The Regional Offensive of JNIM Reveals the Fragmentation of the Sahel Security Architecture

The launch in February 2026 of a coordinated large-scale offensive by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) across central Sahel and into Benin marks a concerning tactical turning point in the regional jihadist dynamic. This military campaign, unprecedented in scale for the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, occurs against a backdrop of profound restructuring of West African security alliances, revealing the structural fragilities of an increasingly fragmented region.

The JNIM offensive finds its origins in an internal defection that shook the group's cohesion. Sadou Samahouna, a senior commander operating in the Eastern region of Burkina Faso and younger brother of Abu Hanifa, the emir of JNIM for Niger, defected to the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP). Although Sadou apparently rallied to the ISSP with only a small group of fighters, his influence and support base raised major concerns within JNIM's leadership regarding internal cohesion and the risk of cascading defections. This strategic concern seems to have catalyzed the intensity and geographical scope of the subsequent campaign.

The first major attack of this offensive took place on February 4 in Makalondi, Niger, near the Boni area where Sadou had executed his defection. JNIM launched a massive assault on a Nigerien military base, clearly signaling a desire to demonstrate its operational power and deter other potential defections. However, it was in Burkina Faso that the campaign fully unfolded, with the country becoming the main theater of operations with over thirty documented attacks in February alone.

The Burkinabè armed forces and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), state-supported militia auxiliaries, were the primary targets in the Eastern, Central-North, and Northern regions. The human toll proved particularly heavy, with over 120 soldiers, forest guards, and VDP fighters killed during this offensive. The intensity and brutality of the attacks recall tactics generally associated with the ISSP, characterized by mass and indiscriminate violence. This tactical convergence suggests a concerning evolution of JNIM, which appears to be adopting more aggressive methods resonating with segments of its grassroots fighters.

While JNIM was conducting its campaign, the ISSP did not remain inactive. On February 9 and 10, the rival group launched its own offensive in the Burkinabè Sahel region, attacking and taking control of several JNIM positions in various villages. These clashes resulted in the deaths of over 40 JNIM fighters, underscoring the persistent challenge that the ISSP poses to JNIM's claimed regional dominance. This jihadist rivalry adds an additional layer of complexity to an already fragmented security landscape.

The context in which this offensive occurs is one of a major restructuring of regional military alliances. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) announced at a meeting of military chiefs in Sierra Leone in early March 2026 the activation of a regional reserve force intended to combat cross-border armed groups. The plan calls for the initial mobilization of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026, with a long-term goal of a force of 260,000 men supported by a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion.

This initiative comes after the dramatic withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS in January 2025 to form their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The three countries, all led by military juntas that came to power through coups between 2020 and 2023, justified their power grabs by the inability of civilian governments to address jihadist groups. The AES has officially turned its back on France, its historical ally and former colonial power, which had deployed around 4,000 soldiers in the region for counter-terrorism operations.

Instead, the three Sahelian states have turned to Moscow. Approximately 2,000 Russian fighters, initially from the Wagner paramilitary group and now integrated into the African Corps controlled by the Russian state, have been deployed to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The AES is currently working to establish its own combined force of 6,000 men, in an attempt to prove its ability to compete with ECOWAS by effectively combating armed groups.

The institutional fragmentation between ECOWAS and the AES poses major operational challenges for any coordinated military response. Nigeria, which has historically provided 75 percent of the personnel for ECOWAS missions and has been a major funder, faces significant economic and security constraints. High inflation in 2023, exacerbated by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, has weakened the country's financial capacity. Militarily, Nigerian forces are already stretched across multiple fronts, fighting jihadist groups in the northeast, criminal gangs in the northwest, and separatist movements in the south.

Operational coordination also represents a significant challenge. Armed groups operate across at least eight distinct jihadist entities using densely forested areas as refuges and transit corridors between countries. JNIM, with an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 members, remains the main Al-Qaeda-affiliated actor, but the ISSP, Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru, and the emerging Lakurawa group all pose active threats requiring differentiated approaches.

Funding for this ECOWAS regional force remains uncertain. The United States, which has intensified its cooperation with Nigeria since December 2025 after initially wrongfully accusing the country of allowing a "genocide" against Christians, could be a source of funding. France, which is developing increasingly close ties with Abuja after its eviction from the Sahel, represents another potential option.

Beyond military and financial challenges, experts emphasize the need for social interventions in rural areas from which armed groups recruit their members. These organizations often secure local adherence by collecting taxes, providing resources such as fertilizers, building mosques, or promising security in the absence of the state. Without addressing these attraction factors, military operations risk producing only temporary tactical results without lasting strategic impact.

The current situation illustrates a concerning paradox: as the jihadist threat intensifies and coordinates across borders, state responses become increasingly fragmented and competitive. The rivalry between ECOWAS and the AES, fueled by considerations of national prestige and divergent geopolitical orientations, risks creating ungoverned spaces that armed groups can exploit. The February 2026 offensive led by JNIM demonstrates that these groups retain significant operational capacity and a willingness to exploit the systemic vulnerabilities of a rapidly changing regional security architecture.

The question remains whether the multiplication of military initiatives – the ECOWAS reserve force of 260,000 men, the AES combined force of 6,000 soldiers, and the approximately 1,650 personnel of the Rapid Deployment Force announced in September 2025 – represents dysfunctional redundancy or whether some form of pragmatic coordination will eventually emerge in the face of a growing common threat. For now, institutional fragmentation seems to play in favor of jihadist actors who, despite their own internal divisions, demonstrate an ability to conduct coordinated operations on a regional scale.