High City Calls for Removal of "Enemy State Clause": Why Has a Difficult Charter Amendment Become a New Battleground in Sino-Japanese Security Narratives?

Tanaka Takashi | Analysis of Japanese Security Affairs

Confirmed Facts

According to the speech delivered by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office on September 22 (New York time) at the 81st United Nations General Assembly general debate, High City Semae called for the removal of the text commonly referred to as the "Enemy State Clause" from the United Nations Charter, citing the consensus among heads of state and government expressed in 2005 to delete the relevant text. It is important to clarify: this is Japan reiterating its demand for amendment, not that the clause has been abolished, nor does it mean that the constitutional amendment process has been initiated or is about to be completed.

The historical target of the clause is the enemy states of World War II, not an immediate authorization for sanctions against contemporary Japan. Article 53 of the Charter defines "enemy states" as those countries that were enemies of any signatory during World War II and reserves exceptions related to enforcement actions under regional arrangements connected to Article 107; Article 107 retains transitional language for actions against such countries post-war. Article 77 also involves the trusteeship arrangements for territories separated from enemy states. Therefore, they are remnants of the 1945 system, not permissions for actions against Japan that can be activated at any time, independent of the overall rules of the Charter.

The significance of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document must also be accurately understood: in paragraph 177, the leaders of various countries confirmed that these provisions "are outdated" and expressed their determination to delete them in accordance with the procedures of Article 108 of the Charter. It is a political commitment and direction for reform passed by the General Assembly, not a legal tool for rewriting the treaty text. The official UN page still retains Articles 53 and 107, indicating that "consensus" and "completion of amendment" are two different matters.

Why Institutional Breakthroughs Are Difficult to Achieve in the Short Term

Article 108 sets a dual threshold: it must first be approved by two-thirds of all UN member states, and then ratified by two-thirds of member states according to their respective constitutional procedures, which must include all five permanent members of the Security Council. Although the enemy state clause is generally regarded as outdated, it still must pass this high threshold; if any permanent member does not approve, the amendment cannot take effect for all member states. Therefore, High City's statement is a form of diplomatic pressure and agenda-setting, not something that can be written as an imminent institutional reform.

The Real Value of Narrative Competition

Recently, Beijing has cited the relevant clause to criticize Japan, and Tokyo has placed it prominently at the UN, competing first for the interpretive framework. China can link World War II responsibilities, post-war order, and Japan's security policy; Japan, on the other hand, responds by arguing that the provisions are outdated, emphasizing the universality of the UN and the rule of law, attempting to steer the discussion back to modern international law and institutional reform. The risks in the Taiwan Strait, the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance, and Japan's defense capability development make this debate more likely to spill over: historical narratives are used to define the legitimacy of contemporary security actions, rather than merely discussing a set of dormant provisions.

Analytical Judgment

In the short term, the most likely outcome is not constitutional amendment, but a mutual calibration between China and Japan regarding history, international law, and regional deterrence. For Tokyo, continuously raising the demand for removal can weaken the dissemination of the "enemy" label; for Beijing, retaining and citing historical texts still has political symbolic value. The truly noteworthy indicator is not the wording of a particular speech, but whether both sides further embed this symbolic issue into communications regarding the Taiwan Strait crisis, UN reform negotiations, or bilateral diplomatic confrontations.

Verifiable Sources

• Japanese Prime Minister's Office: Speech at the 81st UN General Assembly General Debate (September 22, 2026, New York time; official speech materials section): https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/105/statement/index.html
• United Nations: Article 53 of the UN Charter: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8
• United Nations: Article 107 of the UN Charter: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-17
• United Nations: Article 108 of the UN Charter: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-18
• United Nations General Assembly: A/RES/60/1 "2005 World Summit Outcome" paragraph 177: https://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1