The Controversy of "Starlink" Highlights a New Type of Military Sovereignty Game

Reference News Network reported on October 22 The European website "Modern Diplomacy" published an unsigned article titled "Having Weapons Is No Longer Enough: Starlink and New Military Sovereignty" on October 20, excerpts of which are as follows:

On the evening of October 13, Ukraine's military satellite communication link would be interrupted if its speed exceeded 100 miles per hour (approximately 160.93 kilometers). Ground forces using "Starshield" (the military version of "Starlink") could maintain connectivity when stationary, but intercept drones chasing Russian drones could not. A Ukrainian defense technology advisor stated that Kyiv "has been deprived of one of its few self-defense opportunities."

Subsequently, the blame-shifting began. Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, wrote that the speed of "Starshield" is set by the U.S. military and even the U.S. president. Reuters reported that the order to cut the network came from within the White House. A senior U.S. official denied that Trump had issued such an order. Two days passed without anyone taking responsibility for the network interruption. The lack of accountability is the truth.

Weapons Delivered, "Permission" Denied

Since 2022, Ukraine has received over 50,000 "Starlink" terminals, many of which have their subscription fees paid by Poland. Kyiv uses "Starshield" for battlefield communications, conducting medium-range strikes, and operating intercept drones. This speed limit occurred during a broader pressure campaign. Reports indicate that Washington warned that unless Kyiv ceased strikes on Russian oil refineries, intelligence sharing and arms sales would be suspended, including weapons purchased with European funds. For three whole days, Ukraine did not receive U.S. warnings about Russian ballistic missile launches. On October 12, Kyiv's air raid alarms only sounded when missiles were already incoming.

These are not new developments. In March 2025, Washington suspended intelligence and assistance to Kyiv. In 2023, U.S. senators demanded explanations from the Pentagon regarding reports of Musk's personal involvement in Ukraine operations. What is new is that this tactic has now become commonplace.

The standard interpretation of this incident is that Ukraine is overly reliant on an eccentric billionaire. This misidentifies the core issue. Musk is not the risk; the risk lies in the way modern military power is structured.

Today, a Western army operates on two levels. The first level is equipment: missiles, drones, artillery. The government places orders and transports them, and once delivered, the user owns them. The second level can be termed the "permission layer," which encompasses the services that enable the equipment to function. Satellite links, missile launch warnings, target data, software updates, and cloud access fall under this layer. This layer is never given to you; it must be rented, and the provider can turn it off tonight without anyone noticing.

This is precisely why it has become a useful leverage tool. Stopping a shipment of weapons is visible and requires a decision that can be attributed to someone, usually sparking disputes within Congress. Speed limits, however, are invisible, reversible, and can be denied outright. Responsibility can be shifted back and forth between the company, the Pentagon, and the White House, just as happened this week. Musk claims it is set by the government, the government says it issued no orders, and Treasury Secretary Yellen calls Kyiv's claims "very reckless." Each party can deny holding the switch.

External Supply Systems Limit Combat Power

"Starshield" is a commercial product, but its operation relies on contracts worth over $6 billion with the U.S. government. In reality, its company provides Washington with a means to exert pressure through services. A government that owns its weapons but rents permissions possesses only partial sovereignty.

This right is bidirectional, which is precisely why it is easily overlooked. In February, SpaceX collaborated with Kyiv to shut down the "Starlink" terminals mounted on Russian attack drones, allowing only Ukrainian terminals on the government whitelist to remain online. This action helped Ukraine. However, it indicates that the provider, not the user, decides which side on the front line can maintain connectivity.

Ukraine has no alternative to "Starlink" technology and should be grateful for this military capability that no one else can provide. This is a fact and precisely the key point. European leaders made this clear at the summit. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell acknowledged, "In the short term, Europe cannot replace this capability." Europe's main alternative is the European Communication Satellite Company's "OneWeb" system, which has 648 satellites, while "Starlink" has over 10,000 satellites, and the "OneWeb" system lacks the small terminals required for drones.

Germany is planning to establish its own military network "SATCOMBw Phase IV," costing between 8 billion and 10 billion euros, with a maximum of 40 satellites by 2029. Italy has expressed interest in building its own network. Several national networks, each controlled by a different country, merely recreate the same switch on a smaller scale, but they will face the same questions: Who can turn it off? Under what rules? And who must be informed?

Three Possible Scenarios for the Future

Baseline scenario: Making do. "Starshield" can maintain full speed most of the time, but it remains an unspoken bargaining chip. Early next year, the EU will add commercial services to government satellite communication services, and Ukraine will switch fixed command posts to European satellite links while drones continue to use "Starshield."

Adverse scenario: Connectivity becomes a bargaining condition. After the November 3 midterm elections, Washington openly links the use of "Starshield" and missile warnings to whether Kyiv accepts ceasefire terms. If speed limits persist during Russia's winter offensive, it would allow the U.S. to influence Ukraine's negotiating position without announcing a reduction in aid. Europe has weapons on the battlefield but lacks the network to use them. This would force Brussels to make political choices sooner.

Favorable scenario: Europe buys the switch to use weapons, not just this military capability. Several European governments already bear most of Ukraine's communication costs, and they will use this funding as leverage in negotiations. Countries will demand all service providers—whether U.S. or European companies—offer binding service guarantees: advance notice before implementing any restrictions, custodial access rights, and clear decision-makers. This approach would treat access to communication services in accordance with military export rules, bound by established agreement terms, just like weapons. This is currently the lowest-cost, quickest solution for sovereignty assurance, yet it is hardly discussed.

The "Starlink" incident reveals not the recklessness of a billionaire but that Western military power now consists of two parts: equipment owned by allies, but usage permissions that can be turned off by others. Ukraine has drones but lacks control over speed limits. Europe is spending significant funds to fill this capability gap, but without clear rules on "who can turn it off," this merely shifts the problem from Washington to European countries. (Translated by Tu Qi)