The Depth of Xi Jinping's Military Purge Exceeds Imagination: The Leadership Vacuum in the PLA and the Prospects for Modernization

The latest research report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on February 24, 2026, reveals a shocking fact: since 2022, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China has undergone an unprecedented large-scale purge at the senior level, the breadth and depth of which far exceed previous external perceptions. This internal political war led by Xi Jinping has not only reshaped the power structure of the PLA but has also had a profound impact on China's military modernization process and recent combat readiness.

The "Chinese Military Purge Database" constructed by the CSIS China Power Project shows that since 2022, 101 senior military officers at the general officer level have been officially purged or are suspected of being under investigation. This number includes 36 generals and lieutenant generals who have been officially purged, as well as another 65 officers who are "missing" or suspected of being purged. The judgment of these officers' absence is based on their failure to attend important meetings and events they were supposed to participate in, which is an extremely unusual signal in the highly procedural system of the Chinese military.

Most notably, the purge at the Central Military Commission (CMC) level has been significant. Xi Jinping removed six CMC members in the second round of purges, including former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli, and senior CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia. This purge has completely destroyed the high-level command structure of the PLA, leaving only one active-duty general, Zhang Shengmin, who was promoted to vice chairman at the end of 2025.

The scale of the purges peaked in 2025. That year, 15 generals were officially purged, of which 9 were expelled from the Party and 6 were dismissed from their posts. Even more shocking, at least 46 generals went "missing" in 2025, as they were absent from key events. For example, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China held in October 2025, in addition to the members who had been officially expelled, 14 generals and 5 lieutenant generals were noticeably absent.

Data analysis reveals the devastating extent of the purges. Among the 47 PLA leaders who served or were promoted to general in 2022, 41 (87%) have been purged or are suspected of being purged. Even more striking is that among the 35 three-star generals promoted by Xi Jinping since 2020, 32 appear to be under investigation, and 29 have subsequently been confirmed or suspected to be purged. This means that the vast majority of generals personally approved for promotion by Xi Jinping have ultimately faced scrutiny.

The purges have touched nearly every branch of the PLA. The Rocket Force has been the hardest hit, with all four of its former commanders officially purged. The Army follows closely behind, with two commanders, two political commissars, four deputy commanders, and one chief of staff purged in 2024 and 2025. The Navy's purges are closely related to procurement corruption and capability shortfalls, highlighted by the sinking of China's first Type 039A submarine during sea trials at the Wuhan shipyard in 2024, underscoring the severity of this issue.

Among the five theater commands, the Southern Theater Command has been the most severely affected, with one commander, one political commissar, and five deputy commanders (four of whom also held leadership positions in the Army, Navy, and Air Force of the theater) purged, leading to a near-total paralysis of the command structure, with the top two positions still vacant. The former commander of the Eastern Theater Command, Lin Xiangyang, is the only theater commander to have been officially expelled from the Party to date.

From a career trajectory analysis, 61% of the currently purged senior military officers come from the operational command system rather than the political commissar system. At the CMC level, 80% of the purged officials held key operational positions, which has resulted in the current CMC lacking military leaders from the operational command system. This situation has had a noticeable impact on the PLA's combat readiness.

The impact of the purges on the PLA's combat capabilities has already become evident. In 2025, two large-scale military exercises around Taiwan were delayed. In 2024, China launched the "Joint Sword" exercise within 3-4 days after "problematic behavior" occurred in Taiwan. In contrast, the "Strait Thunder-2025A" exercise in April 2025 was delayed by 19 days, and the December exercise was also delayed by 12 days.

Notably, the scale and nature of the April 2025 exercise were different, being defined as a "drill" rather than the usual "exercise," suggesting a smaller scale. Although it took nearly two weeks longer to prepare than the 2024 exercise, the exercise was clearly rushed, with the Eastern Theater Command announcing the exercise name only the day before. In contrast, after the appointment of a new commander for the Eastern Theater Command in mid-December 2025, the execution of the "Mission of Justice 2025" exercise was more in line with the standards of the 2024 "Joint Sword" exercise.

The reduction in Sino-Russian joint military exercises is also noteworthy. In 2025, China conducted only six exercises with Russia, less than half of the 14 exercises in 2024. Particularly missing were complex exercises involving multiple branches of the military—there were four such exercises held between China and Russia in 2024, with at least one occurring each year since 2018. This significant decline may be related to the purging of several deputy chiefs of staff from the CMC Joint Staff Department in 2025, a department that has long played a key role in China's military diplomacy.

Regarding the reasons for the purges, while corruption is often cited as a public justification, political factors are the root cause. The PLA's official media, the PLA Daily, claimed that the issues surrounding Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli "seriously undermined and damaged" Xi Jinping's authority as CMC chairman, "intensifying the political issues and corruption that threaten the Party's absolute leadership over the military and harm the Party's governing foundation." Some observers speculate that this indicates Xi Jinping believes Zhang Youxia has accumulated too much influence within the PLA, or that factionalism threatens the CCP's control over the military.

Looking ahead, Xi Jinping faces the daunting task of rebuilding the high-level command system of the military. Between political loyalty and capability, political factors will take precedence. Unlike most militaries, the PLA owes its allegiance not to the state but to the Communist Party. Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership view the military primarily through the lens of regime security.

Currently, apart from Zhang Shengmin, the only remaining member of the CMC (who lacks combat experience), Xi Jinping has only three three-star generals to choose from immediately: current Defense Minister Dong Jun (a naval commander and former deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command), Eastern Theater Command Commander Yang Zhibin (one of only two generals promoted in 2025, an Air Force pilot), and Central Theater Command Commander Han Shengyan (also promoted in 2025, an Air Force officer who served as the overall commander of the military parade in September 2025).

Notably, at the 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping made an exceptional promotion of He Weidong to CMC vice chairman, allowing him to skip a PLA rank (promoted directly from theater leadership to CMC vice chairman), and he was not even a member or alternate member of the Central Committee at that time. Xi Jinping may take similar unconventional measures for future promotions.

In the long term, as the leadership that has undergone purges gradually stabilizes, newly promoted officers will accumulate more experience using China's modernized equipment by the end of the 2020s and establish closer working relationships with Xi Jinping. This may enhance their confidence and expectations of success, making China a more formidable adversary during that period. However, in the short term, this unprecedented purge has undoubtedly created a significant leadership vacuum at the high levels of the PLA, and the long-term impact on China's military modernization agenda and combat readiness remains to be seen.