The Sahel Facing a Triple Threat: the Expansion of JNIM, the Failure of Russian Engagement, and Regional Fragmentation

The security situation in the Sahel is experiencing an unprecedented deterioration at the beginning of the year 2026, characterized by three converging dynamics that are profoundly reshaping the geography of conflict in West Africa. The rapid expansion of Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the main al-Qaeda affiliate in the region, the manifest failure of the Russian security project, and the growing fragmentation of regional cooperation structures now constitute the three pillars of a crisis that threatens to spill far beyond traditional Sahelian borders.

The year 2024 marked a worrying turning point in JNIM's operational trajectory. According to data from the Global Terrorist Trends and Analysis Center, the group carried out 474 attacks during the year, representing a 177% increase compared to the 171 incidents recorded in 2021. Even more concerning, the number of victims exploded, rising from 1,828 in 2021 to 4,609 in 2024, reflecting a steady improvement in the lethality and tactical sophistication of the group. This spectacular progression not only reflects a quantitative intensification of operations but also reveals a profound qualitative transformation in JNIM's force projection capabilities, which now possesses extensive intelligence networks and a proven ability to conduct complex and coordinated assaults over vast territories.

In February 2026, JNIM demonstrated the extent of this evolution by launching a series of coordinated attacks over an entire week across eastern and northern Burkina Faso, highlighting the operational mobility of the group over immense territorial expanses. On March 22, the Malian Armed Forces retaliated by conducting two large-scale operations against armed terrorist groups, including a strategic ambush in Tabakoro, illustrating the ongoing intensity of clashes in the Mopti region. This action-reaction dynamic now characterizes the security daily life of an area where neither side manages to impose lasting dominance.

The geographical expansion of JNIM may be the most concerning aspect of this evolution. Initially anchored in northern and central Mali, the group has methodically extended its grip southward, transforming the border areas of Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria into new active jihadist fronts. The border triangle between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria has witnessed an explosion of violence: between 2024 and 2025, violent events involving jihadist groups in this region increased by 86%, while the number of deaths related to this violence surged by over 260%. This rapid progression marks a strategic shift: JNIM is no longer conducting isolated attacks but is establishing a lasting territorial presence, systematically exploiting the weakness of state governance, the porosity of borders, and the absence of regional security coordination.

The group has also publicly claimed a series of attacks along the border between Benin and Nigeria, notably in Basso, Wara, Nuku, and Karunji, marking its first recognized operations within Nigerian territory and clearly signaling its intention to project its power well beyond traditional Sahelian strongholds. This expansion relies on a skillful use of the natural terrain: forest belts and the W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) protected area complex provide the guerrilla network with bases for movement, concealment, and logistics that facilitate cross-border movements.

The structural conditions prevailing in these border areas have significantly strengthened JNIM's foothold. Limited government presence, reduced cross-border cooperation following withdrawals from ECOWAS, and the fragmented response capacity of local militias and security forces have created a permissive environment for jihadist expansion. The group has diversified its recruitment well beyond a single ethnic group, attracting fighters from the Fulani, Gourmantché, Djermas, Baribas, and other communities, while co-opting local bandits and exploiting community tensions rooted in conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as economic marginalization. This localized presence allows JNIM to maintain its ranks and strengthen networks that support both the mobility of fighters and resilience against counter-insurgency efforts.

Economically, jihadists, led by JNIM, have integrated into subsistence and illegal trade networks, using smuggling routes notably along the Niger and Mékrou rivers and fuel transport corridors linking northwestern Nigeria to Niger and Benin. These logistical connections have expanded the operational reach of fighters and fostered informal economies that indirectly link some civilian livelihoods to extremist activity through transport, taxation, and protection arrangements.

JNIM also maintains strategic ties with other Nigerian jihadist groups. Its connections with Jamaat Ansar al-Muslimeen fi Bilad al-Sudan (Ansaru) reinforce long-standing cooperation patterns, while neighboring groups like Boko Haram and the Mahmuda faction operate in overlapping areas, sometimes coordinating specific operations. This network of interconnected jihadist factions complicates the attribution and understanding of threats, highlighting a conflict environment where militants are increasingly visible, competitive, and operationally intertwined.

In the face of this jihadist expansion, Russian military engagement in the Sahel today reveals all its structural limitations. Since the initial deployment of 1,000 Wagner mercenaries to Mali in 2021, now increased to about 2,500 fighters, Moscow's military footprint has proven both too limited and too undisciplined to address the scale of the insurgent and jihadist threats faced by Bamako's leaders. More importantly, Russia has not learned the lessons of the French Barkhane Operation. Like the French deployment, Russian military operations have favored a war of attrition without any attempt to improve rural governance, engage in inter-community and sub-regional mediation efforts, or achieve a sustainable political settlement through local power-sharing arrangements. But in Moscow's case, these shortcomings have been amplified by the indiscriminate violence practiced by Russian forces.

Nowhere have the consequences of this violence been more apparent than during the joint Malian-Russian operation in 2023 aimed at retaking Kidal, a city in northern Mali that had served as a bastion for a series of Tuareg uprisings since the early 1960s and which, since the mid-2010s, had been occupied by a set of predominantly Tuareg separatist rebel groups. After an attack involving the use of Turkish-made strike drones, Malian and Russian forces took Kidal in less than two weeks. Initially, the rapid success of the operation seemed to validate the looser rules of engagement of the Russian army and the ruthless tactics of local forces. Yet, in the months that followed, it became clear that the security gains achieved by this victory had been offset by brutal attacks against civilians carried out by Malian government forces and their Russian partners. The tactics backfired: rather than fragmenting the opposition to Bamako, they unified it, creating a new tactical alliance between three secular Tuareg and Arab groups and several local jihadist networks, including the regional al-Qaeda affiliate, which the Tuareg and Arab groups had long kept at bay.

The same pattern has repeated itself in central and southern Mali as well as in neighboring Burkina Faso. The collective punishments inflicted by Russian and local government forces have regularly produced civilian casualty levels higher than those caused by rebel groups, fueling recruitment into the armed opposition. Some analysts have suggested that the withdrawal of Wagner fighters in mid-2025 and their ostensible replacement by the Africa Corps, managed by the Russian Ministry of Defense, could signal a shift to a more conventional and less brutal training and assistance mission. Yet, there is little evidence of this on the ground. In practice, the Africa Corps appears to have institutionalized the existing Wagner intervention model, along with its abuses. Reports from UN human rights experts and international media highlight Russia's continued involvement in Mali-led counter-terrorism operations, documenting numerous cases of torture, rape, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions of civilians.

Beyond its brutality and inability to convert tactical successes into strategic gains, Russia has failed to support, and in some cases has hindered, significant security cooperation among Sahelian states. In 2024, Kremlin officials triumphantly applauded the decision of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic and security cooperation grouping supported by the West, and to form their own Sahel States Alliance (AES). However, Moscow's subsequent support for the AES has been long on theatrics and short on actual resources and capabilities.

A telling example is the creation of a joint battalion of 5,000 men drawn from the three AES member states for border control and counter-terrorism; Moscow publicly supported the battalion but has done little to support it concretely. Despite Russia's promises to enhance partners' capabilities, the Africa Corps is unlikely to change this pattern since its personnel, composed of over 80% former Wagner fighters, lack the operational culture and experience necessary to forge the kind of strong personal relationships that have defined American and European security engagements and counter-terrorism training programs for decades. Throughout its existence, Wagner has achieved no major success in training local fighters or promoting unit cohesion wherever it has been deployed around the world.

Instead, Russia's regional integration attempts have primarily consisted of high-level exchanges between senior Russian military officials and Sahelian representatives. In the end, much is discussed, but little is delivered. Meanwhile, the lack of cooperation among Sahel countries, particularly on intelligence sharing and joint patrols, has given jihadist groups ample latitude to reorganize and expand across the porous state borders of the region. Increasingly, Russian personnel are paying the price. Over the past eighteen months, they have suffered a series of bloody setbacks and outright defeats on the battlefield, including a deadly ambush in the Tuareg city of Tinzaouaten in northern Mali during the summer of 2024, in which 46 Russian soldiers were killed.

As if these setbacks were not enough, Russia is also finding its influence diluted by the increased presence of other powerful actors in the Sahel security arena, including China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. None of these external states are attempting to replicate the Kremlin's model of deploying large numbers of military personnel in operations against insurgents and jihadists, and all are capable of cooperating with Russia while competing with it. Instead, they offer elements that Sahelian leaders find more reliable and affordable: intelligence systems, arms and training packages, infrastructure protection, and investments with fewer conditions.

Among these newcomers, Turkey poses the most direct, albeit still emerging, challenge to Russia's market share. Presenting itself as a third way for African states, a reliable alternative to both the West and Russia, Ankara has centered its appeal on its ability to offer low-cost yet effective Bayraktar drones and associated training. The message has resonated: since 2022, regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all acquired capable Bayraktar models for both surveillance and strikes, viewing them as more flexible and politically manageable counter-insurgency tools than foreign mercenaries. Additionally, Turkish security companies have established themselves in a terrain long dominated by Russian actors and have provided training to elite units tasked with protecting Malian leaders.

Turkey has exercised the same advantage in Niger, signing intelligence cooperation agreements with the junta in July 2024. Russia has also provided surveillance capabilities to the country. Both arrangements proved short-lived: by spring 2025, the Niamey regime ended its signal intelligence partnerships with Ankara and Moscow, citing the poor quality of their phone interception systems, a sharp reminder that Sahelian regimes are no one's clients. This same junta had expelled nearly a thousand American soldiers just months before briefly hosting the Turks and Russians.

China has also quietly expanded its footprint, focusing on protecting Chinese-owned investments and internal security rather than frontline combat. Throughout the region, it has deployed private security contractors and Chinese personnel to guard energy and mining projects, including the Agadem-Sèmè oil pipeline in Niger, which has been repeatedly attacked by anti-junta rebels. More broadly, Beijing links arms sales, police and gendarmerie training, and surveillance systems to infrastructure financing, offering Sahelian regimes an attractive package backed by significant capital and institutional support. In contrast, Russian companies and government entities generally lack the financial resources and business acumen necessary to compete head-on with their Chinese counterparts.

This complex situation raises fundamental questions about the future of Western engagement in the Sahel. While some American and European policymakers are tempted to rush back into the region to compete with Moscow for the favor of the ruling juntas, it is essential to resist this impulse. The most obvious mistake of Moscow has been to assume that heavily militarized solutions, without any effort to address the political and socio-economic drivers of instability, could work in the Sahel. For Russia, the harsh consequences of this misunderstanding have arrived more quickly due to its brute-force tactics, limited military footprint, and balkanizing approach to regional security.

As Frederick Ware and Andrew S. Weiss recently pointed out in Foreign Affairs, allowing Moscow to fully bear the political costs of its Sahelian failure represents the most prudent strategy for Washington and its European allies. Offering to re-establish security ties with Sahelian juntas could relieve pressure on Moscow by allowing it to claim that the responsibility for the increasingly precarious condition of the region actually lies with the West, not with Russia. A purely transactional approach would reward the juntas' extractive negotiation strategy, thereby perpetuating the corruption, poor governance, and economic inequalities that are precisely fueling the jihadist violence that Washington would like to see eradicated.

Russia's engagement in the Sahel increasingly resembles a quagmire that is bogging down, with few strategic returns beyond the limited spoils drawn from the region's extractive industries. In recent months, insurgent groups in the Sahel have become bolder and have expanded into parts of the region that were previously insulated from violence. It is now clear that Russia has not fulfilled its most important promise: to restore stability and protect regimes from internal challenges. The political costs of this failure for Russian ambitions in other parts of Africa and beyond are still unfolding, and Washington should allow Moscow to bear them fully.

The current situation in the Sahel illustrates a fundamental truth: the fragility of states in the region is not the result of insufficient external engagement but is rooted in long-standing domestic governance failures. Corruption, authoritarian rule, and predatory security establishments have regularly eroded the legitimacy of many regimes, placing limits on what outsiders can hope to achieve, especially when trying to support leaders who themselves are the source of many problems. For the United States and Europe, the way forward requires strategic patience and an investment in what Moscow has neither wanted nor been able to provide: trans-regional cooperation and governance capacities that address civilian suffering and build more sustainable security in the region.