The PLA's Drone Mine-Laying Tactics and New Concepts for the First Island Chain Blockade: Strategic Insights from the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Hormuz

The PLA's Drone Mine-Laying Tactics and New Concepts for the First Island Chain Blockade: Strategic Insights from the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Hormuz
Submitted by: Li MinghuiLi Minghui
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In mid-April 2026, the Chinese military academic journal "Shipborne Weapons" published an analysis article that sparked widespread attention, exploring a new tactical concept for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to use the AJX002 unmanned underwater vehicle to execute offensive mine-laying missions in the Taiwan Strait conflict. The proposal is not an isolated event but resonates subtly with the vulnerabilities exposed by the blockade operations in the Strait of Hormuz during the current Middle East conflict, providing a rare window to observe the evolution of Chinese military thinking.

The article clearly states that in cross-strait operations against Taiwan, the PLA has no need to deploy mines around the island, as it already possesses the capability to establish a comprehensive blockade through firepower interception and rapid deployment of air and naval forces. Specific blockade measures include land-based missile strikes, air force suppression, submarine blockades, and carrier strike group blockades, forming a multi-layered operational system. This statement reveals an important message: the PLA's confidence in implementing conventional maritime and aerial blockades around the Taiwan Strait has reached a considerable level, and mine-laying around Taiwan has been deemed redundant in its operational planning.

What is particularly noteworthy is the article's proposed extension concept—shifting mine-laying targets to key maritime passages controlled by U.S. allies along the first island chain. Specifically, the AJX002 unmanned underwater vehicle could be used to conduct offensive mine-laying operations in the waters around Japan's Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines, aimed at hindering the mobility of U.S. and Japanese Self-Defense Forces and cutting off external forces' supply routes to Taiwan. The strategic logic of this tactical concept is clear: instead of blockading Taiwan itself, it focuses on blocking the supply routes supporting Taiwan.

From a technical perspective, the AJX002 is a new type of underwater unmanned system developed by China in recent years, previously described by Chinese military media as having disruptive and intelligent characteristics. If this platform indeed possesses mine-laying capabilities, it signifies substantial progress for the PLA in the field of underwater unmanned combat systems. Traditionally, offensive mine-laying requires the deployment of surface vessels, submarines, or air forces, which carries high risks and can easily expose intentions. In contrast, unmanned underwater vehicles for mine-laying offer advantages such as strong concealment, long duration, and large-scale deployment, significantly enhancing the surprise and effectiveness of blockade operations.

It is noteworthy that the timing of this tactical concept's proposal is highly correlated with the current situation in the Middle East. The U.S. blockade operations in the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated the strategic vulnerabilities of maritime chokepoints to the world. Chinese military analysts are evidently drawing lessons from this. Chinese military commentator Zhang Xuefeng analyzed the outstanding performance of the Iranian 358 cruise missile in countering the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone—this weapon, costing only tens of thousands of dollars, successfully shot down a U.S. platform worth tens of millions of dollars. Zhang pointed out that although the 358 missile has a flight speed of only 0.6 Mach, which poses little threat to jet aircraft, it poses no problem for turboprop-powered medium-altitude long-endurance drones, with its greatest advantage being its extremely low cost.

This cost-effectiveness analysis holds significant implications for Chinese military decision-makers. In the potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. military heavily relies on unmanned platforms like the MQ-9 and MQ-4C for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. If China can develop similar low-cost interception systems, it would gain a significant asymmetric advantage in the Taiwan Strait battlefield environment. Combined with the AJX002 unmanned mine-laying system, the PLA is constructing a multi-layered, low-cost blockade operational system that spans from underwater to the air.

At the same time, Japan's upgraded role in the U.S.-Philippines shoulder-to-shoulder joint military exercises is also noteworthy. This year, the Japan Self-Defense Forces sent approximately 1,400 personnel to participate in the shoulder-to-shoulder 2026 exercise held from April 20 to May 8, becoming the third-largest military contributor after the U.S. and the Philippines. The Japanese side also deployed multiple surface vessels, aircraft, and the 88-type anti-ship missile system, with exercise subjects covering maritime strikes, live-fire anti-landing exercises, and integrated air defense and missile defense. Analysts point out that these capabilities are precisely the operational elements considered crucial in the Taiwan Strait conflict scenario. Japan's military presence expansion in the Philippines direction is essentially an important supplement to the defense depth of the southern segment of the first island chain, which is also the area that Chinese military journals propose to counter with unmanned mine-laying systems.

On a broader strategic level, the U.S. military recently cited the Chinese military threat as a core argument for requesting a record defense budget for fiscal year 2027 during a congressional hearing. Vice Admiral Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, explicitly stated that the PLA's invasion exercises and live-fire drills around Taiwan and throughout the region demonstrate the necessity of maintaining a state of readiness for naval forces in the Indo-Pacific region. However, during the same hearing, leaders from various branches of the U.S. military also acknowledged that U.S. vessels, aircraft, and ground vehicles generally face issues such as shortages of parts, insufficient maintenance capabilities, and limited defense industrial capacity. This contradiction between rising threat awareness and declining readiness objectively provides a strategic opportunity window for Chinese military planners.

Additionally, Major General Feng Yufang, an important missile scientist in the Chinese Rocket Force, passed away on April 13 due to illness at the age of 63. Feng graduated from the Nuclear Radiation and Protection program at the National University of Defense Technology and was assigned to the former Second Artillery Corps Research Institute in 1987. He was promoted to Major General in 2006 and made significant contributions to the development of the Rocket Force's nuclear and conventional missile systems during his nearly 40-year military equipment research career. His passing is a significant loss to China's missile technology field. Feng publicly stated that core technologies cannot be bought and that relying on imports will not lead far; this statement carries profound strategic implications in the current international environment and reflects China's consistent adherence to a self-reliant path in military industrial development.

In summary, a series of developments in mid-April outlines a clear picture of China's military development: while traditional power projection capabilities continue to strengthen, the PLA is actively developing new operational capabilities centered on unmanned systems, low-cost precision strikes, and asymmetric warfare. From the AJX002 unmanned mine-laying system to the technical lessons drawn from Iran's 358 missile, and to the independent development of the Rocket Force's nuclear and conventional missile systems, these seemingly disparate clues point to a unified strategic direction—building a comprehensive operational system that can effectively blockade and maintain economic sustainability in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The adjustments in military deployments by the U.S. and its allies along the first island chain, including Japan's force extension in the Philippines direction, are becoming direct targets of this system's planning.

Classification
Region
East Asia & Pacific
Analytical Domain
Operational
Primary Category / Secondary Categories
Military Operations / Force Movement
Subcategory
Naval Engagement
SALUTE Report
Size
Approximately 1400 personnel from Japan Self-Defense Forces
Activity
Japan participates in joint military exercises with the U.S. and Philippines, enhancing military presence in the region
Location
Philippines · Japan · Taiwan
Unit
Japan Self-Defense Forces
Time
April 20 to May 8, 2026
Equipment
AJX002 unmanned underwater vehiclesurface vesselsaircraftType 88 anti-ship missile system
Summary

China's military is enhancing its capabilities with the AJX002 unmanned underwater vehicle for offensive mine-laying operations, targeting key maritime routes controlled by U.S. allies. Japan is increasing its military presence in the Philippines through joint exercises with the U.S. and Philippines from April 20 to May 8, 2026. This development reflects China's strategic focus on effective blockade systems in the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding region.

Key Facts
  • China's military confidence in conventional sea and air blockades around Taiwan is high.
  • The AJX002 unmanned underwater vehicle is proposed for offensive mine-laying operations.
  • Japan is increasing its military presence in the Philippines as part of joint exercises.
  • The U.S. acknowledges the need for naval readiness in the Indo-Pacific region due to Chinese military activities.
  • China is developing low-cost interception systems to gain asymmetric advantages in potential conflicts.