The Sahel Under Pressure: Jihadist Escalation and the Regional Response to a Persistent Insurrection

The spectacular attack carried out on January 29, 2026, against the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey marked a turning point in the asymmetric war ravaging the Sahel. Thirty fighters from the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP) used armed drones, small arms, and mortars to assault the airport and Air Base 101, the headquarters of Nigerien drone operations and the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This two-hour nighttime offensive, although repelled with the elimination or capture of all assailants, achieved its strategic objective: to demonstrate the capability of terrorist groups to strike at the very heart of military and state infrastructures, despite the intensification of counter-terrorism operations in the region.

This incident illustrates a concerning reality: jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, notably Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and those linked to the Islamic State such as the ISSP, maintain an active and growing threat across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, while extending their influence towards the coastal states of West Africa. According to data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the region recorded 2,976 security incidents between January and August 2025, resulting in the deaths of 7,900 people. These figures reflect a continuous deterioration of the security situation, despite the promises of the military juntas in power in the three countries to restore order where democratic governments had failed.

In Mali, the economic blockade imposed by JNIM starting in September 2025 revealed the strategic vulnerability of Bamako. For three months, the group intercepted and burned fuel convoys coming from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, causing shortages that paralyzed daily life in the capital. Although the blockade eased in early 2026 without official explanation, its psychological impact lingers. The residents of Bamako now live in fear of a return of this economic strangulation strategy or an escalation towards direct attacks on urban infrastructures. This siege tactic, combined with the systematic use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drones, and landmines, reflects an increasing sophistication of jihadist methods aimed at eroding state authority.

The situation in Burkina Faso may be the most alarming of the three AES nations. JNIM conducted over 500 attacks there in 2025, according to the monitoring group SITE Intelligence, and now controls up to 60% of the national territory. The capital Ouagadougou is effectively encircled, while security forces and volunteer militias for homeland defense (VDP) remain confined near their bases in the rural regions of the Center-North, East, and Sahel. The devastating attack in Titao in February 2026, which claimed the lives of 80 soldiers and militiamen as well as at least 20 civilians, demonstrated the insurgents' ability to launch coordinated offensives against multiple targets simultaneously, including a military camp, a local market, and communication facilities.

In February 2026, JNIM also orchestrated a series of coordinated attacks across eastern and northern Burkina Faso over an entire week, highlighting the operational mobility of the group over vast territorial expanses. These simultaneous assaults significantly complicate defense efforts and force government forces to disperse their already limited resources. Analysts from African Security Analysis estimate that these dynamics are likely to persist, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger, where the presence and mobility of armed groups remain structurally entrenched.

In the Tillabéri region, southwest Niger, violence has reached record levels. According to ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), this region became the deadliest in the central Sahel in 2025, with the highest level of targeting of civilians, primarily by the ISSP, followed by the Nigerien army and then by JNIM. More than 50 civilians were killed in two major attacks in early 2026. In response to this resurgence, the Nigerien army intensified its counter-insurgency operations and declared a "general mobilization" in December, granting extensive powers to requisition civilians and resources. However, drone strikes have also resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians, acts that may constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law.

Human rights violations perpetrated by government forces and their allies constitute a troubling aspect of this conflict. In Mali, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Russian African Corps (formerly Wagner Group) have been involved in extrajudicial executions, indiscriminate airstrikes, rapes, sexual violence, looting, and acts of torture. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented hundreds of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, and enforced disappearances in 2025, and UN experts have stated that these disappearances could constitute crimes against humanity. Malian refugees in Mauritania have reported to humanitarian organizations and media abuses committed by the African Corps, including indiscriminate massacres, kidnappings, sexual violence, and torture.

In Burkina Faso, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), state-sponsored militias, have also been involved in serious crimes along ethnic lines, fueling intercommunal tensions and facilitating militant recruitment among pastoral communities. The increased use of airstrikes and drones, IEDs, and rocket and mortar fire by JNIM and the ISSP reflects an evolution in combat tactics that contributes to indiscriminate violence, civilian harm, and likely war crimes.

In the face of this escalation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has formally approved the activation of a regional peacekeeping force, with the goal of deploying 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026 to combat expanding terrorist networks. This regional force marks a significant shift from reactive diplomacy to deployable military action. Notably, it will be self-funded and directly controlled by ECOWAS members, allowing the region to regain strategic leadership in security matters against foreign powers such as France. The deployment will immediately benefit coastal states like Benin, Togo, and Nigeria, providing them with a collective defensive buffer against the southward expansion of ideological armed groups like JNIM and ISWAP.

However, this plan faces significant logistical challenges following the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have formed their own rival Alliance of Sahel States. For the regional force to succeed, ECOWAS will need to cooperate with the AES to ensure a coordinated response against jihadists. The absence of this coordination risks creating gray areas that insurgents can exploit, as they have already demonstrated their ability to take advantage of gaps in cross-border security arrangements.

The increasing repression of civic space in the three AES countries further complicates counter-terrorism efforts. In January 2026, the Burkinabè government announced measures to dissolve all political parties. The OHCHR continues to receive allegations of enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests. The New Humanitarian reported an increase in the arrests of humanitarian workers in recent months, targeting both national and international staff, while new policies introduced in 2025 restrict the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate effectively. In Mali, former Prime Minister Moussa Mara was sentenced in February 2026 to two years in prison for "discrediting the state" following a social media post expressing solidarity with detained political and civil society figures.

These repressive measures inhibit independent documentation and monitoring of violations and abuses, reducing the transparency necessary for accountability. The announced withdrawal of the International Criminal Court further weakens avenues for justice and redress for victims of heinous crimes. A UN special procedures group issued a statement in February on ongoing enforced disappearances in Mali, warning that the frequency, organized nature, and methods used suggest a systematic character.

The expansion of jihadist groups results from deep structural factors: weak governance, limited state presence, porous borders, and persistent socio-economic vulnerabilities. The blockades imposed by armed groups deliberately aim to disrupt local economies and undermine government authority, but they significantly worsen humanitarian conditions. Insurgents are also intensifying their community outreach and preaching efforts to present themselves as "protectors," in an attempt to consolidate their influence among local populations, often disappointed by the state's failure to ensure their security and well-being.

The security forces of the three countries face an immense challenge: to combat a sophisticated and adaptable insurgency while respecting international humanitarian law and human rights. The current militarized approach, which stigmatizes certain populations and relies on ethnic militias with questionable track records, risks creating dangerous escalation dynamics. The increased reliance on airstrikes and drones necessitates the establishment of strict guidelines to minimize civilian harm. Collaboration with ethnically aligned militias that have a history of human rights violations must cease, as it fuels intercommunal tensions and facilitates militant recruitment.

The challenge for the region is immense but not insurmountable. A holistic approach combining counter-terrorism that respects international law, socio-economic development, improved governance, and inclusive community dialogue offers the best chance to sustainably reduce the jihadist threat. The African Union should convene an extraordinary session to address the crisis across the region and publicly denounce abuses. Additional measures must be implemented to end the proliferation of arms, improve land management, and achieve political settlements in areas where the risks of atrocities are highest.

The military authorities of the central Sahel, with the support of national human rights commissions and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, must investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. They must cease threatening civil society, ensure that it can operate without fear of reprisals, and release all those who are arbitrarily detained. Cooperation with international human rights monitoring mechanisms, including the UN independent expert on the human rights situation in Mali, must be restored to ensure effective and impartial oversight.

The year 2026 represents a critical moment for the Sahel. The strategic choices made now by regional governments, international organizations, and development partners will determine whether the region can reverse the current trend towards increasing instability or whether it will continue to sink into a prolonged conflict with catastrophic humanitarian consequences.