EU Targets Ports of Third Countries for the First Time: A New Phase in the Sanction War Against Russian Oil

The European Union has proposed to include the ports of Georgia and Indonesia, which handle Russian oil, in the sanctions list — this is the first instance where the EU plans to directly sanction the port infrastructure of third countries. According to Reuters (February 10, 2026), the new package also includes the blocking of two Kyrgyz banks — "Keremet" and "Capital Bank," which provide cryptocurrency services to Russia to circumvent financial restrictions.

Erosion of Neutrality: Why the EU Took This Step

Sanctions against the ports of third countries represent a qualitatively new tool. Until now, the EU had limited itself to banning the import of Russian oil and imposing a price cap ($60 per barrel), but the transshipment infrastructure in neutral countries remained in a gray area. Georgia — a traditional trading partner of Russia in the South Caucasus — continued to process Russian oil products through the ports of Poti and Batumi. Indonesia, which is formally not participating in the sanctions, has also become a transit hub for Russian exports to Asia.

This step reflects growing frustration with the effectiveness of sanctions. Russia has adapted by creating a "shadow fleet" of tankers without Western insurance and redirected flows through friendly jurisdictions. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Russia sold oil worth $180 billion in 2025 — only 20% lower than the 2021 level. The EU is now betting on direct pressure on circumvention infrastructure.

Central Asian Financial Hub: Kyrgyzstan in the Crosshairs

The inclusion of Kyrgyz banks "Keremet" and "Capital Bank" in the sanctions list is a logical continuation of the fight against cryptocurrency channels. After Visa and Mastercard left Russia in 2022, Russian businesses actively used banks in Central Asia for international transactions. Kyrgyzstan, a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), has turned into a financial transit point: trade turnover between Russia and Kyrgyzstan increased from $2 billion (2021) to $9 billion (2025), which is physically impossible to explain by the actual consumption of a country with a population of 7 million.

The cryptocurrency services of Kyrgyz banks allowed Russian companies to convert rubles into USDT and then cash out through Chinese or Turkish platforms. Blocking these banks will hit not only Russia but also Kyrgyzstan itself: the country earned commission income from transit and risked becoming dependent on Moscow. Now Bishkek will have to choose between maintaining access to Western finance and loyalty to the Kremlin.

Military-Logistical Consequences

Sanctions against the ports have a direct military dimension. Supplies of components for the Russian defense industry often go through Georgia and Indonesia: microchips, optics, CNC machines. According to an investigation by the Open Source Centre (2025), up to 40% of Western components in Russian "Iskander-M" missiles and "Geran-2" drones come through Georgian ports. Blocking these routes will not immediately stop Russian production — Moscow has reserves for 6-9 months — but it will complicate the replenishment of critical components like gyroscopes and thermal imagers.

Indonesia plays a role in the supply of raw materials: rubber for armored vehicle tires, chemical reagents for explosives production. Although Jakarta publicly declares neutrality, its ports handle Russian vessels without checking their contents. The EU is effectively warning Indonesia: continuing such a policy will result in economic isolation.

Risks and Limitations of the New Strategy

Sanctions against third countries are a double-edged sword. Georgia has already stated (through unofficial channels) that it views this step as an interference in its sovereignty. If Tbilisi refuses to comply with the sanctions, the EU will face a choice: punish a candidate country for accession or acknowledge its impotence. The same goes for Indonesia: the largest economy in Southeast Asia will not follow Western dictates without real incentives.

Moreover, sanctions stimulate further diversification of Russian routes. If Georgian ports close, Russia will switch to Iranian (Enzeli, Amirabad) or Chinese ports in the Far East. Each new ban creates temporary inconvenience but does not change the structural reality: as long as China, India, and Global South countries refuse to join the sanctions, the "iron curtain" around Russia remains permeable.

What’s Next: The Limits of Sanction Expansion

The EU's proposal raises a fundamental question: how far is the West willing to go in the extraterritorial application of sanctions? Blocking the ports of Georgia and Indonesia is a step towards secondary sanctions of the American type, where not only the adversary is punished but also those who trade with them. This approach worked against Iran but cost the US diplomatic capital in Latin America and Asia.

For Russia, the new sanctions package is yet another stress test of adaptability. The Russian defense industry has already learned to operate under conditions of scarcity: switching to domestic analogs (albeit of lower quality), simplifying designs, replacing rare metals with more accessible ones. Sanctions slow down Russian production but do not stop it. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia produced about 1,800 missiles of various types in 2026 — 15% less than in 2025, but still enough to maintain the pace of strikes on Ukraine (as of February 2026 — about 11 ballistic missiles and 149 drones in one night, February 8-9).

Forecast: Local Effect, Global Fragmentation

Sanctions against the ports of third countries will have a short-term impact: Russian companies will need 2-3 months to restructure logistics, and transportation costs will rise. But strategically, this step deepens the divide between the West and the rest of the world. Developing countries increasingly perceive Western sanctions as a tool of coercion unrelated to international law.

For Russia, this is further confirmation that the war is not a sprint but a marathon of attrition. Moscow bets that the Western coalition will tire before Russian resources run out. Sanctions against the ports of Georgia and Indonesia will not change this calculation but will show whether the West is willing to pay the political price for tightening pressure.

The sanction war has shifted from blockading Russia to besieging its trading partners. The question is how many neutral countries will agree to sacrifice their interests for someone else's conflict.