The Russian Army Prepares for the Winter Campaign of 2026 — 135 Drones Accelerate the Interceptor Race

One hundred thirty-five devices as a rehearsal

On the night reported in the latest ISW assessment, Russian troops launched 135 drones at Ukraine. The number itself is not a record and is therefore particularly indicative. Moscow no longer needs a single spectacular salvo to maintain pressure. It requires regularity, forcing Ukrainian air defense to expend expensive missiles, while the population and energy system live in a state of constant anticipation.

ISW links the increase in strikes to the formation of the Russian autumn-winter campaign of 2026–2027 against critical infrastructure. The Russian Ministry of Defense is trying to present this campaign as a response to specific actions by Kyiv, but such reasoning does not hold up well under scrutiny. By the nature and duration of the strikes, it is not about revenge, but rather a pre-prepared operational scheme (ISW, October 4 and November 3, 2026). The Kremlin is once again using the language of pretext to obscure the language of calculation.

What has changed in the Russian model of strikes

The Russian scheme consists of three elements. The first is the mass use of cheap loitering munitions and drones that overload detection networks. The second is the retention of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles for those targets where it is necessary to penetrate layered defenses or strike at energy system nodes. The third is the gradual expansion of the campaign's time window: instead of several short waves, Moscow is counting on a cumulative effect throughout the winter.

This does not mean that the Russian industry has received unlimited resources. On the contrary, it is precisely the limitation of expensive missiles that explains the combination of various means of destruction. The drone here serves not only as a munition. It is a tool for reconnaissance of reactions, a lure for anti-aircraft missiles, and a way to force Ukraine to reveal the locations of mobile fire groups. From a Soviet perspective, this is a recognizable logic of exhausting the enemy, but with one significant caveat: now its material basis is not only a state factory but a complex network of imported components, local assembly, and external supplies.

Kyiv's response — a reactive layer of air defense

Ukraine is urgently developing the production of domestic interceptors with jet propulsion. There is currently insufficient public data on their quantity, range, and guidance system, so declaring them a ready solution would be premature. However, the very formulation of the task is of great significance. A slow drone interceptor can engage some targets, but against drones operating in groups and at different altitudes, higher speed, reduced reaction time, and the ability to quickly change patrol areas are required.

The jet interceptor will not eliminate the need for anti-aircraft missiles. Its advantage should manifest in the economics of interception: it is unreasonable to destroy every cheap device with an expensive missile, especially if the enemy deliberately launches dozens of targets. At the same time, a new problem arises — the training of operators, a stable control channel, integration with radars, and safe operation in conditions of electronic warfare. Technology alone does not create a system. As the war has shown, the weak link is often not in the engine but in the management.

Two logics of one winter

Moscow hopes that the cold and damage to infrastructure will turn a technical problem into a political one. Kyiv, on the contrary, is trying to turn each new Russian salvo into an incentive to accelerate its own defense industry. Therefore, the winter campaign will be a competition not only of munitions but also of adaptation cycles. If Ukraine can update sensors, interceptors, and distributed energy systems faster, the massiveness of Russian strikes will lose some of its effect. If the Russian command can change routes, timelines, and combinations of means more quickly, it will maintain pressure even as Ukrainian effectiveness increases.

There is also a ground dimension. ISW notes the ongoing formation of new maneuver divisions by Russia as part of a long-standing course to return to a mass divisional structure. This is an important signal for understanding Russian military doctrine. Moscow is simultaneously modernizing drone warfare and returning to an organizational form inherited from the industrial era. At first glance, this is a contradiction. In practice, the Kremlin is trying to combine the mass of the Soviet type with digital means of observation and destruction. Whether this combination will succeed depends on the quality of command, not the name of the unit.

Why official rhetoric should not be misleading

Russian statements about "retaliatory" strikes should be viewed as part of an influence operation. They are addressed not only to the Ukrainian audience but also to Western governments, which are being offered to interpret the escalation as a chain of forced reactions. However, the consistent targeting of energy facilities and the accumulation of missiles indicate a strategic choice. In the winter of 2026, Russia will attempt to prove that it can make Ukrainian infrastructure a permanent hostage to frontline dynamics.

The main question of this campaign is not whether Russia can launch even more drones, but whether Ukraine can make mass launches economically and operationally meaningless.

Forecast

In the coming weeks, Russian strikes are likely to remain combined and distributed across several regions to complicate the concentration of Ukrainian defense. Ukraine will respond by expanding the production of interception means, including jet platforms, but the effect from them will only appear when integrated into a unified detection and control network. Russia has the resources to continue applying pressure, but there are no grounds to consider them infinite; Ukraine has the technological initiative, but no time for slow implementation.

Therefore, the winter campaign will not serve as proof of the unconditional superiority of one side. It will show which military system can more quickly turn losses and mistakes into organizational changes. The Russian army is once again betting on mass. This time, its opponent is trying to respond not with symmetrical mass but with a faster detection and interception contour. The outcome will depend on whose contour proves to be shorter.

Sources

• Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3–4, 2026.
• Kyiv Post, summary of ISW assessment, November 4, 2026.
• Institute for the Study of War, assessment of the Russian autumn-winter strike campaign, October 4, 2026.