The Deep Impact of Power Struggles Among PLA High Command: Insights from Zhang Youxia's Fall on China's Military Modernization Concerns

On January 24, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced that Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, Director of the Joint Staff Department of the Military Commission, were placed under investigation for suspected "serious violations of discipline and law." This news shocked the international military observation community, as Zhang Youxia is not only the second-in-command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) but also one of Xi Jinping's most trusted military allies since he took office. This incident not only marks a new peak in the internal power struggle within the Chinese military but also profoundly reveals the serious systemic crisis faced by the PLA in its rapid modernization process.

The downfall of Zhang Youxia carries unprecedented symbolic significance. The 75-year-old general is the son of founding general Zhang Zongxun and belongs to the core circle of the Chinese Communist Party's "red second generation." He enlisted in 1968 and has served in the PLA for 58 years, participating in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the 1984 Battle of Laoshan, possessing rich combat experience and deep military connections. After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, Zhang Youxia was appointed as the Minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission and was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Military Commission in 2017, becoming the highest military leader after Xi Jinping.

However, a commentary published by the PLA Daily on January 26 used extremely harsh language, accusing Zhang Youxia of "seriously undermining the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission." This expression has a special meaning in the Chinese political context—it implies that Zhang is not only suspected of corruption but, more seriously, has challenged the military authority of the supreme leader and may have even formed factions within the military. The severity of such accusations has only been seen in similar expressions during the Lin Biao incident in 1971.

In-depth analysis shows that this military purge is not an isolated event but the latest chapter in a power struggle that has been brewing since the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022. According to multiple sources, the seeds of conflict were sown in early 2023. At that time, a large-scale corruption case erupted within the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission and the procurement system of the Rocket Force, involving several of Zhang Youxia's former subordinates. The investigation quickly spread to the defense industry, theater command headquarters, and core departments of the Military Commission. By June 2024, 12 senior PLA generals (mostly lieutenant generals and generals) had been investigated.

Notably, there has been a clear factional confrontation in this power struggle. Xi Jinping's camp mainly relies on the "Fujian clique" of officers he cultivated during his tenure in Fujian (1985-2002), with the core being generals from the PLA's 31st Group Army system based in Xiamen, including Military Commission member Miao Hua and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission He Weidong. However, Zhang Youxia's camp successfully countered and brought down Miao Hua and He Weidong—Miao Hua was arrested in November 2024, and He Weidong was arrested in March 2025, both ultimately expelled from the Party and military in October 2025. This marks the near collapse of Xi Jinping's carefully nurtured "Fujian clique" military network.

Zhang Youxia's ability to maintain a strong position in the long-term struggle is closely related to his special background. As the son of a founding general and a core member of the princeling faction, Zhang Youxia maintains close relationships with several CCP elders, which to some extent undermines Xi Jinping's absolute authority in the military. More importantly, Zhang Youxia has established a vast network of connections within the PLA, particularly in equipment procurement and the Rocket Force system. Liu Zhenli, as Zhang's subordinate, built a deep superior-subordinate relationship with him during the Laoshan campaign in the 1980s, and their simultaneous downfall is not coincidental.

The rapid pace of this purge also reflects the urgency of the situation. Unlike previous cases, Zhang Youxia went from public appearance to being announced under investigation in just five days. His last public appearance was on January 12 at the fifth plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. He was absent from scheduled activities at the Central Party School and National Defense University on January 20-21, and was announced to be under investigation on January 24. This "swift resolution" approach is extremely rare in Chinese politics, indicating the immense pressure Xi faces and the urgent need to control the military.

However, the consequences of this purge may far exceed expectations. As of now, five of the seven members of the Central Military Commission have been investigated or expelled, leaving only Xi Jinping and newly appointed Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin. Zhang Shengmin is a political commissar who has spent his entire military career in political departments and disciplinary inspection systems, with no combat experience. Among the 30 senior PLA generals appointed by Xi Jinping after he took office in 2012, 13 have been investigated or are under investigation. This means that the high-level command structure of the PLA is effectively paralyzed.

Even more concerning is that this purge has caused a serious talent gap. Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Liu Zhenli, and others are generals who have undergone real combat tests and possess rich command experience. Their downfall means the PLA has lost a group of the most capable senior officers who could provide objective military advice to the supreme commander. What may replace them are relatively younger generals with high political loyalty but lacking combat experience. This "loyalty over capability" selection standard could lead to a decline in the quality of military decision-making, especially increasing the risk of misjudgment on sensitive issues such as the Taiwan Strait.

From the perspective of military modernization, the timing of this internal turmoil is extremely unfavorable. Over the past decade, the PLA has been advancing large-scale military reforms, including theater system reforms, joint operations system construction, and equipment modernization. These reforms require stable high-level leadership and continuous policy support. However, the ongoing purges and personnel upheavals have severely disrupted this process. According to The Economist, since early 2023, Xi Jinping's "personal command and personal deployment" model has become difficult to implement due to internal resistance within the Military Commission.

International observers generally believe that this power struggle exposes deep contradictions within the Chinese political system. The U.S. National Security Advisor used the term "paranoia" to describe Xi Jinping's mindset when assessing the PLA's purges. This assessment is not unfounded—a leader who needs to maintain authority through continuous purges reflects the fragility of his power base. A military with constantly changing high-level personnel, where everyone feels insecure, raises doubts about its combat effectiveness and loyalty.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, the internal chaos of the PLA may affect China's military posture in key regions such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. On one hand, an internally unstable military leadership may prompt the highest levels to adopt a more cautious foreign policy, as they cannot be sure the military can effectively execute complex military operations. On the other hand, to divert internal contradictions and consolidate power, there is also a risk of adopting a hardline external posture to unify internal factions.

It is worth noting that this purge is not yet over. The five vacant positions in the Military Commission have yet to be filled, which itself indicates the seriousness of the problem. Typically, high-level personnel adjustments are completed in a short time, but the current delay suggests either an inability to find suitable candidates who are politically reliable or that deeper internal power struggles are still ongoing.

The Zhang Youxia case also reveals fundamental flaws in the PLA's institutional construction. A healthy military organization should have a sound supervision mechanism, transparent promotion standards, and a merit-based selection system. However, from this incident, it appears that high-level appointments in the PLA rely more on personal relationships, factional backgrounds, and political loyalty rather than purely military talent. Under such a system, corruption and factional struggles are almost inevitable.

Looking ahead, the PLA faces a difficult rebuilding process. The new generation of military leaders not only needs to establish their own authority and command system but also must continue to advance complex military modernization projects without the guidance of experienced predecessors. At the same time, they must work in a highly politicized environment, constantly vigilant against political risks rather than focusing on military professionalism. Such an environment makes it difficult to cultivate truly outstanding military leadership talent.

For the international community, this internal power struggle within the PLA provides an important observation window. It indicates that although China has made significant progress in weaponry and military technology, there are still serious issues in military governance, command systems, and talent cultivation in terms of soft power. A military plagued by internal political struggles, no matter how advanced its equipment, raises questions about its true combat effectiveness.

Finally, it is worth pondering whether this purge is a successful strengthening of military control by Xi Jinping or a reflection of his power anxiety. On the surface, the opposition has been eliminated, and power has been consolidated. But on a deeper level, a system that needs to maintain control through continuous purges of senior generals is inherently unstable. When loyalty replaces capability as the selection standard, and fear replaces trust as the organizational culture, whether such a military can function effectively in a real crisis remains a significant question.

The downfall of Zhang Youxia is not just a personal tragedy for a senior general but a dangerous signal in the process of China's military modernization. It reminds us that true military strength comes not only from advanced weapons and large budgets but also from stable leadership, professional officer teams, and a healthy organizational culture. In these areas, the PLA clearly has a long way to go.