The Sahel Facing a Security Escalation: The Rivalry Between ECOWAS and the Sahel States Alliance Redefines the Regional Counterterrorism Landscape

The year 2026 marks a decisive turning point in the security architecture of the Sahel, with the emergence of two competing visions of the fight against terrorism. On one side, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is attempting to reaffirm its regional leadership by accelerating the deployment of a rapid deployment force. On the other side, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, continues its sovereign trajectory with a joint operational force. This fragmentation of the regional response occurs as the terrorist threat reaches unprecedented levels.

During a crucial meeting of West African chiefs of staff at the end of February 2026, ECOWAS announced its intention to initially mobilize 2,000 soldiers by the end of the year. This rapid deployment force constitutes the first phase of a much more ambitious project: the ECOWAS Standby Force, whose action plan for 2020-2024 ultimately envisioned the deployment of 260,000 personnel to combat terrorism in West Africa. The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel-Fatau Musah, had already confirmed in September 2025 that a force of 1,650 personnel would be deployed in 2026, a number now raised to 2,000 in light of the security emergency.

This initiative comes amid rising tensions with the AES, established in September 2023 as a collective defense organization. The three member states commissioned a joint military force of 5,000 personnel in January 2025, presented as a symbol of self-sufficiency and security autonomy. On February 26, 2026, the defense, security, development, and diplomacy ministers of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger met in Ouagadougou to approve the roadmap for the second year of the AES, marking their determination to pursue an independent path from ECOWAS.

This regional division occurs as data on terrorist violence reaches alarming levels. According to the Global Terrorism Index, more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024 occurred in West Africa and the Sahel. The first week of February 2026 illustrated this brutal reality: at least 36 Nigerien soldiers were killed in clashes with militant groups, highlighting the persistent volatility of the security environment. Terrorist groups, primarily Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State's Sahel Province, continue to operate cross-border, exploiting gaps in regional coordination.

The AES strategy increasingly relies on the acquisition of advanced military technologies, including attack drones supplied by Turkey and Russia. This modernization of the military arsenal is accompanied by a growing dependence on external actors, particularly the Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group), whose soldiers have been accused of committing atrocities against civilians in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. This foreign presence, while providing tactical support, raises concerns about the actual sovereignty of these states and the humanitarian costs of their security strategy.

ECOWAS, for its part, faces an existential challenge. The AES states have criticized the organization for its lack of support in the fight against terrorism and have become suspicious when ECOWAS decided to establish a regional force that they perceive as directly targeting them. Although the initial objectives of this force are focused on combating terrorism, the three Sahelian states see it as a potential threat and refuse to contribute. This mistrust has significantly weakened regional cooperation, particularly in terms of information and intelligence sharing, which are essential for combating groups operating cross-border.

The Accra Initiative, established in 2017 to counter the growing threat to the coastal states of West Africa, represents another security mechanism struggling to demonstrate its effectiveness. The gradual spread of violence to the Gulf of Guinea countries – Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire – illustrates the relative failure of existing security structures to contain the threat. In December 2025, following an attempted coup in Benin, ECOWAS deployed about 200 soldiers from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire to secure key facilities, demonstrating its ability to respond quickly to political crises but raising questions about its long-term counter-terrorism strategy.

The militarized approach favored by both ECOWAS and the AES raises legitimate questions. Previous operations, including the French operation Barkhane, the United Nations peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, have failed to reverse the security trend. On the contrary, rural areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger continue to suffer massive violence, with civilian massacres such as that in Barsalogho in August 2024, where JNIM reportedly killed hundreds of people building defensive trenches.

The military leaders of the AES have reiterated that their alliance aims to replace ECOWAS by improving regional security through military cooperation and economic integration. However, this ambition faces complex operational realities. The transnational nature of the terrorist challenge requires collaboration that extends beyond the AES to include North Africa, other Sahelian states, and coastal West Africa. The isolation of the AES from ECOWAS and the international community could ultimately limit its ability to achieve sustainable results.

The United Nations Security Council, during an informal interactive dialogue in July 2025, discussed strategies to harmonize approaches to combat the growing terrorist threat. Regional member states and Special Representative Simão expressed their support for the use of resolution 2719, which authorizes the use of assessed contributions from the United Nations to finance African Union-led peace support operations on a case-by-case basis. This openness could provide a more sustainable funding mechanism for peace operations in West Africa and the Sahel, but its implementation remains contingent on a political consensus that is currently absent.

The current situation reveals a fundamental contradiction: while the terrorist threat necessitates enhanced regional cooperation, political dynamics push towards fragmentation. Chad, a crucial security actor in the region due to its role in the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force combating Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province in the Lake Chad Basin, finds itself in a delicate position between these two poles. Its ability to maintain functional relations with both ECOWAS and the AES will be decisive for the future of regional cooperation.

The security escalation in the Sahel in 2026 is not solely the result of intensified terrorist activities but also of the failure of regional and international actors to establish a coherent and unified strategy. The competition between ECOWAS and the AES for security leadership risks creating vacuums that terrorist groups will inevitably exploit. Civilian populations, caught between often brutal government military operations and blind terrorist attacks, continue to pay the heaviest price for this strategic impasse.