The JNIM Drones Transforming Warfare in the Sahel

Niamey, January 29. Orange fireballs streak across the night sky as the Nigerien army attempts to respond. The attack on the international airport and air base 101, claimed by the Islamic State in the Sahel (EIGS, formerly EIGS), marks a turning point. For the first time, a jihadist group strikes at the heart of the capital with a sophistication that resembles a special forces operation more than rural guerrilla warfare.

Unprecedented Tactical Escalation

The fighters breached military drone hangars with RPGs and mortars, damaging several aircraft and a civilian plane. "This is unprecedented," confirms Heni Nsaibia from ACLED. The EIGS typically operates in rural areas with Kalashnikovs. This attack reveals a new level of intelligence capability and tactical audacity. Unconfirmed videos suggest that the group may have deployed a drone for nighttime surveillance.

What is concerning is not just the EIGS alone. It is the speed at which all groups in the Sahel are integrating commercial drone technology into their arsenals.

JNIM, Pioneer of Drone Warfare in the Sahel

The true master of drones in the Sahel remains JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Between 2023 and 2025, the group used drones at least 89 times, including 69 for direct attacks. Their first attempt in 2023 was a failure. Two years later, JNIM combines ground assaults and airstrikes with deadly efficiency.

Their main fleet: the DJI M30T, a high-end model equipped with thermal cameras for nighttime surveillance, and the DJI Mavic (500-700 dollars), ideal for transporting improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These consumer-grade Chinese drones, easy to purchase and smuggle, are becoming "low-cost, high-impact" weapons.

The Bamako Blockade from the Sky

Since September 2025, JNIM has besieged the supply routes to Bamako. Tankers coming from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are blocked, causing fuel shortages throughout Mali. How does the group monitor such a vast territory? Drones. These devices allow for real-time tracking of convoys without exposing ground fighters.

This is no longer classic guerrilla warfare. It is asymmetric warfare augmented by repurposed civilian technology.

Artificial Intelligence Comes into Play

The threat does not stop at drones. Offline AI tools like MISTRAL (the rival of ChatGPT) now enable jihadist groups to generate training materials, propaganda images, and statements without an internet connection. These tools also help to circumvent traditional military jamming systems.

Rida Lyammouri from the Policy Center for the New South warns that the next step could be "drone swarms" piloted by AI, capable of launching coordinated large-scale attacks. The technology exists. Groups are acquiring it. African armies are lagging dangerously behind.

A Fragmented Response to a Unified Threat

The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), fighting for independence in northern Mali, shot down a Malian helicopter with an FPV (first-person view) drone in July 2024 in Tessalit. ISWAP in Nigeria has deployed armed drones ten times since 2024. Tactics are spreading, and groups are learning from one another.

Yet, the regional response remains disunited. The rift between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso – has destroyed security cooperation. This week, Niger and Nigeria resumed dialogue on border security. It is a start, but it is late.

Niamey is No Longer a Sanctuary

Since the coup in July 2023 in Niger, the withdrawal of French and American forces has left a tactical void. The Russian paramilitary group Africa Corps has replaced Barkhane, with mixed results. Twenty assailants are reported to have been killed during the attack in Niamey, according to Niamey and Moscow. Four soldiers were injured. But the audacity of the operation remains.

Nsaibia warns: "Urban centers like Niamey, once considered safe, will increasingly be at risk in the medium and long term." On the ground, this statement resonates differently. It means that every Sahelian capital, every airport, every military base must now consider civilian drones as potential attack vectors.

What to Do?

Lyammouri calls for a coordinated response bringing together drone warfare experts, AI researchers, and regional military planners. It is necessary to simulate recorded scenarios: the combined assaults of JNIM, the aerial intelligence networks of EIGS, future swarms.

But coordination requires trust. And trust requires an end to regional tensions. As long as ECOWAS and AES remain divided, jihadist groups will continue to exploit the gaps. They do not need formal coalitions. Their drones, however, cross borders without visas.