without fighting, a surrender that speaks volumes about the state of morale among government troops. The Aguelhok camp, located 100 kilometers from Kidal, also fell into the hands of the assailants.

On Thursday, April 30, JNIM called for the formation of a broad common front to end the ruling junta, aiming for a peaceful and inclusive transition, a proposal that paradoxically seeks to present the jihadists as legitimate political actors rather than merely an armed force. At the same time, the jihadists established a road blockade around Bamako, blocking several routes leading to the capital, an economic suffocation strategy reminiscent of tactics employed by armed groups during the 2012 crisis.

On the power side, General Assimi Goïta took three days to reappear in public, a silence that fueled various rumors in Bamako. When he finally addressed the nation, he claimed that the situation was under control while acknowledging a moment of extreme gravity. Photographs released by the presidency show him in a meeting at the Koulouba palace with a Russian delegation led by the ambassador in Bamako, Igor Gromyko, a sign that Moscow intends to maintain its presence despite the setback. Russia has also confirmed that its forces will remain in Mali, rejecting the rebels' call for a complete withdrawal.

The shockwave from this offensive was felt well beyond Malian borders. In Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traoré immediately reinforced security in Ouagadougou by launching Operation WIBGA-2, deploying police teams at strategic intersections in the capital and calling on the population to remain vigilant around sensitive infrastructures. In Niger, authorities canceled traditional May 1 parades for security reasons. Neighboring Côte d'Ivoire assured that its borders were secure while preparing for potential influxes of refugees.

These reactions illustrate the first real test of credibility facing the Sahel States Alliance (AES), the confederation grouping Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Created in the wake of the ruptures with ECOWAS and the end of security partnerships with France, the AES aimed to be a sovereign alternative to jihadist threats. The alliance's inability to prevent, or even anticipate, an offensive of such magnitude on the territory of its most important member highlights the operational and political limits of a cooperation still in its infancy. Between ambitions of a unified force and national realities, the AES finds itself caught in the gap between its victorious rhetoric and the harshness of the facts on the ground.

The loss of Minister Sadio Camara, rightly described as the man who believed in the Russians, raises fundamental questions about the viability of the Malian strategy of substituting Western partnerships with alliances with Moscow. Since the departure of the Barkhane force and MINUSMA, Malian authorities had made cooperation with Russia the pivot of their security doctrine, claiming that this new orientation had allowed them to reverse the trend against armed groups. The events of April 25 cruelly contradict this narrative.

The FLA spokesperson, Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, stated in an interview that the situation is far from under control and that the military regime will fall, sooner or later. While such statements are partly part of psychological warfare, they nonetheless reflect a real shift in the balance of power in northern Mali. The conquest of Kidal, long presented as the crowning achievement of the junta's military successes, has turned into a stinging defeat, demonstrating the fragility of previously gained territorial advantages.

At the time of writing, the situation remains extremely volatile. Armed groups control a significant part of northern Mali, the blockade around Bamako maintains constant pressure on the capital, and the response capacity of FAMA and their Russian allies remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the black Saturday of April 25 has irreversibly reshuffled the cards of the Sahelian conflict. The year 2026 promises to be a decisive turning point for the security of the entire region, with implications that extend far beyond the borders of Mali to concern all of West Africa and the Sahel.