The New European Security Architecture: Between Armament, Deterrence, and Strategic Autonomy

The European continent is currently undergoing the most profound transformation of its security architecture since the end of the Cold War. As the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year and Russia continues to expand its armed forces both quantitatively and qualitatively despite massive losses, NATO member states and the European Union are making a historic shift in defense policy. The central question is no longer whether Europe needs to invest more in defense, but whether the pace and coordination of rearmament are sufficient to respond in a timely manner to an escalating threat landscape.

The political framework for this realignment was set by the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025. The 32 member states agreed on a new defense investment target of 5 percent of gross domestic product by 2035, divided into 3.5 percent for military core capabilities and up to 1.5 percent for security-related expenditures such as critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. This decision—described as a "great success" by U.S. President Donald Trump—marks a doubling of the previous 2 percent target and reflects the growing assessment that the security policy situation in Europe requires a fundamentally different financial dimension. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that European defense spending could rise to around 800 billion euros by the end of the decade, taking fiscal capacities into account.

The figures indicate a clear turnaround. According to consolidated EU data, defense spending by the 27 member states reached a total of 343 billion euros in 2024, which corresponds to 1.9 percent of GDP. An increase to an estimated 392 billion euros (2.1 percent of GDP) is expected for 2025. The NATO annual report from March 2026 documents a 20 percent increase in defense spending by European allies and Canada in 2025. Particularly, investment expenditures—i.e., procurement, research, and development—show a sharp increase: from 106 billion euros in 2024 (up 42 percent from the previous year) to an estimated 130 billion euros in 2025. The IISS Military Balance 2026 estimates global defense spending in 2025 at 2.63 trillion U.S. dollars, a real growth of 2.5 percent, primarily driven by Europe and the Middle East.

At the national level, differentiated but determined rearmament paths are emerging. Poland remains the NATO leader in terms of GDP share, expected to reach 4.7 percent in 2025, with a declared goal of 5 percent in 2026. The country is modernizing its land forces at a pace unmatched in Europe. Estonia has adopted a defense development plan with a volume of over 10 billion euros for the period 2026–2029, focusing on air defense, long-range precision strike capabilities, and ammunition stockpiling. Germany is maintaining its 100 billion euro special fund, which has served as a central procurement vehicle since 2022 and is secured by constitutional exceptions. France confirmed in December 2025 the construction of a next-generation nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle, with an intended operational readiness by 2038 and estimated costs of around 10.25 billion euros. Italy, in turn, requested parliamentary approval for a 2.4 billion euro investment package over 15 years for the modernization and maintenance of its frigate fleet.

The European Union is complementing these national efforts with its own financing and coordination instruments. In May 2025, the Council adopted the SAFE program (Security Action for Europe) with a volume of 150 billion euros to promote joint procurement and industrial manufacturing. In January 2026, the Commission approved an initial tranche of SAFE plans for eight member states. Additionally, the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) came into force in December 2025, equipped with 1.5 billion euros in grants for the period 2025–2027, including 300 million euros for a special Ukraine support instrument. These programs aim to overcome the notorious fragmentation of the European procurement landscape and realize economies of scale. Nevertheless, practical implementation remains a challenge: As Reuters documented in January 2026, higher budget allocations do not automatically lead to faster deliveries, especially when multiple countries compete for the same types of ammunition, air defense systems, and platforms.

The urgency of rearmament is underscored by the threat analysis of the Dutch military intelligence service MIVD. In its annual report from April 2026, the service warns that Russia could be ready for a regional conflict with NATO within a year after the end of hostilities in Ukraine. Moscow's goal is not the military subjugation of the alliance but its political division through limited territorial gains—if necessary, under the threat of nuclear escalation. The MIVD documents that the Russian armed forces continued to expand in 2025 despite approximately 1.2 million permanent personnel losses since 2022, including over 500,000 deaths. Combat experience in Ukraine has led to a "significant qualitative improvement," particularly in unmanned systems. The Zapad-2025 exercise in Belarus demonstrated improved command capabilities and the integration of drones at all levels. "The Russian armed forces are not only larger but also more effective than before the war," states the MIVD.

This assessment is shaped by current developments on the battlefield. In March 2026, Russia recorded no net territorial gains for the first time in two and a half years, according to an analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Ukrainian counteroffensives in the south—in the directions of Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole—liberated around 400 square kilometers between January and mid-March. At the same time, the intensity of the drone war reached new dimensions: The Ukrainian Air Force recorded a record number of 6,462 Russian attack drones in March 2026 (daily average: over 208 drones plus 4 cruise missiles). The Ukrainian interception rate rose to 89.9 percent, compared to 85.6 percent in February. The GLOBSEC report on the combat readiness of the eastern NATO flank in 2026 notes progress, but it is uneven, with critical gaps in mobilization, logistics, and industrial capacity.

A strategic risk of its own dimension is posed by the expiration of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026. For the first time since 1972, there is no contractual limitation regime for strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. The MIVD also documents a Russian test of nuclear-powered cruise missiles and torpedoes in October 2025, as well as the likely deployment of the nuclear-capable Oreshnik medium-range missile in Belarus. These weapon systems would have an "extremely destabilizing effect in crises" due to their extremely short warning times. At the same time, the service observes a "worrying collaboration between Chinese companies and the Russian state in the field of space technology," which is likely to intensify in the coming years.

European defense policy thus faces a triple imperative: accelerated national rearmament, overcoming industrial bottlenecks, and maintaining political consensus over multi-year budget cycles. The figures and political conditions of 2026 indicate an irreversible course setting. Whether implementation can keep pace with the deteriorating security situation will depend, among other things, on whether the transatlantic alliance can maintain its cohesion under the conditions of a U.S. security policy perceived as unpredictable. Europe has begun to mature in security policy— the question is whether this maturation process is proceeding quickly enough.