The Sahel States Alliance reaches a strategic milestone with a unified force of 6,000 men

The military consolidation in the Sahel is experiencing unprecedented acceleration. On February 27, 2026, Burkina Faso officially announced that the unified force of the Sahel States Alliance (AES) is now fully operational, comprising 6,000 personnel and equipped with all types of military equipment. This announcement marks a decisive step in the reconfiguration of the regional security architecture, as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) still struggles to mobilize its own intervention force.

The creation of this unified force follows a strategic meeting held on February 26, 2026, in Ouagadougou, during which the ministers responsible for Defense, Security, Development, and Diplomacy from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger finalized the roadmap for the second year of the AES Confederation. Chaired by Burkina Faso's Minister of Defense, Célestin Simporé, this meeting defined the strategic orientations for 2026, with a particular focus on the pooling of military resources and the harmonization of diplomatic positions.

This strengthening of the AES comes in a particularly deteriorated security context. Since September 2025, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main branch of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel, has intensified its operations. Last July, the group launched coordinated attacks across western Mali, before imposing a fuel blockade destined for Bamako in September. More recently, between February 7 and 20, 2026, the Malian army conducted several airstrikes in the Ségou region, neutralizing 35 JNIM fighters near the Niger River. On February 20, a successful air operation was also carried out in the Djibouti sector, demonstrating the growing capability of Malian forces to conduct precision operations.

In the face of this ever-expanding threat, Mali has strengthened its logistical capabilities with the delivery, on February 11, 2026, of 57 vehicles to the police and the National Guard in Bamako. This provision is part of a broader effort to modernize internal security forces, complementing the strengthening of military capabilities. Furthermore, the Georges Namoano Military Academy in Pô, Burkina Faso, graduated 27 junior infantry officers on February 27 after five months of intensive training, thus reinforcing the pool of personnel for combat units.

The jihadist threat is no longer confined to the traditional borders of central Sahel. JNIM is now seeking to establish bases in coastal states to launch attacks towards Burkina Faso. In February 2026, the group crossed an alarming tactical threshold by launching its first kamikaze drone attack against the Togolese army in the Savanes region, in the north of the country. This development reflects a growing sophistication in the technical capabilities of jihadist groups. According to the Critical Threats Project, the lack of coordination in counter-terrorism efforts between Benin and its Burkinabe and Nigerien neighbors has likely created security gaps that facilitated JNIM's offensive southward.

It is precisely to respond to this expansion of the threat that ECOWAS is attempting to mobilize its member states. During a meeting of chiefs of staff held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and chaired by Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio, who currently holds the rotating presidency of the organization, participants agreed to deploy an initial force of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. This force aims to combat terrorism, including threats to coastal nations. The discussions highlighted the need for close coordination between ECOWAS and the Sahel States Alliance, despite the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the sub-regional organization.

The comparison of capabilities is revealing of the current dynamics. While the AES already has an operational force of 6,000 personnel, ECOWAS is still at the planning stage for a contingent three times smaller. This asymmetry reflects the structural difficulties of ECOWAS in transforming its ambitions into operational reality, but also the determination of the three AES countries to build an autonomous defense architecture, detached from traditional Western influence.

In Niger, security forces arrested 28 suspects during a counter-terrorism operation conducted between February 7 and 20 in the Tillabéri and Dosso regions. These arrests targeted cells linked to arms trafficking and improvised explosive device networks, demonstrating that the anti-terrorism struggle is not limited to kinetic operations but also encompasses a significant intelligence and dismantling component of jihadist logistical infrastructures.

The American engagement in the region is also undergoing notable evolution. Washington has deployed 100 military advisors to Nigeria to train local counter-terrorism forces, after losing its bases in Niger following the 2023 coup. This presence, although limited, reflects the United States' desire to maintain a security footprint in West Africa, even as it must now adapt to a deeply reconfigured geopolitical landscape.

Strategically, the rise of the AES is accompanied by an increasingly marked diplomatic alignment. Chad, which recently ended its defense cooperation agreement with France, may join the Alliance. In May 2025, the Chadian Minister of Communication had already stated that Chad's membership in the AES would be "a good thing." Similarly, the Guinean junta led by Mamady Doumbouya, which came to power through a coup like the current leaders of the three AES countries, is closely monitoring the evolution of this structure.

The year 2024 was particularly deadly for West Africa. According to the Global Terrorism Index, more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in this region, underscoring the scale of the security crisis. This alarming statistical reality justifies, in the eyes of many observers, the need for a rapid and coordinated regional response, whether it comes from the AES or ECOWAS.

The roadmap for the second year of the AES, which must now be submitted to the College of Heads of State for adoption, should specify the modalities for harmonizing diplomatic positions, facilitating trade exchanges, and developing strategic infrastructures among the three countries. Beyond the strictly military dimension, the AES aims to become an integrated structure capable of coordinating the economic and diplomatic policies of its members.

For security experts, the main question revolves around the ability of these two initiatives – that of the AES and that of ECOWAS – to coexist in a complementary rather than competitive manner. Some analysts advocate for coordination between the two organizations to avoid duplication and optimize the use of limited resources. Others believe that the political rift between the AES countries and ECOWAS is now too deep to allow for genuine operational cooperation.

The effective activation of the unified AES force nonetheless represents a symbolic and operational turning point. It demonstrates that the three countries have moved beyond mere declarations of intent to enter the realm of concrete implementation. This force, equipped with all types of military equipment according to Burkinabe authorities, should enable a quicker and more coordinated response to jihadist incursions, particularly in border areas where armed groups exploit coordination gaps between neighboring countries.

It remains to be seen whether this military consolidation will be accompanied by governance capable of addressing the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel: endemic poverty, marginalization of peripheral communities, institutional corruption, and lack of public services in vast territories. Without responses to these structural challenges, even the most powerful military force risks providing only a precarious and temporary stability.