The Transatlantic Reordering: Europe's Path to Strategic Autonomy

The American defense strategy of 2026 marks a turning point in the transatlantic security architecture. With the clear demand from Pentagon strategy planner Elbridge Colby that Europe must "take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense," the era of automatic American dominance in European security policy effectively comes to an end. This development, which became evident at a meeting in Brussels in February 2026, is not a sudden turnaround but the logical consequence of a multi-year realignment of U.S. forces towards the Indo-Pacific.

The numbers speak for themselves: Europe has a collective gross domestic product of about 17 trillion US dollars and currently spends around 326 billion euros on defense – a significant increase from 218 billion euros in 2021. Nevertheless, the dependence on American military technology remains structurally entrenched. Between 2022 and 2024, about 51 percent of European arms procurement was for U.S. systems, a marked increase from 28 percent in the period from 2019 to 2021. This development contradicts all statements about increased European defense cooperation and highlights the discrepancy between political rhetoric and operational reality.

The NATO summit in 2025 set new standards with the goal of spending at least 3.5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035. Germany, traditionally cautious in defense matters, plans to increase its spending to nearly 3.5 percent of GDP by 2029, which corresponds to over 100 billion euros annually. Berlin aims to build "the strongest conventional army in Europe" – an ambitious goal that elicits mixed feelings among some European neighbors. The historical dimension of this rearmament cannot be overstated: For 2026, 377 billion euros are earmarked for new military procurements in the German budget alone.

Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have already exceeded the 3.5 percent target in 2025 – a decade ahead of the agreed deadline. These Baltic and Nordic states, along with Poland, do not perceive the Russian threat as a theoretical construct but as an existential reality. The geographical proximity to Russian military power, whose defense budget is around 100 billion US dollars but gains strength through wartime mobilization and asymmetric strategies, sharpens the awareness of the urgency for credible deterrence.

In February 2026, the five largest European defense powers announced a joint program in Krakow to develop cost-effective air defense systems. Within twelve months, autonomous drones and missiles are to be brought to production readiness. This initiative addresses one of the most critical weaknesses of European armed forces: the ability to cope with the growing threat from unmanned systems. The Ukraine conflict has vividly demonstrated how drone swarms and precision artillery have changed warfare. Europe must translate these lessons into industrial capabilities.

The European Defense Fund provides a total of 8.8 billion euros for the period from 2021 to 2027 to promote joint research and development projects. About a quarter of the budget for 2026 will flow into emerging technologies that will shape the future battlefield: artificial intelligence, quantum technology, cyber and electronic warfare. Additionally, 1.7 billion euros are available for military mobility – an often underestimated but essential factor for the deployment of troops and material within Europe.

However, structural deficits are evident. Procurement remains largely nationally organized, leading to fragmentation, inefficiency, and a lack of interoperability. Instead of developing real European alternatives, many governments assemble U.S.-designed systems such as Patriot air defense systems or F-35 fighter jets in Europe. This strategy may temporarily increase production capacities and be interpreted as a signal to Washington, but in the long term, it perpetuates technological dependence and limits strategic agency.

The Munich Security Conference 2026 highlighted the issue: Despite repeated commitments to invest "better, together, and European," the drive to increase defense readiness has reinforced old patterns. The European defense industry faces the paradoxical situation that rising defense budgets do not automatically lead to a strengthening of indigenous capacities. The lack of European "off-the-shelf" alternatives is partly a technical problem but also a reflection of decades of neglect of strategic industrial policy.

NATO 3.0, as it is referred to in some comments, requires a fundamental recalibration. Secretary General Mark Rutte praised the "great shift" in defense spending but simultaneously warned that Europe should "keep dreaming" if it believes it can defend itself without the U.S. This statement from January 2026 illustrates the dilemma: Europe must take on more responsibility but will remain dependent on American capabilities for the foreseeable future – particularly in areas such as strategic airlift, satellite reconnaissance, precision munitions, and nuclear deterrence.

Poland's contract with the South Korean company Hyundai Rotem for 820 K2 tanks, the production and maintenance of which will be relocated to Poland starting in 2026, illustrates another trend: European states are diversifying their suppliers and seeking partnerships beyond the transatlantic space. This is pragmatic on one hand, as South Korean systems often offer a better price-performance ratio and are available more quickly than European homegrown developments. On the other hand, this further fragments the already fragmented European defense landscape.

The economic implications of this rearmament wave are complex. The aggregated budget deficit of the EU27 is estimated by the European Commission to be 3.4 percent of GDP for 2026. The massive defense investments are taking place in a fiscally strained environment. At the same time, these expenditures could stimulate economic growth in the short term by creating jobs and utilizing industrial capacities. However, in the long term, it remains unclear whether Europe is laying the foundation for a competitive, innovative defense industry or merely replacing one costly dependency with another.

Global defense spending reached 2.63 trillion US dollars in 2025, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), an increase from 2.48 trillion the previous year. In real terms, spending grew by 2.5 percent, driven particularly by Europe and the Middle East. Europe is shouldering an increasing share of this burden, but the question remains: Will this effort lead to strategic autonomy or merely to larger arsenals under continued dependence?

The coming years will show whether Europe can manage the transition from a contribution-oriented to a leadership-oriented role in its own defense. The financial resources are available, and political will is growing. What is lacking is a coherent industrial policy strategy that prioritizes European defense cooperation over national egoisms and long-term investments in key technologies. The alternative would be a militarily rearmed but strategically dependent and fragmented European Union – a scenario that would not serve the security interests of Europe or the transatlantic partnership.