The expiration of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding triggers an Omani arrangement for Hormuz and places the Gulf in front of a new confrontation

On August 17, the sixty-day deadline set by the memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad on June 17 between Washington and Tehran expired, without an extension and without a "final agreement" that was supposed to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. On the same day, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Baqaei announced that a "understanding" had been reached with Oman regarding the shipping route map in the strait, while U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to bomb Muscat if it "stood in the way" of a deal with Iran. The scene summarizes the current situation: a memorandum of understanding that was stillborn, and a bilateral Iranian-Omani arrangement emerging from its ruins, with the entire Gulf paying the price.

A deadline that ended before it began

The memorandum signed by Trump and Iranian President Masoud Bezhakian under Pakistani sponsorship was merely a temporary framework of fourteen points: an "immediate and permanent" cessation of military operations, reopening Hormuz, subsequent negotiations on the nuclear file, lifting the blockade and sanctions, and a reconstruction package of no less than three hundred billion dollars. However, the disagreement began from the very first moment over a fundamental question: was the memorandum a ceasefire or a peace agreement? Trump described the Iranian strikes on June 27 as an "idiotic violation," and Tehran responded that the U.S. strikes violated Article One. On July 7, Trump announced that the agreement "was over," while Tehran stated that it had suspended all its commitments.

The result is that the deadline that ended yesterday was merely formal. Analyst Nader Eitim sarcastically states: "Why are we still clinging to the date of August 17 as if it means something? The memorandum has been dead for weeks." The more dangerous aspect is that Tehran does not even acknowledge that the deadline began at all: a senior Iranian source told Reuters that the Islamic Republic does not consider the mentioned agreement to have come into effect, as Washington did not lift the blockade or sanctions nor released frozen assets. So how can an agreement be extended that never started?

The Omani option: Hormuz without America

In the midst of this vacuum, Tehran bet on a bilateral path with Muscat. Baqaei announced on Monday that "an understanding has been reached regarding the shipping route map," and that both sides are working on drafting a joint statement. Leaked details indicate that ships will enter through a route close to the Iranian coast and exit through a route near the Omani coast, without fees during the transitional phase. Three weeks of technical talks were enough to produce what sixty days of the U.S. memorandum could not.

What matters in this arrangement is not the navigation map but the question of governance: who manages the strait? Tehran wants to be the one that charts the routes, counts the ships, and imposes the conditions, meaning it wants to transform from a "state under siege" to a "traffic management" authority for the passage through which nearly one-fifth of global oil and gas supplies flow. Readings that go beyond the navigational aspect see the agreement as a step towards a regional system in which Iran does not need Washington's approval to operate its waterway. When Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharib Abadi stated that the strait "was Iranian, is Iranian, and will remain Iranian," he summarized the philosophy of the entire Omani path.

U.S. pressure: rhetoric higher than capability

In contrast, Washington is escalating its rhetoric: "No one to negotiate with," "a wall of steel," "soon I will declare Hormuz an American region," and on Monday: "If Oman stands in the way, we will bomb it," along with a call for Iran to "surrender." Treasury Secretary Scott Pruitt promised to implement measures "the world has never seen" within a week. However, the rhetoric does not hide the depletion of tools: the stock of U.S. interceptors is exhausted, the strategic oil reserve is at its lowest levels, and aircraft carriers have been at sea for months, exceeding all deployment plans.

Barbara Slavin from the Stimson Center states that Washington "does not have many cards left," and that Iran has proven its ability to harm the global economy without an army, simply by keeping Hormuz open on paper and closed in practice. The real question is not whether Trump will bomb Oman, but whether his administration can lower oil prices before the November midterm elections, which make any deal with Tehran nearly impossible before then.

Where does the Gulf stand in this equation?

Here lies the real wound. The Gulf states are the ones paying the price: their tankers are being attacked, war insurance for their ships jumped from 1-3% to 7.5-10% of the cargo value, and traffic through the strait has collapsed from dozens of ships daily to one ship on some days, with oil exceeding $89 per barrel. Yet they are spectators to the Washington-Tehran-Muscat triangle, with none of its vertices being a Gulf capital.

We established a maritime alliance of fifteen countries, signed the Mecca Agreement for collective defense, and joined a strike force with drones, yet none of this has moved a single ship in Hormuz. We labeled the Revolutionary Guard as "pirates" in a statement from the UAE Foreign Ministry, but piracy requires warships to stop them, not statements to condemn them. Any military officer who has served in the region knows the difference between having a platform and having the will to use it: we buy capabilities, but those who decide the fate of our strait are others. Oman, which does not have one-tenth of our defense budgets, was able to negotiate with Tehran on a navigation map because it possesses what we cannot buy: a neutral location and a voice that does not threaten anyone.

An unsolvable dilemma

In summary, the memorandum of understanding has ended, but the Gulf dilemma did not start today. Tehran wants Hormuz closed until Washington pays the price of war, and Washington wants Hormuz closed until Tehran is broken, while the Gulf states want Hormuz open but lack the tools to open it. The Omani arrangement - if completed - will be the first navigational system in the strait since February, but it will be an Iranian-made system par excellence, and the Gulf will pay for it in the form of influence, not in the form of fees.

Practically, we face three scenarios: a deal after the U.S. elections that grants Iran compensation and partial control over the strait, or a new military escalation that drains both sides and closes Hormuz permanently, or an Omani arrangement that turns into a permanent system legitimizing Iranian control over the passage. In all three cases, the question that memorandums of understanding do not answer remains: when will the Gulf understand that the strategy is not in the number of missiles we buy, but in the ability to make decisions in our waterways? As long as the answer remains deferred, our strait will remain hostage to agreements signed between those who do not inhabit its shores.