The New Defense Architecture of Europe: Between Atlantic Partnership and Strategic Autonomy

The European defense landscape is undergoing a historic transformation in February 2026. Recent developments on both sides of the Atlantic mark a turning point in the transatlantic security architecture, which will have far-reaching consequences for the future of NATO and the strategic autonomy of Europe.

On February 12, 2026, Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon, presented the new American defense strategy to NATO defense ministers in Brussels. His message was unequivocal: Europe must take the lead in the conventional defense of the continent, while the U.S. will reduce its conventional forces in Europe. The approximately 85,000 U.S. soldiers currently stationed in Europe are to be deployed in a "more limited and focused" manner, as Colby put it.

This announcement is not a surprise to observers of American defense policy. Colby is regarded as one of the most influential advocates for a strategic realignment of the U.S. away from Europe and towards the Indo-Pacific, where the containment of China is defined as a primary national interest. His statement that the "most consequential" interests of the U.S. lie in deterring China and on the American continent clearly underscores this prioritization.

Nevertheless, Colby emphasized that the U.S. would continue to provide "extended nuclear deterrence" and uphold its commitments under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This assurance was evidently necessary after President Trump sowed significant doubts about the reliability of American alliance commitments with his remarks regarding Greenland in January.

The European response to this new reality did not take long to materialize. Just three days after Colby's speech, on February 15, 2026, the defense ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden signed a letter of intent for the development of the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA). This project for the development of long-range precision weapons represents a significant step towards European strategic autonomy.

The choice of these five nations is strategically highly relevant: Germany and France traditionally form the Franco-German engine of European defense integration. Italy brings its industrial capacity to the table. Poland, which now has the largest army in the EU by personnel strength with over 200,000 soldiers, represents the eastern flank of the alliance. Sweden, a NATO member since 2024, expands the northern European dimension of the project.

In parallel to ELSA, three other European cooperation projects were initiated at the NATO meeting, including the development of ballistic missile defense and air-launched munitions. These initiatives are part of a broader strategy that has been explicitly endorsed by the Pentagon. Colby signaled that Washington is willing to live with European procurement preferences—a remarkable turnaround from previous American policy.

The financial dimensions of this transformation are impressive. Germany, under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, is consistently continuing its "turning point" and surpassed the $100 billion mark in defense spending for the first time in 2025, reaching $107 billion. The entire European Union spent a total of €343 billion on defense in 2024, setting a new record.

In the summer of 2025, NATO members agreed to increase the defense spending target from 2% to 3.5% of GDP by 2035. Several states have already exceeded this target: Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are already above 3.5%, demonstrating the seriousness of the situation, particularly on the eastern flank of the alliance.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte attempted to smooth over the waves after Colby's speech. He emphasized that an alliance of democracies will always have "debates and discussions" and interpreted Colby's remarks as evidence that the U.S. remains "anchored in NATO." However, his statement that the alliance would "always find a way forward" sounded more like a conjuration than a certainty.

The structural challenge lies in Europe's ongoing dependence on American weapon systems. Between 2022 and 2024, about 51% of the arms purchases by European NATO members came from the U.S.—a significant increase from 28% in the period from 2019 to 2021. This development reflects both the lack of European alternatives and the attempt to solidify Washington's security promise through purchases of American systems.

The recent shift towards a "European preference" in defense procurement—long dismissed as a French fantasy—now gains significance in light of the American realignment. For the first time, Europe seems ready to seriously protect and promote its defense industry.

The question of governance for this transformation remains open. The American National Defense Strategy 2026 does not provide a model for this transition. Europe must fill the gap through NATO adjustments, EU defense integration, or coalitions of willing and capable states. The ELSA initiative suggests that the third path—flexible coalitions outside rigid institutional structures—is gaining importance.

The Munich Security Conference 2026 aptly diagnosed "Detachment Issues" between Europe and America in its report. This estrangement can no longer be denied. The question now is whether Europe will be able to close the emerging security gap before it becomes a strategic vulnerability.

The reality is this: Europe faces the necessity of building an independent conventional deterrent capability within a decade that is credible enough to deter Russia from military adventures. This requires not only increased spending but a fundamental transformation of military capabilities, industrial capacities, and strategic planning.

February 2026 may retrospectively be seen as the month in which the era of unrestricted American leadership in European security came to an end. What will take its place is still unclear. But the direction is unmistakable: Europe must grow up and take responsibility for its own security—whether it is ready to do so or not.