The Sahel after Barkhane: Restructuring Security Arrangements and the Persistence of the Jihadist Threat

The strategic reconfiguration of the security apparatus in the Sahel is entering a critical phase at the beginning of 2026, two years after the definitive withdrawal of French forces from Operation Barkhane. This evolution marks a historic turning point in the Western approach to counterterrorism in West Africa, while raising fundamental questions about the viability of regional stabilization strategies in the face of a jihadist threat that, far from fading, continues to adapt and thrive in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

The French withdrawal, initiated in February 2022 with the announcement by President Emmanuel Macron and gradually completed between 2022 and 2025, occurs in a context of increasing diplomatic tensions with the Malian, Burkinabé, and Nigerien authorities. The approximately 5,000 French soldiers deployed in the region since 2013 have gradually left their bases in Gao, Ménaka, Tessalit, and Timbuktu, taking with them an aerial intelligence and rapid projection capability that constituted the backbone of the fight against armed terrorist groups in the area. This redistribution of security dynamics comes as jihadist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State continue their territorial expansion and strengthen their operational capabilities.

The security situation on the ground reveals a continuous degradation despite the efforts made by national armed forces. The Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Mouslimin (JNIM), a coalition affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and led by Iyad Ag Ghali, remains the dominant actor in the Sahelo-Saharan band. Attacks against defense and security forces have intensified in Burkina Faso and Mali, with an increasing sophistication in operational methods. Ambushes against military convoys, coordinated attacks against camps and forward positions, as well as improvised explosive devices, testify to a remarkable tactical adaptability of these armed groups.

At the same time, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), although facing internal dissent and military pressure, maintains its presence in the tri-border area between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Clashes between JNIM and EIGS for territorial control and the allegiance of local populations add an additional layer of complexity to the regional security landscape. These inter-jihadist rivalries, far from facilitating the work of security forces, create increased volatility and multiply the gray areas where state authority remains absent or contested.

In the face of this security vacuum, several international actors are attempting to reposition their apparatus. The United Nations mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was dissolved in December 2023 at the request of the Malian authorities, depriving the region of a stabilization force of over 13,000 personnel. The United States maintains a reduced presence, primarily focused on training and intelligence, from their base in Agadez, Niger, although their future remains uncertain due to regional political turbulence. Russia, through the Wagner group rebranded as Africa Corps, has gradually expanded its influence in Mali and the Central African Republic, offering an alternative security model that appeals to some military regimes seeking strategic autonomy from the West.

This diversification of security partners is accompanied by a reconfiguration of regional alliances. The Alliance of Sahel States, created in September 2023 by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following their respective coups, seeks to promote a common approach to counterterrorism, independent of former colonial powers. However, this cooperation faces significant material constraints: weak air capabilities, insufficient intelligence capacities, logistical and equipment gaps, and above all, a lack of effective operational coordination on the ground.

Civilian populations remain the primary victims of this deteriorating security situation. Forced displacements have multiplied, with more than 2.5 million internally displaced persons in the Liptako-Gourma region according to figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Massacres of civilians, whether perpetrated by jihadist groups or, in some cases, by elements of security forces and self-defense militias, create a cycle of violence and retaliation that undermines any prospect of reconciliation and reconstruction of the social fabric.

The analysis of current dynamics also reveals the growing role of economic factors in perpetuating insecurity. Control of trans-Saharan trade routes, artisanal gold mining in border areas, and trafficking of all kinds (weapons, drugs, human beings) constitute sources of funding for armed groups. This war economy is embedded in transnational networks that far exceed the borders of the Sahel and complicate counterterrorism strategies focused solely on the military aspect.

Poor governance and weak public services in rural areas provide fertile ground for jihadist rhetoric. The absence of the state, endemic corruption, intercommunal tensions exacerbated by competition for natural resources in a context of climate change, and the feeling of abandonment felt by peripheral populations are structural factors that fuel the insurgency. Without a comprehensive strategy integrating development, inclusive governance, and reconciliation, sporadic military gains will not sustainably break the insurgent dynamic.

Medium-term prospects appear concerning. The geographical expansion of the threat towards the coastal countries of West Africa - Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire - is confirmed with the multiplication of security incidents in the northern regions of these states. This progression southward demonstrates the ability of jihadist groups to exploit security gaps and socio-economic fragilities beyond their historical area of establishment. The creation of a new belt of instability linking the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea is now a plausible scenario that could destabilize the entire West African region.

In the face of these multidimensional challenges, the international community and Sahelian states must profoundly rethink their approaches. The excessive militarization of responses, the lack of coordination among actors, the absence of a clear political vision for the post-conflict period, and the insufficient consideration of local dynamics have demonstrated their limits. A renewed strategy should prioritize strengthening state capacities, political inclusion of marginalized communities, investment in the development of peripheral areas, and the promotion of regional dialogue that transcends current diplomatic divides.

Post-Barkhane Sahel stands at a historic crossroads. The failure of external military interventions does not mean that solutions will spontaneously arise from within, but rather that any sustainable strategy must rely on local ownership of the issues, repositioned and sustained international support, and a comprehensive vision integrating security, development, and governance. The future of this region, which concentrates some of the most acute security challenges on the African continent, will depend on the collective ability of regional and international actors to learn from past failures and build responses adapted to the complex realities on the ground.