The Sahelian Fracture: ECOWAS and AES Facing the Rise of Terrorism in West Africa

West Africa is going through a critical period of security reconfiguration, marked by the emergence of two competing military architectures and an unprecedented intensification of the jihadist threat. Developments in the last week of February 2026 strikingly illustrate this new geopolitical reality where regional division confronts a common enemy that knows no borders.

The meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of ECOWAS in Freetown, Sierra Leone, chaired by Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio, resulted in a major decision: the deployment of a regional force of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. This initiative responds to a manifest urgency, as jihadist groups, notably Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, continue their methodical expansion towards the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Recent attacks in Benin and Togo, where JNIM deployed kamikaze drones against the Togolese army in the Savanna region in February 2026 for the first time, demonstrate the growing sophistication of these terrorist organizations.

At the same time, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, held its own strategic ministerial meeting in Ouagadougou on February 25 and 26, 2026. Defense Ministers Sadio Camara (Mali) and Salifou Modi (Niger) joined their Burkinabe counterparts to approve the roadmap for the second year of the alliance's operation. This military confederation, which now has a joint force of 6,000 soldiers according to the latest estimates, represents a deliberate break from ECOWAS, from which the three countries withdrew after the expulsion of French forces from their respective territories.

This institutional bifurcation poses a major strategic challenge for regional counter-terrorism efforts. As analysts Michael Howard and Ethan Czaja pointed out in the Small Wars Journal, the lack of joint funding and coordination between ECOWAS and AES condemns their respective initiatives to limited effectiveness, if not failure, due to prohibitive startup costs. The security gaps created by this lack of coordination have already been exploited by JNIM, which has established bases in coastal states to launch cross-border attacks into Burkina Faso and Niger.

The situation in Burkina Faso illustrates the extent of the crisis. JNIM's operations have intensified since July 2025, with coordinated attacks in western Mali and a fuel blockade imposed on Bamako in September. Despite proclaimed Russian support for the AES joint force, including military instructors, arms deliveries, and the deployment of the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner), operational results remain mixed. A recent report from the Carnegie Endowment highlights that Moscow is pragmatically adapting its approach to the demands of its Sahelian partners, but this flexibility has not yet translated into a significant reversal of the security dynamics on the ground.

In Niger, terrorist violence continues with alarming intensity. By the end of February 2026, 25 people were killed by jihadist groups near the Malian border in the Tillabéri region, a historical epicenter of Nigerien insecurity. These incidents add to internal tensions, illustrated by gunfire and explosions that occurred in February near Niamey's main airport, close to Air Base 101, incidents whose exact circumstances remain unclear but testify to the persistent fragility of the military regime in power.

Nigeria, the demographic and economic giant of the region, is facing its own escalation of terrorism. An 86% increase in attacks in the states of Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, and Kwara has been recorded in recent months. The attack on the village of Woro in early February 2026, which claimed at least 35 lives, is among the deadliest of the year. In response to this deterioration, Washington announced the deployment of 100 American military advisors in northern Nigeria to train local counter-terrorism forces, marking a discreet but significant return of the United States to the region after setbacks in the central Sahel.

This American intervention occurs in a geopolitical context where Western powers are trying to maintain influence in the face of rising Russian power and the growing presence of China in Africa. However, it raises questions about long-term strategic coherence, especially as accusations from AES leaders against Western actors, notably France, regarding alleged support for regional armed groups fuel deep mistrust and complicate any future cooperation.

The expertise of security analysts converges on a troubling conclusion: without close coordination between ECOWAS and AES, the fragmentation of counter-terrorism efforts will continue to open opportunities for jihadist organizations. The summit of African defense chiefs held in Nairobi in 2025 had already emphasized the need to improve collective security in West Africa, but current political divisions make this cooperation increasingly unlikely.

Recent developments demonstrate that JNIM is pursuing a deliberate strategy of geographical expansion, seeking to create territorial continuity from the central Sahel to the Atlantic coast. Coastal states like Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire, historically spared from Sahelian jihadism, now find themselves on the front lines. The use of armed drones by JNIM in Togo marks a worrying tactical evolution, suggesting access to increasingly sophisticated technologies and know-how.

The proposed force of 2,000 soldiers by ECOWAS, while symbolically important, appears modest in the face of the scale of the challenge. By comparison, the French operation Barkhane had deployed up to 5,100 soldiers at the height of its engagement, with permanent bases in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and failed to sustainably stem the jihadist threat. The issues of funding, operational mandates, and the political will of contributing states remain central to the viability of this initiative.

The year 2026 thus promises to be a turning point for the security of West Africa. The ability of the two rival military blocs to overcome their political differences to confront the common jihadist enemy will determine not only the security future of the region but also its economic and social stability. Civilian populations, who bear the heaviest price of this violence, are waiting for concrete results rather than statements of intent. In this context, each day of institutional division represents an additional opportunity for terrorist groups to consolidate their positions and expand their territorial grip.